

# Building Bridges

Baseline Report on  
Community Youth  
Interfaith Action  
towards Countering  
Violent Extremism

Mombasa | Nairobi | Kilifi

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## ***Publishers***

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## Executive summary

Violent extremism, Insurgency and Terrorism have become common global insecurity phenomena. Horn of Africa has seen an increase of 'extremist' groups with the most prominent being the 'Al-Shabaab'. The increased presence and complexity of non-ideological violent gangs catalyse and confound what is perceived as locally bred 'extremism'.

Consequently, this has evoked different global and state responses.

<sup>1</sup>In the recent past, most responses to violent extremism were political and security oriented. This approach proved to be counterproductive as it portrayed extremist as Martyrs therefore fuelling the recruitment and radicalization. Extremist groups take advantage of historical grievances, security, social and economic fault lines. <sup>2</sup> Countering Violent Extremism is a field that is emergent and an alternative to the 'hard' approaches. Countering violent extremism is a softer counter terrorism approach that engages developmental dimensions that render individuals and communities vulnerable to extremism. It seeks to address the social and political drivers. CVE programming has gained prominence in Kenya especially in the Coast, North Eastern and in the major cities such as Nairobi where there are significant numbers of Muslim communities

and have experienced violent attacks. This report deliberates community perceptions about Youth's vulnerabilities to the drivers of violent extremism, community resilience in regards to government-community relationships and interfaith relationships in the larger context of the nature of civic engagements in the respective locations.

The counties of Mombasa, Kilifi (Kilifi North and South) and Nairobi (Shauri Moyo and South C) exhibit similar patterns in community perceptions on inequalities and grievances such as youth civic engagement and tolerance of the other yet the Youth respondents register different responses when it comes to their own lived experiences. The research therefore offers a chance to reflect on popular narratives that reinforce stigmatization of the Muslim / Somali communities. Inferences such as; because most Muslim Youth's do not have Identity cards therefore they feel marginalized and lack opportunities to exercise their civic rights, therefore they are susceptible to recruitment and radicalisation-often generalised as a collective community at risk. <sup>3</sup>

Melissa Finn, Bessma Momani, Michael Opatowski, Michael Opondo 2016 Journal for Deradicalisation Youth belonging in Kenya, consequently are



Alshabab sympathizers or likely to be recruited or radicalized to take up arms themselves is Contrary to our findings. Findings suggest that youth are more tolerant amongst peers of different faiths and ethnicities but this does not reflect in larger community relations which are characterized by fear and suspicion. There is no single way of predicting or assessing an individual's vulnerability to violent extremism and drivers are not linear but complex and overemphasizing on Unemployment may lead to unbalanced interventions. On a general case Kenya employment indices show that employment is a general concern for most Youths and therefore, this does not therefore mean that all Youths without jobs are at risk of recruitment and radicalization. <sup>4</sup>

### A summary of the findings; CVE knowledge

Most Religious leaders and Government official respondents exhibited a fair knowledge of CVE programming and said that they felt confidently equipped to intervene for individuals at risk of recruitment or radicalization.

Perceptions about who is at risk of joining the path of violence, differed

with religion, age and profession. The communities exhibited a belief that unemployment was a leading factor to Youth joining violent extremist groups followed by religious/ ideological influence.

CVE programming vocabulary is relatively common among respondents, this though does not indicate lack of difficulty in terminology development and application in policy and academia language

### Security

Most respondents who are government officials said that their number one concern was security and identified the Youth who are unemployed as the most vulnerable to crime and violent extremism

Most respondents reported low trust on government officials, making allegations that the police used excessive force, targeted and harassed especially Muslims and Somali communities and were engaged in extra judicial killings especially in Mombasa and Shauri Moyo.

Most youth respondents indicated feeling safe in their communities and though they held that police used excessive force, the numbers of those who had personally experienced police harassment was relatively lower.

## Community relationships

Christian respondents shared that cases of violent extremism had changed the way they saw other members of the communities especially Muslims.

Most Religious leaders' respondents identified cohesion among people of different faiths as a concern and those engaged in interfaith programs had peace and security as part of their Commitment.

Willingness to interact with others from different religion and ethnicity does not necessarily indicate community resilience

Youth respondents exhibited more tolerance for the 'other' than their older patrons and matrons. Though the levels of suspicion had risen because of the increase of violent extremism cases, the young people had a positive threshold compared to other key informants of different ages.

## Muslim/ Somali Community Profiling;

Discrepancies in perception and narratives is also true when the issue of Muslim communities profiling comes up. The government officers do not identify that as a key problem

and only 16% of them identify this is a link, cause or effect to violent extremism.

Contrary to popular narratives, life experiences and reports police harassment remains a serious concern among many Kenyan youth, it is especially intrusive for Somali Kenyans who routinely confront bureaucratic inefficiencies and police profiling as subjects of heightened suspicion when tending to the demands of daily life. Youth Respondents in all research locations described police harassment, corruption and extortion as common occurrences, and alleged cases of forced disappearances and extra-judicial killings by security forces especially those of Young Muslim / Somali "looking" men.<sup>1</sup>

## Savings groups:

Most respondents affirm savings groups as a sustainable economic empowerment strategy for the Youth and public in general but provide that it should be complimented with other economic empowerment strategies such as entrepreneurship, vocational training and seed grants.

<sup>1</sup> Human Rights Watch, (12 January 2012). Al-Shabaab is now taking advantage of Kenyan security officers' outdated belief that all AlShabaab are Somali looking by infiltrating non-Somali members into the province to carry out attacks.

When asked if an interfaith savings group would be a sustainable interfaith cooperation activity most respondents answered in the affirmative.

## **Drivers of violent extremism by location**

Respondents in Mombasa and Kilifi identified religious influence and political grievances as the major drivers to violent extremism with a large number of religious leaders alleging that houses of worship were likely places of radicalization and recruitment.

While a majority number of Youth said that they were not satisfied with their wages and found work difficult to find, among whom were breadwinners in their households most of them said that they would not consider joining a violent extremist group for any amount.

Youth respondents indicated identifying with religious community, contrary to what is popular narrative majority of them affirmed reading the scriptures for themselves even as they followed the interpretation of their religious leaders.

Discriminatory and suspicious ethnic and religious attitudes were identified as fuelling locally bred conflicts and violence that made youth vulnerable to radicalization and/or recruitment to violent groups.

Fear and Mistrust are leading psychological factors that predispose individuals to extreme ideological ideas and reinforcement of Us Vs Them narratives that violent extremist groups exploit.

Respondents from both locations identified youth as lacking stability and relatively deprived of opportunities to participate in civic and economic activities, on the other hand Youth respondents exhibited a positive outlook on politics including elections but a majority of them did not feel represented in the government.

Most respondents expressed openness to having returnees integrated back in the community and showed trust in the judicial process to execute justice in the cases of violent extremism.

## **Social media engagement**

Religious leaders' respondents exhibited social media savviness that went beyond having an account but that they also used the platforms as a place of influence for their followers and as a place to garner more followers. Most of them had Youth as majority followers and used the platforms to discuss and comment on present issues.

Most Respondents in the focus group discussions (FGDs) indicated awareness of violent extremist

online spaces that target Youth for recruitment and radicalization.

Social media could be used to counter the narratives and youth should be vigilant not to be lured into recruitment by peers.

Many respondents felt that a strong interfaith movement could help promote cohesion along ethnicity

The Youth use social media as their primary source of information and interaction. Social media trends have significant effects on group and individual behavior.

### **Introduction:**

Youth from specific communities seem to be more vulnerable to recruitment into violent extremism and radicalization that leads to terrorism (VERLT) than others. Because of stereotyping and pigeon-holing, members of these communities often face discrimination, profiling and prejudice – presenting a practical obstacle to the engagement of these youth against VERLT. Another common narrative has been that poor, un-educated youth who are unable to live up to their true potential are disenfranchised and therefore vulnerable to VERLT. It is believed that because of their perception of disenfranchisement, these youths are more likely to seek and find acceptance and

appreciation in radicalized groups. (AAYMCA proposal and concept note)

In order to effectively commit to the elimination of VERLT, the YMCA is investing more in prevention measures targeting young people, while including them in shaping of such measures. The YMCA believes that promoting cooperation and working towards the encouragement of mutual values of peace and stability will pave the way for long-term change. The YMCA also believes that without the participation of youth, any efforts towards reduction and eventual elimination of violent extremism will not succeed.

Desk review indicated that a comprehensive context research papers and policy briefs on the drivers and factors drawing youth to join violent extremist groups in Kenya and the region informed the YMCA's CVE future programming. However, gender analysis of the counter-terrorism strategies in the country is yet to be done, but this research paper alludes to the community perceptions on the role and impact of violent extremism on women and girls.

### **Methodology:**

The study design and methodology of this research was designed in consultation with the AAYMCA



staff in programming, management implementing partners and the community engagement working group. Six (6) enumerators from each county were trained on digital mobile data collection tools, interview skills and introduction to CVE.

The research used a mixed-method approach, first approach; drawing on key informant interviews (KIIs) collected using mobile data collection tool; Open Data Kit (ODK) and descriptive provided for each KII survey (analysis) second approach; focus group discussions (FGDs) collected using audio recorder that were then transcribed. Third approach; Desk Review on The National and County countering violent extremism strategies.

Five (5) KIIs and Six 6 FGDs took place in each research locale and the respondents included men and women, and female and male youth from different socio-economic backgrounds. Religious leaders, Higher institutions faculty members, official governments were the key KIIs. Efforts were made to ensure that each group was as representative and as inclusive as possible, while reflecting the religious and ethnic demographics of the wider population from which respondents were drawn. Data collection was done face to face and took 16 days to complete in the 3 locations; Mombasa, Kilifi and

Nairobi.

### **Sampling:**

The target respondent for this study was 750 Key informant. Due to the limitations mentioned below, 712 took part in the interview. This was a convenient sample as consultations were with the AAYMCA respective to time and cost implications. They were previous identification of beneficiaries.

### **Sampling Techniques:**

A simple random sample technique (SRS) was used to select respondents of this study. SRS was suitable for this study because it is a subset of a statistical population in which each member of the subset had an equal probability of being chosen.

### **Limitation:**

The limitations to be considered during the interpretation of these research findings are several. That the research was conducted during a heated over extended electioneering period that had looming threat of insecurity and therefore religious and ethnic differences were more ardently pronounced. The presence of police officers and alleged police brutality as a major election narrative may have influenced the nuance of the responses in

the questions investigating police relationships with the Youth.

Violent extremism as a field has vocabulary that is hard and difficult to translate in other languages, Swahili was mostly used as a target language but additionally in the case of Shauri Moyo FDGs, there is a lot of use of sheng which is a combination of English and Swahili popular in the urban areas of Nairobi. There is possibility that significant meaning was lost. The research contained questions of high sensitivity modules and respondents might have withheld information for fear of perceived consequences.

Though the four locations exhibit similar drivers of extremism, though in different degrees of occurrence and relationship, it must be noted that these locations have their own socio economic dynamics and political patterns. It must be also be noted that the samples do not seek to generalize the experiences of all populations in these locations.

The Muslim population in Kenya is registered at 10%, that withstanding efforts were made to ensure a balance in representation in all the interviews and FDGs.

### **Justification:**

Tolerant rhetoric promotes peaceful coexistence and inhibits community crevices that violent extremists

groups use to lure sympathisers and recruit from communities. The AYYMCA seeks to create a program that engages interfaith community about the different facets of violent extremism. The findings of this research will be used to design a Youth appropriate program that fosters interfaith relationships and provide opportunities to explore sustainable, Economic activities.

### **Context:**

In the recent past, Kenya has been victim of terrorist attacks. Some of the major attacks are: The August 7, 1998, when al-Qaeda attacked the United States of America Embassy in Nairobi, killing 213 people. The attack happened simultaneously with the bombing of the United States of America Embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, which killed 12 people On November 28, 2002, Al-Qaeda militants attacked the Israeli-owned Paradise Hotel in Mombasa, Kenya, killing 15 people. Al-Shabaab terrorist attacks on churches escalated in 2012.<sup>5</sup>

Al-Shabaab activities within Kenya (2013–16) have become much more sophisticated and lethal, as is clear from the Westgate shopping mall attack in Nairobi in 2013, the Lamu County attacks in June and July 2014, the Mandera bus and quarry attacks in November 2014, and the Garissa University attack in April 2015. In

the northeast region, as elsewhere in Kenya, al-Shabaab has been able to exploit a combination of political realities, socioeconomic factors, and individual characteristics that render many people—and youth in particular vulnerable for recruitment.<sup>6</sup>

The rise of violent extremism in the Horn of Africa region is associated with the emergent regional security threat posed by Somalia's al-Shabaab. Kenya, Somalia's neighbor to the southeast, has been particularly vulnerable to the group's activities and has been the target of most of its attacks outside Somalia. Within Kenya, al-Shabaab has had the most success in the northeast, the coast of Kenya and the low income urban in recruiting new members, launching attacks, and spreading an extremist ideology.<sup>7</sup>

In 2012, it was reported that al-Shabab was attracting a large number of Kenyan converts to Islam. In December 2014, it was estimated that Kenyans comprised around 25 percent of al-Shabab. These Kenyan converts are typically described as “young” and “zealous” and can be difficult to detect and monitor since they are able to blend easily into the general population. As of mid-2016, school heads in local communities were concerned that Al-Shabab militants had infiltrated their institutions, influencing students and recruiting some to their cause.<sup>8</sup>

## Definition of Terms:

Violent extremism' is rarely defined: neither the United Nations nor the European Union has an official definition. USAID defines it as “advocating, engaging in, preparing, or otherwise supporting ideologically motivated or justified violence to further social, economic or political objectives”<sup>9</sup>

## Countering Violent Extremism

Defined as the use of non-coercive means to dissuade individuals or groups from mobilizing towards violence and to mitigate recruitment, support, facilitation or engagement in ideologically motivated terrorism by non-state actors in furtherance of political objectives.<sup>10</sup>

## Counter Terrorism:

refers to all measures aimed at thwarting terrorist plots and dismantling terrorist organisations. This typically includes the arrest of suspected members, the disruption of terrorist attacks, recruitment, propaganda, travel, and logistics, countering terrorist finance, the protection of potential targets, and the pooling and exchange of data with foreign countries. In nearly all countries, counter-terrorism is the primary responsibility of law enforcement, intelligence services,

and – in some cases – the military<sup>11</sup>

### **At risk individuals and groups:**

These are individuals and groups in an environment that has high recruitment to radicalisation or a high concentration of risk factors.

Radicalization is a process by which an individual or group comes to adopt increasingly extreme political, social, or religious ideals and aspirations that reject or undermine the status quo or reject and/or undermine contemporary ideas and expressions of freedom of choice. Radicalization is therefore seen as the process that leads to violence which, in the final analysis is what distinguishes a terrorist from other extremists.<sup>12</sup>

**Push factors:** these are factors of a negative social, cultural and political features of one's societal environment that aid in "pushing" vulnerable individuals onto the path of violent extremism<sup>13</sup>

**Pull factors:** these are positive characteristics and benefits of an extremist organization that "pull" vulnerable individuals to join. These factors can independently have an effect on an individual or several factors can overlap and have a cumulative impact.<sup>14</sup>

### **The project theory of change:**

YMCA is intending to design and

implement interfaith programs believing that bringing people from different cultures will help prevent radicalization.

### **Gender and violent extremism:**

Gender should be understood as a social, not physiological, construction: Femininity and masculinity, the terms that denote one's gender, refer to a complex set of characteristics and behaviours prescribed for a particular sex by society and learned through the socialization process.<sup>15</sup>

Public and international discourse on the debate for gender equality focuses on the oppression of women, as it rightly should. However, the impact of traditional male stereotypes on how women are viewed in conflict also need to be studied. In Kenya, studies have not been keen establish the extent at which recruitment and radicalization affects women, as the notion that women are weak and therefore victims of violence pervades the field of CVE as the in the larger of peace and conflict. Popular community perceptions uphold the notion that young men fuel the rise of extremist groups.<sup>16</sup>

Generally, individuals are more likely to choose violent action if they face challenges to fulfilling their societal roles, one can expect the presence

of such barriers to be illustrative of a greater vulnerability to radicalization. Young Men are most likely to resort to illicit behaviour to achieve a sense of dominance over their surroundings, as well as vent their frustrations with the status quo but so are women although on relatively lower degrees. <sup>17</sup>Globally, the main drivers of women's involvement in violent extremism and terrorism are strong relationship ties (family, kinship and romantic), grievances regarding their economic and socio-political circumstances, and a commitment to and/or the oppression of certain religious or ideological beliefs. <sup>18</sup> Respondents in this the FDG identified women as possible recruiters although reinforcing the gender stereotypes of caregivers, whether as brides to the militia, 'recruiter –mothers' or just women who had lost relatives in the hands of government or other militia. According to the respondents, most women were lured into joining the violent extremist groups because of leading family ties that provided contact, passively or actively. Religious miseducation was also cited as a leading cause for women to join violent groups.

**“For revenge after they feel they have been subjected to injustices like killing of their close family members like children or**

**husband by security organs of the government”** Respondent from Mombasa. <sup>19</sup>

In April 2015, three girls - one Tanzanian and two Kenyans - were arrested while allegedly headed to Somalia to join al-Shabaab. Reports differ as to their motivations: some claim that the girls intended to become suicide bombers and jihadists, while others contend that they 'were lured by recruiters to be concubines or "what is commonly known as Jihadi Brides"’<sup>20</sup>

### Youth and Violent Extremism:

There is no one direct cause in personal development that leads absolutely to violent behaviour or attitudes. Rather, there are characteristics of an individual's psychosocial development and physical environment that impose stresses, which increase the risk that he or she will perpetrate or experience violence. The accumulation of these stresses, or risk factors, is associated with an increased tendency of being a victim or a perpetrator of violence. <sup>21</sup>

If the notion of youth can be seen, to a large extent, as corresponding to a transition from childhood to adulthood, then it can be argued that a youth crisis is a situation where this transition is blocked, and the perspectives for transition to full



adult status are seen as shrinking. Most Youth in developing countries identify going to school to find employment as priority. When this is not feasible, their expectations against minimal social change gives rise to “idle and disillusioned youth”

The presence of a “youth bulge” in a population has been documented as an indicator of imminent societal unrest<sup>22</sup>. 80% respondents who were Young people indicated not being part or taking part in community Baraza’s while 50% of them did not feel represented in the government. (baraza is a name for neighborhood/community meetings) Young people who are yet to achieve the milestones that define culturally defined adulthood become frustrated and seek validation by joining violent extremist groups, which give them an adult-like status through responsibility, purpose, and often financial compensation.

*“Lack of a sense of belonging and wanting to be somewhere in a certain group. Wanting to be armed and feel powerful. Wanting to belong somewhere to feel complete”.*<sup>23</sup> a respondent in Shauri Moyo Nairobi.

## **Religion and Violent Extremism:**

Studies on the impact of religion on Youth provide that religious participation fosters identity

development which is a critical aspect of youth development. In multicultural societies such as Kenya religious participation gives young people the opportunity to reflect on their own beliefs and values as they develop worldviews about other faith traditions and cultures.<sup>24</sup> 131 out of the 146 youth interviewed indicated belonging to a religion or subscribing to a faith tradition, of these 92 % indicated further that they read the holy books for themselves indicating self-determination for the faith that they held. Kenya has 83% of its population (Protestant 47.7%, Catholic 23.4%, other Christian 11.9%), Muslim 11.2%.<sup>25</sup> Many studies show that religion serves as a type of support in terms of providing emotional, social, and sometimes financial resources. Indeed, religious students and their organizations have forged the backbone of social activism on a variety of causes in Kenya. While today’s students are often characterized as inactive and apathetic on social causes, this is not an accurate depiction. And, much of the volunteering and activism on college campuses is forged in religious organizations by religious students. Most studies of the effects of religion on success focus on personal religiosity or on religious participation, and these indicators are likely to produce positive effects.<sup>26</sup> Finally, the narrowing of social networks and the restriction

of information sources advocated in sectarian and fundamentalist religious groups is associated with prevalence of violence. There are two types of religious conflicts. In inter-religious conflicts, the conflict parties differ in their religious affiliation - for example, Christians and Muslims. This can overlap with ethnic identities, and it is clear that heterogeneous societies are more vulnerable to triggering conflicts along these lines <sup>27</sup>. Kenya is prone to ethnic conflicts which are borne of a myriad factors, key among them is what has now been identified as the dimension of community identities, which is closely reacted to the issue of land and borders. The ethnic differences fuel the **‘them-and-us’** attitude. This attitude is an enabling ground for violent extremist groups that seek to validate community grievances by creating proxy conflicts which is prevalent among areas with <sup>28</sup> other factors leading to conflict (*Check Religious Leaders Survey Descriptive in the annex*).

### **Key informant perspectives on Youth and Risk Factors:**

#### **i) Religious leaders:**

More than 80 percent of the world’s population identify as religious, and most of the world’s violent conflicts occur in countries with the most youthful populations.<sup>29</sup>

Religious leaders’ incitement to hatred, hostility and violence is prevalent in Africa, as it is in all regions; incitement has preceded and accompanied violence and atrocity crimes in countries affected by conflict and violent extremism, as well as in countries considered to be relatively peaceful. The targets of incitement have included communities defined by their religious and ethnic identity or political affiliation, as well as women.<sup>30</sup>

According to the research findings in all the study areas both youth and religious actors, despite having what are often shared objectives and values of peace and cohesion but a mutual sense of differing priorities, such as employment, are eager for more meaningful engagement with the other. Trust needs to be built between youth leaders and religious leaders. The religious leaders interviewed indicated difficult in reaching the vulnerable youth. This was mostly because of overriding perceptions that the Youth are obstinate and unwilling to follow instruction and the over simplified narratives that because the Youth are lacking in jobs and livelihood, therefore are likely to join the violent extremist groups.

The majority of the religious leaders said they had relatively balanced congregations. 36% of the religious

leaders affirmed that most of their congregants were Youthful- Of the interviewed religious leaders, 91% of them said they had outreach programs for the Youth and among them 42% dealt with the Issues of peace and Security.

## **ii) Interreligious Leaders**

Among the religious leaders interviewed 22 % were Young Clerics. This is a tangible number for community engagement but contrary to popular youth-focused peace building programs, tend to target participants working in secular-oriented civil society organizations, often excluding young religious leaders, such as young clerics or imams, inadvertently. Similarly, religion focused peace building programs also tend to exclude youth. Little to no programming brings youth into religious peace building, focusing instead on formal religious leaders. This exclusion results in limited space for young religious leaders or actors in international peace building programs and by extension interfaith or violent extremism programs.

In the interviews among the 109 respondents only 2 said that the membership of their respective interfaith organization was made up of Youth, in contrast 61 % of the respondents indicated that the Youth were their target groups for Peace,

interfaith and countering violent extremism programs. Largely, most peace building programs aiming to foster a connection between youth and religious actors convene youth around the identity of being young, this is simplification of the identity “youth” is overly considered over religious or other identities. Youth are often viewed as participants into religious peace building programs. Intergenerational religious/ peace building programs that bring youth leaders together with older religious actors are rare.<sup>31</sup>

## **iii) Higher Learning Faculty Members:**

The school is an artificial institution set up for the purpose of socialization and cultural transmission. The school can be regarded as a formally constituted community as opposed to mutual communities. The school represents a formal and conscious effort by the society to socialize its young. It does this through the content of the curriculum and co-curricular activities. They also socialize the values that they communicate to the young. Teachers also act as models for students.<sup>32</sup>

The study engaged 152 members of higher learning institutions drawn from the 4 locations. Among the 76 of the respondents taught in Humanities and Social sciences with

17 instructing in Peace and Security Studies, 62 of these indicated tackling violent extremism as part of their research while 41% of the lecturers offered that students in their classes inquired of violent extremism or subjects related to Violent extremism. See Appendix (*Faculty survey Descriptive*).

In contexts such as the study areas where violent extremist groups claim to operate in the name of religious or otherwise identified communities, it is important for institutions to provide learners with accurate and relevant knowledge and with skills that encourage and facilitate intercultural dialogue. This includes teaching about cultural diversity within learners' societies and giving facts about different religions and different worldviews. The class representations of religious affiliations reflect those of the national proportions 5: 1 Christians: Muslims.<sup>33</sup>

Internet has become of particular and growing concern to countries throughout the world. It is associated with the phenomenon of so-called lone terrorists or self-starters, who seemingly act on their own without any clear outside direction or support. Lecturers and teachers cannot stop massive communication efforts directed at learners coming from charismatic violent extremist leaders, but they can help learners

engage responsibly with media and information systems as well as develop the analytical skills that allow them to critically evaluate information and media content coming from various information sources.<sup>34</sup> Among the respondents 105 of the lecturers said that they spoke both formally and informally to their students about social media and civil etiquette; 72% of those claimed that they were aware of the online radicalization as a social media danger for the Youth in their institution (*Check Faculty Survey Descriptive in the Annex*).

#### **iv) Government officials:**

Community engagement by and with the government, with its focus on establishing police-public partnerships between the police, other public authorities and communities for proactive problem solving, can make a tangible and durable contribution to broader strategic efforts to prevent violent extremism. Research shows that the manner in and degree to which community –police relationships benefit countering violent extremism efforts depend on the level of trust and co-operation that already exists between the police/ government officials and the public.<sup>35</sup>

A case in point is the aftermath of September 2013 Westgate terror attack in Nairobi, Kenya, where the

police launched Operation “Linda Nchi” in an effort to flush out suspected al-shabaab operatives from the Eastleigh suburb. However, residents and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) protested that the operation was characterized by ethnic profiling, unlawful detention and deportations. At the close of the operation, all suspects were released by the court for lack of evidence (infringement of the residents’ fundamental human rights, brutality and wide-spread bribery (IPOA, 2014) <sup>36</sup> Contrastingly the officers indicated high confidences on the level of trust communities held for them and vice versa. 78% of Key Informant Government official respondents, identified Young Jobless Youth as the group that is mostly at risk of radicalization and recruitment by violent extremist against the options with only 7% relating Muslim Youth as probable group at risk. Due to the sensitivity of the interview, the enumerators did not prod for identification, but without disclosing the segment of population they were speaking about, 54% of government officials pointed out that cases of violent extremism in Kenya had affected how they viewed specific communities (Check Government officials: *‘Has violent conflict changed the way you think about other groups of people?’-Descriptive*)

### **SDGS and Violent Extremism:**

The SDGs aim to significantly reduce all forms of violence, and work with governments and communities to find lasting solutions to conflict and insecurity. Strengthening the rule of law and promoting human rights is key to this process, as is reducing the flow of illicit arms and strengthening the participation of developing countries in the institutions of global governance.<sup>37</sup>

Poverty can be said to be the other side of wellbeing which is not only concern about income, but rather it encompasses the inability to own a piece of land, have access to credit, health care service, quality education, exposure to violence, external economic shock, natural hazard, voicelessness and social exclusion (Yekini, Rufai, Adetola, Akinwole and Ojo, 2013).<sup>38</sup>

High levels of armed violence and insecurity have a destructive impact on a country’s development, affecting economic growth and often resulting in long standing grievances that can last for generations. Massive evidence has demonstrated that countries that are less peaceful also have lower levels of gender equality. In the SDG framework Goal 5 focuses on gender equality. The norms and values that underpin gender inequality often drive and perpetuate conflict.<sup>39</sup>

Young people aged 15 to 24 are most



likely to be among the working poor: 16 percent of all employed youth were living below the poverty line in 2015, compared with 9 percent of working adults according to a UNDP Report.<sup>40</sup> Goal 16 of the Sustainable Development Goals is dedicated to the promotion of peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, the provision of access to justice for all, and building effective, accountable institutions at all levels.<sup>41</sup>

Poverty is a vast and complex issue whose tentacles reach into many areas, including climate change, sustainable development and crucially global security. The link between poverty and sustained inequalities and violent extremism is complex. Poverty eradication and development gains cannot be sustained under conditions of violent conflict and insecurity.<sup>42</sup> Peace is also about much more than just the absence of physical violence. While often the search for peace is seen as an end to armed conflict or the enforcement of stability. 'Positive' peace includes changes in the attitudes of conflicting parties and the transformation of the systemic and structural elements that form part of the reasons for why the tensions that are present in every society spill over and become violent. Acknowledging and transforming structural violence,

including the systems responsible for marginalising and excluding sections of society and the historical and present causes of poverty, inequality and under-development, is key to understanding how peace and development imperatives are inextricably linked.<sup>43</sup>

While there are a number of combining factors attributed to violent extremism and radicalization, such as poverty, unemployment, marginalization and frustration, pull factors such as access to material resources, protection, a sense of belonging and empowerment, as well as strong governance.<sup>44</sup>

In a recent research published and conducted by the UNDP Africa on recruitment *Journey to Extremism in Africa: Drivers, Incentives and the Tipping Point for Recruitment*, the study reveals a picture of a frustrated individuals, marginalized and neglected over the course of their life. With few economic opportunities or platforms for meaningful civic participation that can bring about change, and a growing mistrust and its agencies the study suggests, such an individuals could, upon witnessing or experiencing perceived abuse of power by the state, be tipped over the edge into extremism.<sup>45</sup> Most recruits interviewed expressed frustration at their economic conditions, with employment

the most acute need at the time of joining a group. Recruits also indicated an acute sense of grievance towards government, 83 percent of the interviewed believed that government looks after only the interests of a few and over 75 percent said that they place no trust in politicians or in the government security apparatus.<sup>46</sup>

According to the World Bank, out of 23 countries identified as experiencing on-going conflict, 17 also suffer from the highest levels of terrorism. This is not to say that all conflict breeds terrorism, but where it does, terrorist incidents exacerbate already heavy development costs such as declining health and education, disruption of social services, disintegrated communities, broken infrastructure, and forced migration.<sup>47</sup>

In Kenya the high levels of violence are as a result of a range of factors including; ethnic intolerance, border disputes, competition over land and other resources, political party zoning, proliferation of small arms, poverty, under development and marginalisation. Devolution has only made these factors complex.<sup>48</sup>

“Kenyan politics are bad because they make people fight each other, extremist can take advantage of the division and bitterness created by the politics to recruit members who

will join feeling they are fighting for a just cause” A respondent from South C.

Violent Islamist activity has tended to be clustered in the North Eastern province which borders Somalia, the Coast province in the southeast, and Nairobi which have a higher concentration of factors of deprivation.

In its 2015 Human Development Report, the UN Development Programme asserted that violent extremism not only deprives people of their freedoms, but limits opportunities to “expand their capabilities”. A sustained high level of insecurity has adverse implications for the socio-economic prospects for individuals and communities, and impedes the advancement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), but there are other terrorism implications as well.<sup>49</sup> This was affirmed by a discussant from Mombasa during a Focus Group Discussion.

*“The groups are attracting people is because they feel they need to revenge due to the problems they face which they believe have been brought by the government. These problems such as lack of jobs, poverty etc. They just join feeling they are doing something against the government.”* a discussant during a FGD in Mombasa.

## The National Strategy to Violent Extremism:

Kenya is one of six country participants in the Security Governance Initiative (SGI), focusing on management, oversight, and accountability of security services, according to the U.S. Department of State. Kenya's SGI priorities include border security, administration of justice, and police human resource management, with each area having as a special focus countering violent extremism. Kenyan civil society organizations are actively engaged in CVE efforts.<sup>50</sup>

After the several attacks by Al-Shabaab militants against and inside Kenya, the Kenyan government realized that terrorism is a cross-border crime and a national security threat. This necessitated the formation of a multi-agency mechanism, effective coordination of key actors and a coordinating mechanism as national Countering Terrorism focal point.

In September 2016, Kenya launched its new strategy aimed at preventing violent extremism, against a background of increased number of threats from al-Shabab, home-grown militants, and ISIS sympathizers.

The strategy oversees, advises and coordinates the CVE interventions of bilateral and multilateral partners

and national security agencies, in addition to the field-level CVE work of County Security Intelligence Committees (a national government mechanism), county government agencies, NGOs, community level security mechanisms, such as Nyumba Kumi Committees and Community Policing Committees, among other actors. The plan would emphasize de-radicalization over military tactics. Three county governments—Lamu, Kwale, and Mombasa—established their own CVE strategies as well.<sup>51</sup>

The NSCVE is in its early stages of implementation. It is therefore not possible to conduct a comprehensive review of performance and approach at this point. The strategy assigns roles to various government agencies, county governments, civil society organizations, faith-based organizations, communities and researchers. In the event the consultations did not involve public participation adequately there is the risk that this might affect public support and cooperation for the Strategy going forward. Like most Security strategies, this strategy is not available for the public and it is not clear why.<sup>52</sup>

Consistent with global policy on CVE, in particular, the UN Security Council's Resolution 2178 (2014) the NSCVE bears a clear vision of minimizing and/or eliminating

violent extremism by mobilizing individuals and groups at the national and community levels “to reject violent extremist ideologies and aims in order to shrink the pool of individuals whom terrorist groups can radicalize and recruit”.<sup>53</sup>

The Strategy now complements these security-focused counterterrorism measures with a framework for CVE measures, which include the provision of employment options, business opportunities and life skills, among other interventions, aimed at reducing youth vulnerability to violent extremism.<sup>54</sup> The NSCVE mandates the NCTC to coordinate all counterterrorism and CVE-related activities of Government agencies and non-state actors as per its mandate which is to provide capacity building and training to county leaders to enhance their capacities to carry out these activities. The County Security Intelligence Committees are in fact the key nexus of implementation of the NSCVE, and are expected to consult and coordinate closely with county government officials.<sup>55</sup>

The strategy affirms the various drivers that predispose populations in their respective contexts. Such of these are ; Unresolved historical injustices and grievances in parts of the country such as the coast and the north, drive people towards violent extremism.<sup>56</sup> There is need to

work through the vital actors of the security agencies such as the police and the army. Corrupt immigration officers and who have been accused of rounding up all ethnic Somalis, including young children, which is a flagrant case of racial profiling akin to collective punishment of the entire community for the crimes of a few.<sup>57</sup>

Various counties affected by violent extremism have in the past year in consultation with relevant stakeholders in their respective counties developed their own County CVE Action Plans. Their vision statements and strategic objectives are similar to those of the NSCVE. The three plans also envision county government partnerships with civil society, faith-based organisations (FBOs), media and other non-state actors in CVE work, a similar strategy with that of the NSCVE. The key priorities in the three plans is mobilization of all actors in the counties to play roles in preventing violent extremism, in addition to creating greater community cohesion.<sup>58</sup>

In implementation of the action plan, the counties’ priorities are; developing a framework to guide on early warning signs and intervention measures, rehabilitation and integration of people who disengage from violent extremism.<sup>59</sup> These are good starting points for counties to get officially engaged in CVE

work. The challenge however, is that counties need to relate their development mandates to security ; eventually shift away from an outreach approach towards linking development planning and spending to CVE-related security outcomes.<sup>60</sup>

### **Drivers and Risk Factors Matrix:**

There can be no general theory about why and how the turn to Violent Extremism occurs, the dynamics vary from one setting to another.<sup>61</sup> It is therefore important that before implementation or design of a program, there is an adequate understanding of context in present and historical detail. No context prompts automatic and predictable responses by the actors affected by it. In other words, while context matters, practitioners cannot therefore make general assumptions such; economic deprivation causes people to be susceptible to recruitment and radicalisation, because in theory and in practice, not all economically deprived people are likely to join violent extremist groups. Empirical evidence and recent research does not suggest a direct causal link between specific economic conditions and violence, though poorer populations are more prone to violent extremism<sup>62</sup>. By overemphasizing the underlying direct economic conditions arguably leading to violence, indirect consequences of poverty may

be overlooked and counteractive general assumptions about communities made.<sup>63</sup> There is a different relationship between poverty and violent extremism at the macro, country-wide level, and micro, individual level.<sup>64</sup> Unmet socioeconomic needs may be significant not because of actual economic deprivation, but because of the related perceptions of those marginalized populations that the state and society have abandoned them and left a governance gap. Relative deprivation and frustrated expectations (not only for economic benefits, but also for political power and/or social status) are significant drivers towards violent extremism.<sup>65</sup>

The risk factors include multiple push and pull factors that influence an individual's radicalization process.


**Push Factors:** drive individuals to violent extremism, such as: marginalization, inequality, discrimination, persecution or the perception thereof; limited access to quality and relevant education; the denial of rights and civil liberties; and other environmental, historical and socio-economic grievances<sup>66</sup>

**Pull Factors:** those factors that nurture the appeal of violent extremism, for example: the existence of well-organized violent extremist groups with compelling discourses and effective programmes



that are providing services, revenue and/or employment in exchange for membership. Groups can also lure new members by providing outlets for grievances and promise

vulnerable.<sup>68</sup> Utilizing a cluster model approach, the following CVE matrix indicates how the risk factors of radicalization were grouped for this study. *See figure below:*



of adventure and freedom. Furthermore, these groups appear to offer spiritual comfort, “a place to belong” and a supportive social network.<sup>67</sup>

While it is broadly recognized that there is no single path to radicalization and no formula to predicting who will become radicalized, CVE programs seek to mitigate the factors that make individuals and communities

*Matrix Adapted from WORDE*

Notably as all other studies in CVE, this matrix does not provide a causal link between any risk factor or a combination of the factors and an

individual in becoming a terrorist.

<sup>69</sup>This matrix is not predictive of who will become radicalised based on the presence of one or more risks factors. For the purpose of this study, it will guide in exploring and assessing significant potential risk factors in the specific locations of study.

### **Political grievances:**

Respondents in all research locations described police harassment, corruption and extortion as common occurrences, and alleged cases of forced disappearances and extra-judicial killings by security forces. Several respondents from South C, Nairobi, how police *“concentrate on the innocent and ignore criminals because the criminals pay them”*. Respondents explained that such incidents have resulted in a deep sense of distrust and resentment towards the police and security forces in the communities and make it hard for the communities to work with the police. Youth respondents were most critical of the police 62% of them said that security agents used excessive force during terrorism operations; of the 26 % of the Youth who said they felt harassed and profiled for their ethnicity and religion, most of them were Muslim. (See Annex question 36).

Past research by Human Rights Watch and Kenyan human rights

non-governmental organizations over the past four years has implicated the ATPU and Kenya’s anti-riot police, known as the General Service Unit (GSU), in killings and disappearances in Nairobi and at the Kenyan coast.<sup>70</sup>

Although studies indicate that youths in Africa also vote less than older citizens research on youth’s political participation in African contexts are scarce (Resnick & Casale 2011:19) This study though indicates results contrary to popular belief, most Youth have National Identity Cards. Out of the 146 interviewed 97% had received their National Identity Card and 81% of these had taken part in the last election. 92% believed that elections affected change in their community but adversely only 20% participated in their village Barazas. ( See Appendix V: Youth Survey Descriptive)

Henn & Foard (2012) argue that the issue of low representation among youths could be caused by a feeling among youths that they are disconnected from influence in the political system. In this study the number of Youth who felt that they were represented in the government was fairly higher at 45%.

### **Economic deprivation:**

Unemployment as one among several contributors to youth alienation comes up repeatedly

in discussions of radicalization, and it stands to reason that young people with no prospects may be easily lured by promises of work and status<sup>71</sup>. 57 of the Youths interviewed did not have work during the time of Study, 86% said that work was difficult to find while 95% of the 16% and 27% of those employed and self-employed said they were not satisfied with their wages. Feelings of relative deprivation, the discrepancy between what an individual believes they are entitled to and what they obtain or experience in order to obtain it are another prominent push factor of violent extremism because it fuels aggression and frustration. Feelings of relative deprivation has to be identified as a root factor of collective violence even when an individual is not personally deprived but act on behalf of a group that perceive to be deprived.

Economic instability reportedly had the highest impact and was also a leading cause of violent extremism according to the government officials- 120 out of 152 interviewed said that the most pressing community need was economic deprivation and 55% of these said that economic instability was the most significant impact of violent extremism but only a negligible percentage 1 % of them considered youth empowerment as a pressing

community need yet when asked which group is most vulnerable to recruitment and radicalization, 78% of the officials categorize jobless youth as the most at risk population. (See Government Officials Descriptive)

The Kenyan coast and the urban low income areas such as Shauri Moyo have been acknowledged to be flashpoints for radicalisation and violent extremism. This is because these areas have indices of extreme poverty, high illiteracy levels and under-investment in basic services. The majority of those living in these regions have for years believed themselves to be excluded from the national development agenda.<sup>72</sup>

*“Illiteracy – some of the illiterate people join and engage in the activities since they are not aware of repercussions of their activities. The educated join since they want to get rich faster. They may also join due to unemployment”* A respondent from Shauri Moyo.

Among the 146 Youth respondents interviewed only 16 % were employed, 27% indicated having a business while 57% had no source of income at all. **See Youth Survey Descriptive.** Though only 19% answered in the affirmative when asked if they would consider joining a Violent Extremist group for any amount, lack of gainful employment

compounded by other poverty indicators such as lack of essential services have been identified as a driving factor of recruitment and radicalisation. In the recent study by UNDP Journey to Extremism in Africa: Drivers, Incentives and the Tipping Point for Recruitment Most recruits express frustration at their economic conditions, with employment the most acute need at the time of joining a group.<sup>73</sup> It is noteworthy that respondents who cited economic reasons for joining al-Shabaab were suitable to view the organisation as a reliable employer.

### Sociological Motivators:

The role of social groups including familial, tribal and peer groups can be the catalyst for a search for identity and belonging beyond the family, such as a larger, collective identity, and this search could result in that person's radicalization.<sup>74</sup>

Perceived threats to the in-group's interests and survival can increase the group's cohesiveness, which can lead to a lack of empathy and increased animus to out-groups. The cohesive nature of the groups ensures they are highly resistant to disruptive influences, whereby pressures from law enforcement and the mainstream community can strengthen the collective identity. The shared threat, and commonality

in outcomes or fate, can include battles against outsiders; as such, winning or losing in conflict can unite the group through the shared experience (Bjørge & Horgan, 2009). Victories provide members with shared pride, and losses can produced a shared hatred and bitterness against the common enemy.<sup>75</sup> Research shows that social networks that had existed prior to joining militant groups played a critical role in the radicalisation process.<sup>76</sup> *“Peer pressure – even the educated youths are influenced by their peers to join, it gives them a sense of belonging because they desire to belong to a crew or a group and fill the gap, they also aim to be like their peers, the educated offer the brains for the violent extremism”.* A Respondent from Shauri Moyo

Besides socialization, another significant manifest function of school is the transmission of cultural norms and values to new generations. Schools help to mold a diverse population into one society with a shared national identity and prepare future generations for their citizenship roles. Students are taught about laws and our political way of life through civic lessons, and they're taught patriotism through rituals such as saluting the flag.<sup>77</sup> Most Youth interviewed had relatively stable childhoods and school experiences. 100% attended

school with 80% of them attending schools in their counties of origin. 94 % indicated that they had moderate to excellent experiences with their peers of different ethnicities and 55% reported belonging to healthy social groups such as sports team and cultural groups.

### **Ideologies and Beliefs:**

The relationship between religion and radicalization is largely established as originating from the fact that religion serves as a powerful expression of individual and group identity, particularly in contexts where religious identities compete with patriotism; and/ or where charismatic leaders and individuals are present and able to exploit these dynamics.<sup>78</sup> Violent extremist beliefs espoused by radical groups are often deviant interpretations of religious discourses, although often projects have a focus on violent extremism in Muslim communities , it is important to note that violent extremism is not limited to any single faith tradition<sup>79</sup>. Pervasive narratives such as “US vs Them” are used by Violent Extremists groups to propagate a worldview that sets Muslims and Non- Muslims are in a constant state of conflict. 90 % of the Youth interviewed identify with a religious identity and 85% of these were born in their present religious’ tradition. ( **See Youth Descriptive**)

Negative propaganda regarding the West’s treatment of Muslims also tended to be linked to negative narratives about democracy as a form of government. This narrative is often reinforced as a result of US foreign policy, which includes the Donor agencies and feature prominently in recruitment videos and extremist propaganda.<sup>80</sup> Most youth exhibited a positive view and tolerance of the “ other”- 94% of the 146 interviewed had friends from other faiths and 48 (33%) of these were members of an interfaith group.

Since, select Kenyan mosques – especially those that had provided alternative platforms for political debate since the complete demise of the Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK) in 1997 – established themselves as hubs for radical preaching and the increasing projection of an anti-American extremist ideology that framed local Muslim (sometimes coastal) concerns within a language of global jihad. According to investigations conducted by the United Nations Monitoring Group for Somalia and Eritrea (SEMG), mosques such as the Pumwani Riyadhha in Nairobi and Masjid Musa in Mombasa had, by 2008, formed an elaborate Al Shabaab support network, commonly known in intelligence circles as Al Hijra. Al Hijra operatives managed to send



hundreds of Kenyans to Somalia to fight alongside Al Shabaab.<sup>81</sup>

*“Internationally, cases like when the American President Trump says he recognises Jerusalem as the Israeli capital creates hate towards America and Israel. Jihadist will be formed to fight these perceived enemies that is the Israelites and the Americans” - A respondent in Kilifi.*

Youth respondents indicated identifying with religious community, contrary to what is popular narrative majority of them affirmed reading the scriptures for themselves even as they followed the interpretation of their religious leaders. **See Youth Survey Question 21.** Comparatively 59 out of 153 religious leaders identified religious institutions as possible places of recruitment and radicalization while 42 of them said that they knew of such places- anonymity upheld. **See Religious Leaders Survey Question 19.**

### Psychological factors:

Recent research indicates that some people join extremist as part of quest for significance, desire for purposefulness and meaning of life. Moreover, circumstances that erode one's sense of self-worth such as personal trauma, shame, humiliation

and discrimination when coupled with immigration and acculturation challenges have been shown to play a major role in cultivating support for radical groups and ideologies.

In Nairobi, Shauri Moyo respondents in FDGs alluded to circumstances that caused personal trauma and shame, which indicated a prevalence of aggression as a means of revenge.

*People harbour anger after witnessing traumatising activities especially if they happened to people close to us like if a sister is sexually harassed in your presence. When in future some things happen they trigger these memories and they may result in violent reactions. These traumas hardly go away’.-Nairobi-Shauri Moyo*

40% of the Youth said they had experienced bullying as children and a close percentage of 39% indicated that they did not trust members of their communities. Perceptions of social alienation, political repression and personal crises have been proven to facilitate cognitive openings enabling individuals to accept extremist beliefs, and While there is no evidence that suggests that terrorists Among the Youth respondents, only 4% had been imprisoned and 29 % had a relative killed in a Violent extremism related incidence- This indicates lower PTSD levels but an independent research

would be recommended as this is a complex phenomenon and the scope of the study was limited have higher levels of mental illness than the general population, depressive and anxiety symptoms are more prevalent in those who sympathize with violent acts of terrorism. (ibid)

*“Psychological torture by security organs like beatings, sexual violence, ignoring cultural religious practices like entering mosques with shoes, forcing women to remove their veils, shootings and unlawful arrests leave people with anger and bitterness, they join groups as a way of avenging themselves.”*  
Respondent in Mombasa

### **Social media as a tool for youth engagement in Interfaith dialogues:**

Considering the importance of social media among youth, it is critical to understand how to use it as a tool to foster youth development. 90% of the respondents in this study indicated presence and usage of social media. Web chat is especially appealing to younger audiences as well as respondents who are trying to complete a task on the site, such as filling out an electronic form.<sup>82</sup> People like having the option of talking with an agent in real-time without having to pick up the phone.

64 % of the Youth respondents are familiar with live chats and 54% of these indicated willingness to participate in Interfaith live chats.

Religious leaders’ respondents exhibited social media savviness that went beyond having an account but that they also used the platforms as a place of influence for their followers and as a place to garner more followers.

During the FDGs the respondents indicated a knowledge of sites that are used by violent extremist groups and also indicated a concern that Interfaith Social media groups might be used to proselytize others to conversion.

### **Conclusion:**

The constantly and often rapidly changing political landscape within CVE programming results in unique challenges to both implementers and evaluators. A clear understanding of how the project’s activities will attempt to influence the recruitment and radicalization to violent extremism is needed for effective designing, to help link specific program activities that lead to those changes.

CVE projects can be located in traditional education, development, social services and conflict mitigation domains. Sometimes, CVE results may be an additional outcome or

impact rather than primary objective of a given program. Programs that are preventative in nature represent a particular challenge for evaluation as a traditional evaluation models focus on identifying what did happen rather than what did not happen this results into a bias towards a positive result. Because of security concerns, there is reluctance among actors to share information and knowledge even as there is a growing community of actors engaging in CVE programming.<sup>83</sup>

Peacebuilding metrics are generally too broad to capture CVE program specific outcomes. They are largely dependent upon perceptions surveys of various levels of stabilization determined within a hierarchal framework that is broadly applied rather a programmatically based. Upon evaluation, CVE program should reflect what is happening specifically as a response to a program intervention.<sup>84</sup>

The ability to effectively evaluate an existing program is most likely compromised if there is no baseline data. In other cases, baseline data may have been collected but is not the desired data. In the case of YMCA, the original assumption was that Youth from the 3 locations are susceptible to recruitment and radicalization because of economic deprivation; halfway through the project the theory of change was

altered upon discovery that political grievances and extreme ideological beliefs were more critical factors. This study is an effort to strengthen the program.

In order to design a CVE project effectively, it is essential to identify clear and relevant objectives that are based on the risk factors present in every given location. The proposed framework has three broad CVE programming objectives.

**Counter violent extremist narratives and worldview**

Provide positive, alternative social networks; decrease psychological conditions; increase economic opportunities for at risk and /or empower communities to prevent Violent Extremism

Reduce political grievances, strengthen government capacity to curtail violent extremist activity; and support nonviolent solutions to political grievances or conflict.

According to the study and proposed theory of change, at risk individuals are Youth in locations with a high concentration of risk factors. Data from the 3 counties is similar in risk factor thresholds among the sampled populations. The following tables are a sample of this fact.

*Table 1: Matrix: Example 1*

Do You take part in elections?	Ans	Freq	%
Nairobi	Yes	37	73
	No	14	27
Total		51	100

Mombasa	Yes	42	84
	No	8	16
Total		50	100

Kilifi	Yes	39	87
	No	6	13
Total		45	100

Overall	Freq	%
Yes	118	81
No	28	19
Total	146	100

**Table 1: Matrix: Example 2**

Have You felt harassed or profiled, because of Your faith or ethnicity?	Ans	Freq	%
Nairobi	Yes	17	33
	No	34	67
Total		51	100

Mombasa	Yes	14	28
	No	36	72
Total		50	100

Kilifi	Yes	7	16
	No	38	84
Total		45	100

Overall	Freq	%
Yes	38	26
No	108	74
	146	100

The program design should also incorporate influencers and change agents, which among them were key informants for the study- These are groups and or institutions that are capable and committed to reducing one or more risk factors of radicalization. E.G the religious and inter religious leaders.

Public officials who can reduce political grievances of the local population.

### Recommendations:

Implementers of CVE even in their efforts towards risk reduction should mitigate their many possible negative effects, such as stigmatizing specific communities, enabling violent extremist groups to mobilize

support through highlighting ‘foreign occupation’, or ‘resistance to western thought.’ However, implementers should also seek to avoid the converse temptation to become overly risk-averse as this will impinge on their ability to achieve their intended impacts.<sup>85</sup>

CVE is widely understood to describe a range of preventative and non-coercive measures, CVE may involve, for instance, community dialogues on issues of the day, such as security in Kenya’s case *Baraza* media messaging, interfaith dialogues, training of state governance and security actors, and a variety of initiatives with individuals deemed to be ‘at risk’ of being drawn to violence, such as vocational training and political participation programmes. While there are substantial overlaps between CVE and Risk Reduction in terms of activities, and many authorities group them under the same umbrella, it is important to note that Risk Reduction is considered distinct because its activities more narrowly target individuals who were previously directly or indirectly involved in the production of violence, such as defectors from VE entities or those serving sentences for terrorism-related charges.<sup>86</sup>

In the case of the AAYMCA this may involve (a) identifying a number of ‘at risk’ individuals and (b) establishing

the critical factors that predispose the populations to recruitment and radicalization- the risk factors.

According to the study, the critical risk factors in the four locations of study are, community relationship with the authority (government officials) and economic deprivation/ limited economic opportunities. These factors create grievances which can be harnessed to promote extremist violence – but are neither sufficient nor consistent factors to validate the occurrence of radicalization, it is important to consider proximity or accessibility to violent extremist groups.

The program design should lead to;

Building positive and collaborative relationships with diverse faith communities towards refuting/ countering extremist ideologies and sympathetic undertones of the same.

Understanding the potential risk factors of radicalization and mobilization to violent extremism specific to the target group- Youth towards reducing their sense of alienation and frustration.

Creating a community-led engagement model to counter violent extremism by creating opportunities for participants, especially the Youth to confidently engage with relevant partners.

## **Programmatic Recommendations:**

### **Community Recommendations:**

Intentionally create interfaith circles engaging both religious leaders and grassroots' communities employing both the ethics and resources of diapraxis.

This could be done by Liaising with existing local networks of inter-religious groups or organizations, such as United Religions Initiative; Inter-religious Council of Kenya; Kenya Muslim Youth Network.

Facilitate community forums youth leaders and explore areas of partnership with existing community processes such as *Nyumba Kumi* to enhance community-police relationship.

### **Institutional recommendations:**

Work with existing initiatives as entry points when engaging with the Youth to avoid duplication of activities and re-occurrence of interventions on similar populations by other stakeholders.

Work closely with other organizations such as *Muhuri, ACT, Life and Peace Institute* who have steadier relationships with the County Government.

If Table Banking is still the preferred method of economic empowerment, AAYMCA should engage a Muslim expert to avoid religious contradictions for Muslim Participant.

The project should create opportunities for Youth Influencers (paying attention to Diversity) to spear head community leadership, paying attention to generational roles and the cultural dynamics that are part and parcel of the grievances that fuel violent extremism, specifically for the Young People.


### **Government recommendations:**

The government should emphasize on working with Community leaders and organizations towards working with law enforcement to develop procedures for nonpunitive ways of helping people who are in the precriminal space of radicalization and recruitment make a turn back.

Chiefs and Head men more trusted by communities compared to other security actors, facilitate their office to harness their presence on the ground, for better community and government relationships.

Implementation of the County Countering Violent Extremism Strategies should be done with a focus of a bottom – up approach.





Government officials should be trained on cultural sensitivities as component of public safety to avoid the community backlash of profiling Muslim/ Somali community.

## Demographics:

### 1.0 Survey: Youth

146 youths were interviewed in 3 counties that is Nairobi (51), Mombasa (50) and Kilifi


counties in Kenya. Majority of the youth interviewed were Christians as showed in Figure 1.

96 out of 146 interviewed were Christians, 44 out of 146 were Muslims, 3 out of 146 were Hindus while 3 out of 146 were African traditions.

The figure below shows break down of religions by county.

**Figure 1: County grouped by Religion**

County: grouped by Respondents gender




74 out of 146 youth interviewed were male while 72 were female.

25 out 51 youths interviewed in Nairobi were male while 26 were female.

25 out of 50 youths interviewed in Mombasa were male while the remaining 50 were female.

24 out of the 45 youths interviewed were male while 21 were female  
As illustrated in figure 2.

**Figure 2: Respondents gender by county**



**Table 1: Youth Income**

Income	Freq	Percent
No Income	71	49
19-100	3	2
101-500	3	2
501-1000	2	1
1001-10000	38	26
10000+	29	20
<b>Total</b>	<b>146</b>	<b>100</b>

### 1.1 Religious Leaders:

143 religious leaders were interviewed in three counties in Kenya, that is, Nairobi (48), Mombasa (52) and Kilifi (43) from 4 religious backgrounds, Christians (83), Muslims (55), African Tradition (4) and one (1) Hindu as presented in Table 1 below.

**Table 2: Distribution according to Religion by County (Religious Leaders)**

County	Religion	No. Of Respondents	Percentage
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<b>Nairobi</b>	Christians	34	71
	Muslims	14	29
<b>Total:</b>		<b>48</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Mombasa</b>	Christians	26	50
	Muslims	24	46
	Hindu	1	2
	African Traditions	1	2
<b>Total:</b>		<b>52</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Kilifi</b>	Christians	23	53
	Muslims	17	40
	African Traditions	3	7
<b>Total:</b>		<b>43</b>	<b>100</b>

104 (Nairobi=36, Mombasa=35 and Kilifi=33) out of 143 were male while 39 (Nairobi=12, Mombasa=17 and Kilifi=10) were female as shown in Figure 3.

Most religious leaders interviewed were between 31-40 years followed by 25-30 years old. Only 8 leaders were above the age of 55 years as shown in *Table 2 below*.


**Table 3: Respondents Age**

Age	Freq	Percent
18-24	9	6
25-30	27	19
31-35	30	21
36-40	30	21
41-45	18	13
46-50	11	8
51-55	10	7
55+	8	6
<b>Total</b>	<b>143</b>	<b>100</b>

Secondary level is the highest level of education completed most leaders

(37%) followed by college (30%) and only one (1%) leader had no formal education. Shown in Figure 4.

**Figure 4: Level of education by Religious Leaders**




### 3.0 Interfaith Leaders

129 Interfaith leaders were interviewed in Nairobi (39), Mombasa (54) and Kilifi (36). 97 out of the 129 interviewed were male while 32 were female.

The interfaith leaders were from 4 religious backgrounds that is Christians (73), Muslims (40), African Traditions (9) and Hindus (7). Breakdown of religion by county is shown in Figure 5.

**Figure 5: Interfaith Respondents County by Religion**




### 4.0 Institution Faculty

152 lectures were interviewed in Nairobi (51), Mombasa (56) and Kilifi (45).

91 out of 152 interviewed were male ((60%) while 61 out of 152 were female

(40%).

Figure 6: Respondent Gender: Faculty




Most lectures interviewed were between 41-45 years old (18%) while only 9 lectures were above the 61 years old as shown in Table 3.


Table 4: Respondent Age: Institution Faculty

Age	Freq	Percent
23-30	11	7
31-35	21	14
36-40	24	16
41-45	28	18
46-50	26	17
51-55	21	14
56-60	12	8
61+	9	6
Total	152	100

**Figure 7: Respondents religion: Faculty**



**Figure 8: Level of Education: Faculty**



## 5.0 Government Officials


152 Government officials were interviewed in Nairobi (51), Mombasa (51) and Kilifi (50).

100 out of 152 interviewed were Christians (66%), 49 out of 152 were Muslims (32%) while 3 affiliated with African traditions (2%)



121 out of 152 government officials interviewed were male (80%) while 31 were female (20%)

**Figure 9: Gender: Government officials**



Most government officials interviewed were between the age of 26 and 30 (23%) followed by 36 to 40 (22%) only 7% were over the age of 55 years as shown in Figure 10

**Figure 10: Age: Government Officials**





Figure 11: Highest Level of Education: Government officials



APPENDICES

Appendix I: Faculty Survey: Tables

Module A: Demographics

Module B: General Class Outlook Questions

What is Your area of Research or teaching?	Frequency	Percentage
Humanities and Social Sciences	76	50
Peace and Security Studies	17	11
Medicine and Health Sciences	25	16
Engineering courses	9	6
Business courses	10	7
Mathematics and statistics	4	6
Computer studies	5	6
Education	6	4
Total	152	100

Does Violent Extremism show up in your research or as part of research?	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	66	43
No	86	57
<b>Total</b>	<b>152</b>	<b>100</b>

How many classes do you teach in a week?	Frequency	Percentage
1-5	75	49
6-10	56	37
11+	56	37
<b>Total</b>	<b>152</b>	<b>100</b>

What subjects do you teach?	Freq	Percent
Peace and conflict	38	25
Economics	24	16
Gender Studies	48	32
Engineering	11	7
Business	12	8
Maths and Statistics	12	8
Food technology	3	2
Computer studies	4	3
Geography and geology	4	3
Health sciences	10	7
<b>Total</b>	<b>152</b>	<b>111</b>

**CVE Specific Questions:**

Generally, do You address issues of peace and security in your curriculum?	Freq	Percent
Yes	115	76
No	37	24
Total	152	100

In Your class do You address violent extremism or terrorism as part of Your Curriculum?	Freq	Percent
Yes	67	44
No	85	56
Total	152	100

What are the dominant religious and/ or ethnic groups in your classroom?	Freq	Percent
Muslims	24	16
Christians	116	76
Both	12	8
Total	152	100

Do You address violent extremism or terrorism as part of Your Curriculum?	Freq	Percent
Yes	68	45
No	84	55
Total	152	100

Do the students in your classroom bring up/ Reference Violent Extremism/terrorism in your classroom?	Freq	Percent
Yes	63	41

No	89	59
<b>Total</b>	<b>152</b>	<b>100</b>

How concerned are You for Your Safety and the safety of Your students?	Freq	Percent
Least worried	35	23
Relatively worried	73	48
Most worried	44	29
<b>Total</b>	<b>152</b>	<b>100</b>

Do you believe that greater security in campus is a solution to concerns of safety	Freq	Percent
Yes	126	83
No	26	17
<b>Total</b>	<b>152</b>	<b>100</b>

Do you believe that greater security Is an Infringement to personal and civil rights?	Freq	Percent
Yes	66	43
No	86	57
<b>Total</b>	<b>152</b>	<b>100</b>

What other possible solutions could be identified to ensure safety in campus.	Freq	Percent
Training on Indicators of Violence related symptoms	93	61
More Police Officers in the compound	13	9
Better security screening Procedures at the Gate	71	47
<b>Total</b>	<b>152</b>	<b>117</b>

Has Your campus hosted, or partnered for an event about Countering Violent Extremism?	Freq	Percent
Yes	74	49
No	78	51
<b>Total</b>	<b>152</b>	<b>100</b>

Are You aware of Students organizations that actively promote Interfaith Dialogue?	Freq	Percent
Yes	88	58
No	64	42
<b>Total</b>	<b>152</b>	<b>100</b>

### Interfaith Questions

Are You aware of Students organizations that actively promote Interfaith Dialogue ?	Freq	Percent
Yes		89
No		63
<b>Total</b>		<b>152</b>

In your own opinion would You say Interfaith dialogue and cooperation is a social cohesion solution?	Freq	Percent
Yes	143	94
No	9	6
<b>Total</b>	<b>152</b>	<b>100</b>



Do You think interfaith dialogue reduces conflict?	Freq	Percent
Yes	143	94
No	9	6
<b>Total</b>	<b>152</b>	<b>100</b>

### Social Media Questions:

What is your opinion about Youth and Social media?	Freq	Percent
Positive	130	86
Negative	22	14
<b>Total</b>	<b>152</b>	<b>100</b>

Would You consider social media advocacy as a way of engaging young people on pertinent issues?	Freq	Percent
Yes	146	96
No	6	4
<b>Total</b>	<b>152</b>	<b>100</b>

Do you talk to your students about social media etiquette?	Freq	Percent
Yes	105	69
No	47	31
<b>Total</b>	<b>152</b>	<b>100</b>

Are you aware of online radicalization as social media danger for the Youth in your Institution?	Freq	Percent
Yes	110	72
No	42	28

<b>Total</b>	<b>152</b>	<b>100</b>
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<b>Have You been part of any social media campaign?</b>	<b>Freq</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Yes	64	42
No	88	58
<b>Total</b>	<b>152</b>	<b>100</b>

<b>Was is successful?</b>	<b>Freq</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Yes	61	40
No	91	60
<b>Total</b>	<b>152</b>	<b>100</b>

## Appendix II: Government Official Survey Descriptive

### A: Demographics

### B: Community Relationship

<b>Do you generally trust the members of your community?</b>	<b>Freq</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Yes	120	79
No	32	21
<b>Total</b>	<b>152</b>	<b>100</b>

<b>Do you generally feel trusted by the members of the public?</b>	<b>Freq</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Yes	129	85
No	23	15
<b>Total</b>	<b>152</b>	<b>100</b>

<b>Do you feel free to openly interact with people regardless of ethnicity, nationality, religion or political beliefs?</b>	<b>Freq</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Yes	140	92
No	12	8
<b>Total</b>	<b>152</b>	<b>100</b>

<b>Has violent conflict changed the way you think about other groups of people?</b>	<b>Freq</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Yes	82	54
No	70	46
<b>Total</b>	<b>152</b>	<b>100</b>

<b>Do you have more or less favourable view of certain groups?</b>	<b>Freq</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Yes, More	15	10
Yes, Less	42	28
No	95	63
<b>Total</b>	<b>152</b>	<b>101</b>

#### **C: CVE threat perception Questions:**

<b>How concerned are you about the radicalization within your organizations rank?</b>	<b>Freq</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Not at all	11	7
Relatively concerned	71	47
Very concerned	70	46
<b>Total</b>	<b>152</b>	<b>100</b>

What do you think are the most pressing needs of the community?	Freq	Percent
Economic	120	79
Education	52	34
Religious	15	10
Civil expression	41	27
Youth empowerment	1	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>152</b>	<b>151</b>

What is the most significant impact of violent extremism?	Freq	Percent
Profiling of Muslims and Coastal communities	24	16
Civilian/ Police/ Cleric deaths	45	30
Economic instability	83	55
<b>Total</b>	<b>152</b>	<b>101</b>
In your opinion which group has been most affected by violent extremism?	Freq	Percent
Young Muslim Men	16	11
Jobless Youth	119	78
Muslim Young Men and Women	11	7
Any youth	6	4
<b>Total</b>	<b>152</b>	<b>100</b>

#### D: Capacity Questions:

How prepared is your organization to effectively respond to the needs of the most affected community?	Freq	Percent
Not prepared	17	11
Moderately prepared	89	59
Very prepared	46	30
<b>Total</b>	<b>152</b>	<b>100</b>

<b>Do you feel that Your organisation has adequate support services for You?</b>	<b>Freq</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Yes	85	56
No	67	44
<b>Total</b>	<b>152</b>	<b>100</b>

<b>Where do you feel the need for additional support in your line of work ?</b>	<b>Freq</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Training on Countering Violent Extremism	92	61
Trauma Counselling for Your staff	23	15
Community Partnerships	69	45
Equipment/ Materials	16	11
<b>Total</b>	<b>152</b>	<b>132</b>

#### **E: Community Integration perceptions:**

<b>Do you believe that there is a good chance for a person who has taken part in violent crime to change?</b>	<b>Freq</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Yes	150	99
No	2	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>152</b>	<b>100</b>

<b>Do you believe sometimes economic deprivation causes young people to take part in violent extremism?</b>	<b>Freq</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Yes	149	98
No	3	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>152</b>	<b>100</b>

Should former members of armed groups be allowed to return to their communities?	Freq	Percent
Yes	126	83
No	26	17
<b>Total</b>	<b>152</b>	<b>100</b>

What should be done to the perpetrators of violent crimes?	Freq	Percent
Jailed	72	47
Executed through judiciary	58	38
Extrajudicial Execution	5	3
Made to pay reparations	4	3
Rehabilitated	70	46
Forgiven	20	13
Exiled	2	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>152</b>	<b>100</b>

## Appendix II: Interfaith Survey Descriptive

### A: Demographics

### B: General Questions:

Are you a member of an interfaith institution that is engaged in preventing / countering violent extremism?	Freq	Percent
Yes	109	84
No	20	16
<b>Total</b>	<b>129</b>	<b>100</b>

How long have you been a member of the institution?	Freq	Percent
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None	1	1
1-5	77	71
6-10	22	20
11+	9	8
<b>Total</b>	<b>109</b>	<b>100</b>

Who are its members?	Freq	Percent
Clerics	34	31
Community members	29	27
Community leaders	35	32
Government officials	2	2
Cleric, community members and leaders	7	6
Youth	2	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>109</b>	<b>100</b>

What faiths are represented?	Freq	Percent
Christians	85	78
Muslims	77	71
African Tradition	37	34
Hindus	22	20
Non-believers	2	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>109</b>	<b>205</b>

Who do you target?	Freq	Percent
Youth	61	56
Women	4	4
Men	7	6
All	37	34
<b>Total</b>	<b>109</b>	<b>100</b>



What is the agenda of your institution	Freq	Percent
Interfaith Dialogue and Cooperation	53	49
Capacity building of religious communities	44	40
Countering Violent Extremism	38	35
Clerics platform	9	8
Human rights	10	9
<b>Total</b>	<b>109</b>	<b>141</b>

How would you describe the proportionality of representation in terms of percentages or numbers of both male and female in your institution?	Freq	Percent
Least represented	18	17
Moderately represented	55	50
Well represented	36	33
<b>Total</b>	<b>109</b>	<b>100</b>

In your view would you say your interfaith institution has accomplished its agendas ?	Freq	Percent
Yes	78	72
No	31	28
<b>Total</b>	<b>109</b>	<b>100</b>

How would you describe the efforts of your institutions?	Freq	Percent
Successful	76	70
Not successful	33	30
<b>Total</b>	<b>109</b>	<b>100</b>

Have you experienced any challenges in your CVE efforts?		
	Freq	Percent
Low Capacity	16	42
Lack of Funds	30	79
Less partnerships	15	39
Community Resistance	15	39
Threats	1	3
Security issues	1	3
<b>Total</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>205</b>

Have you partnered with the government, local or international actors in your efforts in achieving your agendas?	Freq	Percent
Yes	74	68
No	35	32
<b>Total</b>	<b>109</b>	<b>100</b>

## Appendix IV: Religious Leaders Descriptive

### Module A: Demographics

#### MODULE B - Institutional questions.

Are you a community Religious leader or are You in charge of a congregation?	Freq	Percent
Yes	135	94
No	8	6
<b>Total</b>	<b>143</b>	<b>100</b>

Where do you serve or lead?	Freq	Percent
Mosque	31	22
Community Madrassa	20	14
Parish Church	62	43
Community Congregation	30	21
<b>Total</b>	<b>143</b>	<b>100</b>

What is Your Role within Your Religious community/ organization?	Freq	Percent
Pastor	45	31
Sheikh	33	23
Elder	8	6
Woman leader	16	11
Youth Leader	32	22
Other church role	9	6
<b>Total</b>	<b>143</b>	<b>99</b>

Are you actively engaged in your community?	Freq	Percent
Yes	141	99
No	2	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>143</b>	<b>100</b>

In your estimation how many members do you have in your congregation?	Freq	Percent
1-20	8	
21-40	33	23
41-60	19	13
61-80	10	7
81-100	10	7

101-200	24	17
201+	39	27
<b>Total</b>	<b>143</b>	<b>100</b>

How would you describe the composition of your congregation/ community/organization?	Freq	Percent
Youthful	52	36
Balanced	77	54
Elderly	12	8
Mostly students	2	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>143</b>	<b>99</b>
Is cohesion a problem /challenge in your community among the different faiths or ethnicities?	Freq	Percent
Yes	77	54
No	66	46
<b>Total</b>	<b>143</b>	<b>100</b>

Are discussions of cohesion part of your sermon?	Freq	Percent
Yes	105	73
No	38	27
<b>Total</b>	<b>143</b>	<b>100</b>

Would You/ or Do You lead or host an interfaith community dialogue?	Freq	Percent
Yes	91	64
No	52	36
<b>Total</b>	<b>143</b>	<b>100</b>

Do You have an outreach program for Youths?	Freq	Percent

Yes	130	91
No	13	9
<b>Total</b>	<b>143</b>	<b>100</b>

<b>Which Outreach Program for Youth do you have?</b>	<b>Freq</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Drugs Prevention	32	25
AIDS and HIV Prevention	14	11
Peace and Security	54	42
Issues affecting the youth	16	12
Religion related issues	14	11
<b>Total</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>101</b>

#### **D: Interfaith Questions:**

<b>Do You believe that interfaith programs are a good way of bringing people of different faiths / ethnicities together?</b>	<b>Freq</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Yes	137	96
No	6	4
<b>Total</b>	<b>143</b>	<b>100</b>

<b>Do you have an interfaith program in your church/ mosque?</b>	<b>Freq</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Yes	72	50
No	71	50
<b>Total</b>	<b>143</b>	<b>100</b>

<b>Who are the majority members.</b>	<b>Freq</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Religious leaders	5	7
Community members	4	6
Youth	4	6

Mixed	59	82
<b>Total</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>101</b>

In your opinion what would be the major issue that an interfaith program should address in your community?	Freq	Percent
Religious / ethnic differences	100	70
Gender Based Violence	14	10
Youth unemployment	29	20
<b>Total</b>	<b>143</b>	<b>100</b>

In your Opinion would an interfaith savings group be a sustainable economic empowerment project?	Freq	Percent
Yes	103	72
No	11	8
I don't Know	24	17
No response	5	3
<b>Total</b>	<b>143</b>	<b>100</b>

#### E: CVE Specific Questions:

What should be done to the perpetrators of violent crimes?	Freq	Percent
Jailed	38	27
Executed through judiciary	47	33
Extrajudicial Execution	4	3
Made to pay reparations	1	1
Rehabilitated	46	32
Forgiven	3	2
Don't know	2	1
No response	2	1

<b>Total</b>	<b>143</b>	<b>100</b>
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<b>Have You come across any radicalized individual during your work?</b>	<b>Freq</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Yes	40	28
No	93	65
I don't Know	7	5
No response	3	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>143</b>	<b>100</b>

<b>Would You say that You are equipped to intervene for Individual at risk of recruitment or radicalization?</b>	<b>Freq</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Yes	77	54
No	52	36
I don't Know	11	8
No response	3	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>143</b>	<b>100</b>

<b>Are there any CVE initiatives in Your community?</b>	<b>Freq</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Yes	65	45
No	49	34
I don't Know	29	20
<b>Total</b>	<b>143</b>	<b>99</b>

<b>Does your congregation/ organization run a social media page?</b>	<b>Freq</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Yes	74	52
No	63	44
I don't Know	2	1

No response	4	3
<b>Total</b>	<b>143</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>How many followers do you have?</b>	<b>Freq</b>	<b>Percent</b>
1-30	9	12
31-60	11	15
61-90	0	0
91-120	5	7
121+	49	66
<b>Total</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>100</b>

<b>Do you know the signs of a person who is likely to choose a path of violence?</b>	<b>Freq</b>	<b>Perc</b>
Yes	46	32
No	62	43
I don't Know	28	20
No response	7	5
<b>Total</b>	<b>143</b>	<b>100</b>

<b>Has your community experienced any case related to violent extremism?</b>	<b>Freq</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Yes	77	54
No	51	36
I don't Know	11	8
No response	4	3
<b>Total</b>	<b>143</b>	<b>101</b>

<b>Are places of worship possible recruitment and radicalization?</b>	<b>Freq</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Yes	59	41
No	53	37



I don't Know	26	18
No response	5	3
<b>Total</b>	<b>143</b>	<b>99</b>

Have You experienced that? Or Have you heard of such places?	Freq	Percent
Yes	42	29
No	81	57
I don't Know	13	9
No response	7	5
<b>Total</b>	<b>143</b>	<b>100</b>

#### Social Media Questions:

How Would You describe your followers?	Freq	Percent
Largely Youth	40	54
Mixed Group	34	46
<b>Total</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>100</b>

## Appendix V: Youth Survey Descriptive

### A: Demographics

#### B: Political and Civil Questions:

Do you have an ID Card?	Freq	Percent
Yes	142	97
No	4	3
<b>Total</b>	<b>146</b>	<b>100</b>

Do Elections Matter?	Freq	Percent
Yes	122	84
No	24	16

<b>Total</b>	<b>146</b>	<b>100</b>
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<b>Do You take part in elections ?</b>	<b>Freq</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Yes	118	81
No	28	19
<b>Total</b>	<b>146</b>	<b>99</b>

<b>Have elections effected Change in Your Community?</b>	<b>Freq</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Yes	92	63
No	54	37
<b>Total</b>	<b>146</b>	<b>100</b>

<b>Do You participate in community Barazas?</b>	<b>Freq</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Yes	29	20
No	117	80
<b>Total</b>	<b>146</b>	<b>100</b>

<b>Would You say you're represented in the Government?</b>	<b>Freq</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Yes	65	45
No	81	55
<b>Total</b>	<b>146</b>	<b>100</b>

### C: Education Level:

<b>Did You go to school?</b>	<b>Freq</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Yes	146	100
<b>Total</b>	<b>146</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Did You lack for school fees?</b>	<b>Freq</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Yes	101	69

No	45	31
<b>Total</b>	<b>146</b>	<b>100</b>

Did You go to school in Your County?	Freq	Percent
Yes	117	80
No	29	20
<b>Total</b>	<b>146</b>	<b>100</b>

Did You have friends in school?	Freq	Percent
Yes	146	100
<b>Total</b>	<b>146</b>	<b>100</b>

Were they from another faith tradition or ethnicity?	Freq	Percent
Yes	137	94
No	9	6
<b>Total</b>	<b>146</b>	<b>100</b>

What was your school experience?	Freq	Percent
Poor	10	7
Moderate	95	65
Excellent	41	28
<b>Total</b>	<b>146</b>	<b>100</b>

Do you belong to any social, sports or cultural groups?	Freq	Percent
Yes	80	55
No	66	45
<b>Total</b>	<b>146</b>	<b>100</b>

#### D: Economic Incentives:

Are You employed or self-employed?	Freq	Percent
Employed	23	16
Self employed	40	27
None	83	57
<b>Total</b>	<b>146</b>	<b>100</b>

Is it difficult or easy to find work?	Freq	Percent
Easy	5	3
Difficult	125	86
I don't know	16	11
<b>Total</b>	<b>146</b>	<b>100</b>

Are You satisfied with Your wages?	Freq	Percent
No	138	95
Yes	8	5
<b>Total</b>	<b>146</b>	<b>100</b>

Would You consider joining Al-Shabaab or ISIS for any amount?	Freq	Percent
Yes	28	19
No	118	81
<b>Total</b>	<b>146</b>	<b>100</b>

Are you a breadwinner in your family?	Freq	Percent
Yes	43	29
No	103	71
<b>Total</b>	<b>146</b>	<b>100</b>

#### E: Religious/Ideology:

Do you identify with any religious group?	Freq	Percent

Yes	131	90
No	15	10
<b>Total</b>	<b>146</b>	<b>100</b>

<b>Were You born in this faith Tradition?</b>	<b>Freq</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Yes	124	85
No	22	15
<b>Total</b>	<b>146</b>	<b>100</b>

<b>Do you read the Holy Books/ Scriptures for Yourself?</b>	<b>Freq</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Yes	134	92
No	12	8
<b>Total</b>	<b>146</b>	<b>100</b>

<b>Do you follow the instructions of Your Religiousleader?</b>	<b>Freq</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Yes	127	87
No	19	13
<b>Total</b>	<b>146</b>	<b>100</b>

<b>What do you think about people who kill or injure in the name of their religion?</b>	<b>Freq</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Martyr	20	14
Evil	126	86
<b>Total</b>	<b>146</b>	<b>100</b>

<b>Do you have friends from other faiths?</b>	<b>Freq</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Yes	137	94
No	9	6

<b>Total</b>	<b>146</b>	<b>100</b>
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<b>Are you a member of any interfaith movement/ groups?</b>	<b>Freq</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Yes	48	33
No	98	67
<b>Total</b>	<b>146</b>	<b>100</b>

<b>What are the activities in this movement.</b>	<b>Freq</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Sports	29	20
Economic	36	25
Environmental	13	9
None	71	49
<b>Total</b>	<b>146</b>	<b>103</b>

<b>Should former members of armed groups be allowed to return to their communities?</b>	<b>Freq</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Yes	115	79
No	31	21
<b>Total</b>	<b>146</b>	<b>100</b>

## **F: Psychosocial:**

<b>Did You experience bullying as a child?</b>	<b>Freq</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Yes	58	40
No	88	60
<b>Total</b>	<b>146</b>	<b>100</b>

<b>Do you generally trust the members of your community?</b>	<b>Freq</b>	<b>Percent</b>
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Yes	89	61
No	57	39
<b>Total</b>	<b>146</b>	<b>100</b>

In Your lifetime, have you ever been imprisoned?	Freq	Percent
Yes	6	4
No	140	96
<b>Total</b>	<b>146</b>	<b>100</b>

In your life time have you ever had a close relative killed?	Freq	Percent
Yes	37	25
No	109	75
<b>Total</b>	<b>146</b>	<b>100</b>

In Your lifetime, have you ever been imprisoned?	Freq	Percent
Yes	6	4
No	140	96
<b>Total</b>	<b>146</b>	<b>100</b>

Have You lost someone You know in a terrorist attack or in a counter terrorist operation?	Freq	Percent
Yes	42	29
No	104	71
<b>Total</b>	<b>146</b>	<b>100</b>

Has violent conflict changed the way you think about other groups of people?	Freq	Percent
Yes	88	60
No	58	40

<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	
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<b>Are you on social media?</b>	<b>Freq</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Yes	131	90
No	15	10
<b>Total</b>	<b>146</b>	<b>100</b>

<b>Have you come across social media live chats/ discussions ?</b>	<b>Freq</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Yes	93	64
No	53	36
<b>Total</b>	<b>146</b>	<b>100</b>

<b>Would you host or participate an interfaith discussion/ live chat ?</b>	<b>Freq</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Yes	79	54
No	67	46
<b>Total</b>	<b>146</b>	<b>100</b>



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