

# YOUTH TRENDS

2010 - 2063





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P.O. Box 60856, Nairobi, Kenya

**RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS BY:**

Katindi Sivi-Njonjo Lead Consultant  
P.O Box 74600, 00200. Nairobi, Kenya

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

<b>AAI</b>	<b>Africa America Institute</b>	<b>ISS</b>	<b>Institute for Security Studies</b>
<b>AAYMCA</b>	<b>Africa Alliance of YMCAs</b>	<b>LFP</b>	<b>Labour Force Participation</b>
<b>ADHD</b>	<b>Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder</b>	<b>LFPR</b>	<b>Labour Force Participation Rate</b>
<b>AfDB</b>	<b>African Development Bank Group</b>	<b>MDD</b>	<b>Major Depressive Disorder</b>
<b>APC</b>	<b>Alcohol per Capita Consumption</b>	<b>MFSP</b>	<b>Mobile Phone Financial Service Provider</b>
<b>ASMR</b>	<b>Age-Standardised Mortality Rate</b>	<b>MENA</b>	<b>Middle East and North Africa</b>
<b>AUC</b>	<b>African Union Commission</b>	<b>MMR</b>	<b>Maternal Mortality Rates</b>
<b>CBK</b>	<b>Central Bank of Kenya</b>	<b>NCD</b>	<b>Non-Communicable Diseases</b>
<b>CRC</b>	<b>Rights of the Child</b>	<b>OB</b>	<b>Obesity</b>
<b>CVD</b>	<b>Cardiovascular Disease</b>	<b>ODI</b>	<b>Overseas Development Institute</b>
<b>DALYs</b>	<b>Disability-Adjusted Life Years</b>	<b>OECD</b>	<b>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</b>
<b>DFID</b>	<b>Department for International Development</b>	<b>OW</b>	<b>Overweight</b>
<b>DRC</b>	<b>Democratic Republic of Congo</b>	<b>PPP</b>	<b>Purchasing Power Parity</b>
<b>EAC</b>	<b>East African Community</b>	<b>PRB</b>	<b>Population Reference Bureau SADC Southern Africa Development Community</b>
<b>ECCAS</b>	<b>Economic Community of Central African States</b>	<b>SSCR</b>	<b>Secondary School Completion Rate</b>
<b>ECD</b>	<b>Early Childhood Development</b>	<b>STI's</b>	<b>Sexually Transmitted Infections</b>
<b>ECOSOC</b>	<b>United Nations Economic and Social Council</b>	<b>SSA</b>	<b>Sub Saharan African</b>
<b>ECOWAS</b>	<b>Economic Community of West African States</b>	<b>ToT</b>	<b>Training of Trainers workshop</b>
<b>EPR</b>	<b>Employment-to- Population Ratio</b>	<b>UN-Habitat</b>	<b>United Nations Human Settlements Programme</b>
<b>EY Ernst and Young</b>		<b>UNDP</b>	<b>United Nations Development Programme</b>
<b>FAO</b>	<b>Food and Agriculture Organisation</b>	<b>UNECA</b>	<b>United Nations Economic Commission for Africa</b>
<b>FLFP</b>	<b>Female Labour Force Participation</b>	<b>UNFPA</b>	<b>United Nations Population Fund</b>
<b>FLFPR</b>	<b>Female Labour Force Participation Rate</b>	<b>WHO</b>	<b>World Health Organisation</b>
<b>FPE</b>	<b>Free Primary Education</b>	<b>WRA</b>	<b>Women of Reproductive Age</b>
<b>GDP</b>	<b>Gross Domestic Product</b>	<b>YLD</b>	<b>Years Lived with Disability</b>
<b>HDR</b>	<b>Human Development Report</b>		
<b>HED</b>	<b>Heavy Episodic Drinking</b>		
<b>IDA</b>	<b>Institute for Defence Analyses</b>		
<b>ILO</b>	<b>International Labour Organisation</b>		
<b>IMF</b>	<b>International Monetary Fund</b>		



# FOREWORD



***The Africa Alliance of YMCAs (AAYMCA) is involved in the Africa we Want initiative that focuses on the realisation of Agenda 2063. The project is an attempt to foster informed debate about possible paths the continent might have to travel, whether it likes it or not, given the looming youth bulge. The project is targeted at rallying all African governments to tap into the window of opportunity that youth bulges bring by effectively supporting the role of youth in contributing to the development of the continent to effectively achieve Africa's Agenda 2063.***

This publication is the first part of a three-phased project, and constitutes the research phase. The exercise was geared towards documenting different data patterns on youth expected in the future. A primary data collection exercise was conducted and complimented

with secondary data to determine the status of youth in Africa and how various youth indicators have and will evolve over time, generally between 2010 and 2060. The work was not designed to give reasons for the patterns observed since the forces of change behind

the trend – the drivers of change, will be discussed fully in the second phase of the project.

However, in some instances, the work attempts in-depth analysis and cross-referencing of data to make inferences but in other sections, only simple observations are made to derive meaningful insights and future implications of the trends. Some of the comments and summaries made emanated from the country specific discussions held with young people across Africa during the dissemination of the draft findings.

The second phase will be the scenarios building phase,

which will involve conversations with youth representatives from the continent on possible futures Africa could face, considering the youth trends discussed and the complex external drivers of change.

Possible strategic interventions that countries could consider in order to avert negative outcomes and enhance the positive outcomes will also be produced in this second phase. In the third phase, we will disseminate the findings of both the fact book and the scenarios stories as well as formulate concrete policy messages to key stakeholders with the hope of provoking meaningful action and mainstreaming of youth engagement to realise Agenda 2063.

The topics covered in this publication include: population trends / demographics; urbanisation and migration; health; education; employment; economic trends and ICT. The topics are based on availability of quantitative data with projections. This work was made possible by hundreds of young Africans. The Africa Alliance of YMCAs would like to thank all the teams that participated in this process (see annex 1.1 for more details). We welcome you to interact with this exciting information and hope that you will find it insightful.

***Carlos Madjri SANVEE***  
*General Secretary*  
*Africa Alliance of YMCAs*





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# 1. INTRODUCTION

## 1.1 Rationale of the project

*This project is founded on two main concerns - the majority's outlook of youth issues by African governments on one hand and the assumptions made by Agenda 2063.*

### Majority's outlook of youth issues

African governments largely see the youth issue in two perspectives. The first is unemployment hence the setting up of numerous training, loaning and networking initiatives that address this challenge. The second is education hence the huge investments in Free Primary Education (FPE). Whereas these are very important aspects of youth development, they only address youth issues in part.

Considering that youth is a transition period from childhood to adulthood, it becomes intrinsic to connect how the childhood period contributes to youth development. Investment in early childhood education, nutrition and reproductive health services are among the most important human capital investments a country can make as they have a direct co-relation with the eventual well being of young

people. Further progress requires young people who acquire relevant technical training and advanced skills such as problem solving abilities to make them capable workers and citizens, relevant and valuable in the global, political,

economic and social scene. A successful transition to work accelerates the reduction of poverty and minimises probability of youth engagement in crime and other vices. Building human capacity early is therefore important, not just for the future opportunities but also to mitigate the intergenerational transmission of poverty.

This process also enables young people to be well equipped to interact independently with their communities as a right (e.g. to a fair trial, to vote, to hold public officials accountable for their actions and demand justice) and


as an obligation (e.g. to pay of taxes).<sup>1</sup> The government in this regard has to provide an opportunity for productive civic engagement.

This implies that youth issues are not independent facets and snapshots that require independent strategies but are instead, interconnected systems of causal relationships that interact with one another to produce complex patterns, structures and systems. As such, policies and youth strategies should be structured in a similar way in order to provide the required interventions that result in best outcomes for them.

### Agenda 2063 Assumptions

The vision makes various assumptions, which this work seeks to address.





**FIGURE 2: Agenda 2063**

*Source: Africa Union Commission, 2015<sup>2</sup>*

The first underlying assumption is the fact that, as with all visions, there is one official aspirational future for all. While there is nothing inherently wrong with this approach, it has its limitations. The future is based on the current state of affairs and projects it as if the world will continue to evolve in a linear fashion, devoid of extreme changes. It also assumes that we will be in control of that future for it to turn out as we prescribe.

An aspiration like “an integrated continent, politically united, based on the ideals of pan-Africanism,” while ideal in a fragmented continent that exists today, may be completely irrelevant in 2063, perhaps because global integration will be more ideal, practical and appealing at the time. It could also be that at the time, more localisation will be appealing and feasible than integration. As such, the vision does not interrogate what aspirations will make sense in 2063

based on the volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous nature of the external environment that we cannot control between now and then.

This is for purposes of planning from the future back into the present to determine the implications for us based on where we are, so that we make contingent strategies for various possibilities, including the desirable outcomes. This approach can help us see many more opportunities beyond the prescribed ones and it also enables us to strategise on how to avert undesirable futures.

By stating that, “present generations are confident that the destiny of Africa is in their hands, and that they must act now to shape the future they want,” intrinsically assumes that the children born today and Africa’s young people will be recipients of the stated development and not the key drivers of the outcomes. However,


as shown in the document, today’s children and youth will be the primary implementers of agenda 2063. A child born in 2017 for example will be, by 2063, forty-six years old. It means that at some point during the implementation of the vision, they will be at the peak of their careers, perhaps in key decision-making positions.

The global turn of events, their life experiences and circumstances, which dictate their eventual outlook of life, will determine whether they enhance or curtail the realisation of the vision. If for example, the bulk of them only receive minimal education, they will only be in a position to take low-level menial jobs with low incomes that increase poverty in the continent by 2063 rather than collectively help realise a prosperous Africa. The quality of decisions they make and commitment to the vision will therefore determine if it eventually

succeeds or fails, which makes their involvement and complete buy-in central to the process. However, their lack of centrality in this process is proved by a survey conducted by YMCA to determine whether Africa's young people: know about Agenda 2063; whether they understand its

relevance; and whether they know of government initiatives in their own countries that incorporate this vision. As shown in figure 2, less than one third of the respondents (aged 15-35) in sub-Saharan Africa, knew about Agenda 2063. Less than a third of those who were aware

of agenda 2063 thought it was relevant for them and only 12% of them knew that their government was incorporating the vision in its policies and programmes.



**FIGURE 3:** *Knowledge, relevance and government incorporation of Agenda 2063*

## 1.2 Data collection and profile of respondents

### Data collection

In order to meet the study objectives, the material in this book is collated from both primary and secondary sources so as to bring out a combination of qualitative and quantitative results. Primary data collection was done using a self-administered questionnaire (see Annex 1.2) that was developed through a rigorous process. The research topics emanated from discussions held by African YMCAs where youth from 20 countries held Africa youth day celebrations, between 1st and 12th November 2016, under the theme #AfricansInMe to anchor youth identity discussions. An online peer review of the proposed topics was held with various individuals from the four Sub-Sahara Africa (SSA) regions, which led to a refinement of the data to be collected in the field. The designed questionnaire

was pre-tested with a small group of young Africans and corrected based on the feedback received. The questionnaire was then translated into French. Both the English and French versions of the questionnaire were circulated online and through YMCA youth representatives who distributed physical copies to youth aged between 15 and 35 years. Participants were selected on the basis of their availability to respond to the questionnaire. Our aim was to get 1,000 respondents from at least 20 countries spread across the four regions of Sub-Sahara Africa (SSA) – West, Central, Eastern and Southern Africa. Using an estimated population of 420 million youth in this region (as of April 2017)<sup>3</sup> and a confidence level of 99%, the estimated margin of error is projected at plus or minus four percent. Once the results were analysed, a Training of Trainers (ToT) workshop was held to train

youth leaders on how to convene youth in their respective countries, present the data collected and lead rigorous discussions on: whether the data was a true reflection of their reality, and their detailed views on the various issues presented in the report. These youth conventions were held between August and September 2017 and numerous youth gave their views.

Secondary sources of information certified as credible were used to compliment the primary data collected and offer simple explanations on the trends. However, with the exception of demographic data, the study is limited by the lack of detailed and up to date information consistently collected over time regarding the other variables, to enable accurate statistical projections of trends to 2060. According to Overseas

Development Institute (ODI), issues of most concern to youth and women are poorly covered by existing data and more so, Africa has the weakest data collection and the highest data gaps compared to other regions in the globe<sup>4</sup>. Data challenges also forced us in some instances to exclude Northern Africa in the analysis since most datasets do not

include this region or where they do, they are sometimes clustered with Middle East, making it difficult to offer a sufficient comparative analysis with the other African regions. The Africa Alliance of YMCAs survey had minimal response in the region because of the difficulty experienced in administering the questionnaires there. Overall, resources to conduct

a much bigger exercise limited us to a small sample size of 1,142 people responding to the questionnaire

### Profile of respondents

This section provides information on the demographic characteristics of respondents interviewed.

Respondents by region	No.	%	Gender	No.	%
Burundi	5	0.4	Male	526	46.1
Ethiopia	67	5.9	Female	513	44.9
Kenya	136	11.9	Others	4	0.4
Madagascar	98	8.6	Skipped	99	8.7
Rwanda	1	0.1	<b>Total</b>		<b>100</b>
South Sudan	8	0.7	<b>Age</b>	<b>No.</b>	<b>%</b>
Uganda	2	0.2	15-20	291	25.5
Tanzania	77	6.7	21-25	393	34.4
Zambia	69	6.0	26-30	239	20.9
Zimbabwe	39	3.4	30-35	73	6.4
<b>Eastern Africa</b>	<b>502</b>	<b>44.0</b>	Other ages	9	0.8
Cameroon	108	9.5	Skipped	137	12.0
Chad	2	0.2	<b>Total</b>		<b>100</b>
Congo	1	0.1	<b>Marital status</b>	<b>No.</b>	<b>%</b>
DRC	1	0.1	Single	843	82.2
Equatorial Guinea	1	0.1	Partnered	51	4.98
<b>Central Africa</b>	<b>113</b>	<b>9.9</b>	Married	105	10.2
Tunisia	2	0.2	Separated	1	0.10
<b>Northern Africa</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>0.2</b>	Divorced	5	0.49
Namibia	1	0.1	Widowed	0	0.00
South Africa	11	1.0	Others	20	1.95
Swaziland	1	0.1	Skipped	117	
<b>Southern Africa</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>1.1</b>	<b>Total</b>		<b>100</b>
Gambia	6	0.5	<b>Highest level of education</b>	<b>No.</b>	<b>%</b>
Ghana	77	6.7	None	5	0.4
Liberia	68	6.0	Primary	20	1.8
Niger	12	1.1	Secondary / High school	290	25.4
Nigeria	16	1.4	Tertiary / college	177	15.5
Senegal	39	3.4	University (Undergraduate)	367	32.1
Sierra Leone	74	6.5	University (postgraduate)	160	14.0
Togo	87	7.6	Others	8	0.7

Western Africa	379	33.2	Skipped	115	10.1
Other	11	1.0	Total		100
Skipped	122	10.7	Do you work	No.	%
Total	1142	100	Yes	342	29.9
Respondents by language	No.	%	No	727	63.7
French	311	27.2	Skipped	73	6.4
English	831	72.8	Total	1142	100
Area of residence	No.	%			
Rural	149	13.0			
Urban	701	61.4			
Peri-Urban	143	12.5			
Skipped	149	13.0			
Total	1142	100			



### Regional origin of respondents:

The highest proportion of respondents were from Eastern Africa (44%) followed by West Africa (33.2%), then Central Africa (9.9%) and Southern Africa (1.1%). This pattern coincides with the pattern for youth proportions in Africa

where East Africa has the highest proportion of youth followed by West Africa then Central and Southern Africa. However, there was stark under-representation of youth from Southern and Northern Africa in the survey as shown in figure 3.

### Respondents by language:


About 73% of the respondents were English speaking while 27% were French speaking as shown in figure 4.



### Area of residents:

Although Africa is largely rural, most youth surveyed resided in urban areas (61%), while 12% and 13% resided in rural areas and peri-urban areas respectively as shown in figure 5.


### Respondents area of residence



### Respondents by gender:

The proportion of male respondents participating in the survey was 46% while females were 45%. Some participants preferred not to specify as shown in figure 6.


### Gender composition



### Respondents by age:

Most respondents in this survey were aged between 21 and 25 years (34%), followed by 15 – 20 year olds (26%), then 26 – 30 year olds (21%) and the minority group was 30-35 year olds (6.4%) as shown in figure 7.

### Age of respondents




### Area of residents:


Although Africa is largely rural, most youth surveyed resided in urban areas (61%), while 12% and 13% resided in rural areas and peri-urban areas respectively as shown in figure 5.

### Employment status of respondents

About a third of the respondents were in gainful employment while 64% were not working. Six percent did not respond to this question. From the below profile of respondents, the primary data is largely reflective of what single, urban, 15-30 year old jobless youths with post-secondary education think about Africa.



### Do you work









## 2. KEY MESSAGES

*The report presents salient points about the general trends to expect by 2060 in Africa across various youth indicators. The report also presents youth perceptions on various issues. From the respondents' profile, the perceptions are largely reflective of what single, urban, 15-30 year old jobless youths with*

### Knowledge of Agenda 2063

Less than one third of youth surveyed, knew about Agenda 2063. Less than a third of those were aware of agenda 2063 thought it was relevant for them and only 12% claimed to know that their respective governments were incorporating the vision in their policies and programmes.

### Definitions of youth

Youth was best described by 85% of the respondents as attaining a certain age. About 15% of respondents felt that attaining certain status such as economic independence defined youth hood while 11% felt that certain transitions such as getting married were symbolic of attaining the status of youth hood.

When asked to specify the age bracket of youth, respondents gave age categories ranging from 6 to 50 years.

### Youth outlook

The most important identity for young people was their youth hood (30%), being African (21%), their country of origin (16%), their sex (13%) and being a global citizen (12%).

While 86% of young people felt optimistic about their value in society mainly because of their potential, 68% also felt disillusioned about life

and the future mainly due to few opportunities and an environment that is not so conducive for them to explore that potential

Success is defined as having a good profession or job (19%); being well educated (18%); helping others (14%); being in good spiritual standing (12%); and having a lot of money / fortune (9%). The greatest aspirations among young people for themselves were: desire to have successful and better lives; education; happiness; and good jobs. For their families, young people mentioned: happiness; better lives (wealth and success); long life; love and unity. For Africa, they mentioned peace, development and unity.

The greatest challenges young people experienced include finding work, poverty, illiteracy in their communities and quality of education, drug abuse among their peers, HIV/ AIDs prevalence, corruption in their governments and ineffective citizen engagement. The greatest fear among youth was fear of failure (36%). This was followed by poverty (22%), death (17%), and terminal illness (14%).

Most young people (63%) do not see government, as currently structured, being able to address their concerns. In fact, 73% say that government has never adequately

addressed youth issues in the past and in order to be more effective, they (government) would need to allocate more resources to youth relevant issues (49%), have more young people in governance (28%), do better legislation and make better youth policies (16%) and eradicate corruption.

Although many young people's view of corruption is that it is a great challenge in their country and although 96% of the respondents say that they would not receive a bribe to elect a person, a spirited discussion in many country meetings confirmed that almost all young people would take money and gifts from politicians. They however do not consider these as bribes but as facilitation resources available during campaign times.

Many young people complain of ineffective citizen engagement in their society but interestingly, 52% of respondents were not interested in public affairs. Those who are interested, (48%), it is mainly to have their say about how they are governed.

Three quarters of youth surveyed said they would participate in their country's respective next elections mostly as voters (70%) and also as civic educators or election observers



(7%). Only three percent would offer themselves as candidates.

When asked of other ways they would prefer to engage in debates and discussions on issues concerning youth, most said through social media (49%), youth councils (14%), religious institutions (10%), NGO/CSO's (8%), and youthful Members of Parliament (7%).

Most youth in SSA subscribe to a religion (91%) and 14% feel that religious extremism is justified.

### **Population trends**

The population of Africa was 16% of the global population in 2015 and is projected to grow two and half times more by 2060, thus increasing its share of the global population to 29% or one third of the total global population. The African youth population is projected to more than double from 407 million in 2015 to 975 million by 2060. After 2030, youth will also form the highest population cohort of 33% of the population in the continent.

Regionally, Central Africa's youth population will grow 3 times while Southern Africa will experience a tripling decline of its youth population. However, Eastern and Western Africa will still have the highest populations and proportions of youth by 2060.

Fertility rates are set to decline one and half times between 2015 and 2060. Central Africa will half its fertility rate by 2060.

Infant mortality is also projected to decline 2.5 times in Africa between 2015 and 2060. Western Africa will have the highest decline in infant mortality by 3 times in 2060. By 2060 Africa's median age is projected to be 26.8 years from 19.4 in 2015. While Central Africa had the youngest population in 2015, by 2060, Western Africa will have a slightly younger population than Central Africa.

It is projected that by 2060, average life expectancy in Africa will reach 72.9 years, compared to 62.4 years in 2015.

### **Urbanisation and migration**

Only 40% of the population in Africa

was urban in 2014 but by 2050, 56% of the population will be living in urban areas. According to the survey, only one quarter of Africa's youth preferred to live in rural areas in the future compared to 72% who preferred to live in urban areas. Since African cities are not designed and equipped to accommodate such rapid population increases, the slum population, which was 61.7% in 2014 in SSA is expected to almost double by 2030.

The bulk of African migration takes place within the continent through rural – urban migration and intra – regional migration. However, 67% of Africa's youth would like to migrate to other countries in the future in search of better work opportunities. Of those, a whopping 87% would move to places outside Africa, mainly USA, Europe and Canada and only 13% of those are interested in staying within the continent. One third of Africa's youth are not interested in migrating.

### **Sexual reproductive health**

The biggest health concern among young people is consequences of early and unprotected sex such as unwanted pregnancies, HIV/AIDS and STIs. Others include alcohol and drug abuse (26%) and psychological / mental health (7%).

Internet (26%), peers and friends (19%), religion (18%) and media (11%), specifically TV and radio were the biggest influencers of sex and intimate relationships. Family members, schools, and health institutions played a small role while governments influenced negligibly.

Sex before age 15 was reported by 27% of male and 26% of females aged between 15 and 19 years old. As such 19% of young women become pregnant before age 18. In West and Central Africa, the number of pregnancies among adolescent girls less than 18 years of age could increase by 67%, while in Eastern and Southern Africa, the number of pregnant adolescent-girls could increase by 57%.

About 70,000 adolescent girls die annually from complications

brought about by pregnancy and childbirth. General maternal mortality is expected to fall by 28% between 2015 and 2030.

The proportion of adolescent girls who are married is nine times that of young men the same age in SSA, 13 times in Western and Central Africa and six times in East and Southern Africa. Due to a high population growth rate in sub-Saharan Africa, the number of women who get married before 18 is expected to increase by 50% over the next 15 years. In order to end child marriages by 2030, progress would need to be around eight times faster.

At least nine percent of maternal deaths (16,000) annually were due to unsafe abortions. The regions with the highest number of abortions are Eastern and Western Africa, mainly due to the number of women in the reproductive age. The number of abortions per 1,000 women doubled in all regions except Northern Africa between 1999 and 2014.

### **Non communicable diseases**

The prevalence of Non Communicable Diseases (NCDs) such as Cardiovascular Diseases (CVDs), cancer, respiratory diseases and diabetes, is rising rapidly. Between 2008 and 2030 the share of deaths these NCDs will cause is projected to rise by 64% to a total of 46% of all deaths, thus becoming the leading cause of death in the continent.

Given that Africa has the world's youngest population who will have matured to the ages when NCDs are most prevalent, by 2050, NCD prevalence will be three times the size it is today. Four key risk behaviours among young Africans that will spike NCDs are tobacco and alcohol use (which will quadruple by 2060 if comprehensive tobacco prevention and control policies are not in place), physical inactivity (which is projected to increase direct costs of emerging economies by 450% by 2030) and unhealthy diet (obesity is projected to increase by 80% between 2007 and 2025 while the number of overweight children

is projected to double by 2030) in part because of globalisation, urbanisation, and socio-economic development.

Significant population growth and ageing will result in an estimated 130% increase in the burden of mental and substance use disorders in Sub-Saharan Africa by 2050. The burden of mental and behavioural mood disorders (such as bipolar disorder, major depressive disorder, alcohol dependence and schizophrenia) is likely to triple by 2050. The burden of mental and substance use disorders will continue to be highest in Eastern and Western Africa but the highest increase in prevalence of burden will be experienced in Central Africa. Although the burden of mental and behavioural mood disorders was highest among 20-24 year olds in 2010, it will be highest among 25-29 year olds while the highest increase in prevalence will be among 30-34 year olds.

### Communicable diseases

By 2030, communicable diseases will decrease by almost half as causes of death in the continent. However, treatments for the major communicable diseases like HIV/AIDs will continue to occupy a significant portion of national health budgets for the foreseeable future. Assuming low prevention and treatment, the number of people living with HIV/AIDs will increase 2.7 times by 2050 (from the 2010 infection rates) and new infection rates will increase 2.8 times while the number of deaths between 2010 and 2050 will triple. Assuming increased prevention and treatment, HIV/AIDs deaths are projected to drop to about 1.5% by 2060.

### Sexual violence

Over a third of women in Africa (37%) experience physical and/or sexual intimate partner violence in their lifetime from their partners and about 12% experience sexual violence from people who are not their partners.

Intimate partner violence is quite high among youth (average of 43.5%) and in Central Africa it averages 66%.

### Education

Only 18% of young children in SSA were enrolled in pre-primary programmes and yet their developmental potential and good education outcomes later in their school life are dependent on it. Net attendance in primary school is 73.5%, meaning that about one third of children in Africa do not have access to primary education – they are illiterate. Even then, the survival rate of students to the end is 56.5%. Unfortunately, after graduating from primary school, many students find it difficult to attend secondary school as these schools can only accommodate an average of 36% of qualifying primary school students across Africa. Technical and vocational education and training has not been a top priority for many African countries. As a result, enrolment at this level is only eight percent (10% of young men and six percent of young women) “yet a one-year increase in average tertiary education levels would raise annual GDP growth in Africa by 0.39%. Higher education has the highest pay offs in the world as returns on investments stand at 21%.

In the AAYMCA survey, 77% of the respondents said the education they received was relevant and valuable to them in the future but 22% felt otherwise. Documented benefits of education include:

- Each year of additional schooling for girls reduces infant mortality by 5-10%.
- The children of mothers with five years of primary education are 40% more likely to
- live beyond the age of five and 43% less likely to be malnourished.
- Women with primary education have on average fewer children, use more productive

farming methods and, as non-

agricultural workers, receive higher wages

### Un/employment

The working age population (15 – 64 year olds) will increase by 150% in 2030, 214% in 2045 and by 283% in 2060. This means that the working age population is projected to increase one and half times in the next 15 years, double by 2045 and almost triple by 2060. This translates to 63% of the total population by 2060 and makes SSA the region with the highest number of migrant workers to offer the world (328 million by 2050). A positive outcome of these changing demographics is the fact that it increases the number of the working age population compared to the non-wage population (i.e. the aged and the children). If the working age population is economically productive, it usually decreases dependency and increases savings, which leads to more development in the country– potentially from low income to middle income. Unfortunately if the majority of the working age population is not meaningfully employed, it leads to many idle people, which could be very destructive as 40% of those who join rebel movements are motivated by lack of work. Currently, high levels of youth unemployment and/or underemployment coupled with low- wage income will significantly constrain the continent’s ability to reap the benefits of the demographic dividend

The pace of labour force growth (i.e. those in search of employment) outstrips the pace of job creation. Only three million formal jobs are created annually despite the 10 to 12 million youth that enter the workforce each year, meaning that the continent will have to create high-productivity jobs at an average of about 12 million jobs per year - an extremely rapid and possibly unprecedented rate - to absorb the new entrants in the labour force.

Unemployment disproportionately

affects young people and especially young women. The youth unemployment rate is practically three times higher than that of adult and consistently increases with the level of education attained. Unemployment tends to be for long periods of time compared to other regions of the world. The incidence of long-term unemployment (of 12 months and longer) among youth in SSA was 48%, behind Middle East and North Africa, whose long-term unemployment incidence is 60.6%.

Among the youth surveyed by YMCA, 70% were not gainfully engaged in productive work and only 30% were engaged. When asked the main challenge young people experience in their countries, 60% listed employment related issues. The biggest challenge of finding work is lack of it (28%), inexperience (18%), incompatibility of work with education received (14%), discrimination (11%) and lack of adequate skills (11%).

Besides high unemployment, youth are also over-represented in vulnerable jobs that are informal and that attract low or no wages. The informal sector employs 80% of the labour force meaning that 8 out of 10 of all workers in the continent are informal workers (disproportionately women and youth). Non-wage employment represents more than 80% of total employment for women and more than 60% for men. Among 15-24 year olds for example, very few are wage earners (9% in North Africa and 17% in SSA) yet even among these, a significant proportion (35.9%) were in temporary jobs, making SSA the region with the highest proportion of working poor youth (92%) in the world.

Majority of youth surveyed (78%) felt that the education they receive (or that is offered) in their countries would be valuable to them in the future and would be helpful to them in getting a job or starting a business. However, this was contradicted by the same youth who cited quality of

education in their countries as one of the biggest challenges they face. In SSA, three in five young workers (61.4%) do not have the level of education expected to make them productive on the job. Only one third of young people in SSA have well matched education qualifications to the job market and seven percent are over-educated. This is compared with almost half of young people (47%) in North Africa having well matched education qualifications to the job market while about 12% are over-educated.

The survey also shows that we are training youth for what they really do not want to do in the future (social science, business and law) and under-training for what youth would like to do in the future (science, health and agriculture). The data suggests that high investments should be made in training youth for technology, NGO, education, agriculture and health related jobs (and from various sections in this book, this is where there is the greatest need for workers in Africa).

The survey also revealed that youth are disinterested in small informal businesses. When asked how the ideal future job should be structured, majority desire to be in formal employment (43%), with flexibility in terms of time and place (42%). This counters the many youth employment policies and huge investments currently being implemented in Africa that target training and loaning to youth to start small, often informal businesses. Evidently, technical and vocational skills development through institutional or on the-job-training could help to fill the gap between education and employment.

### **Economic performance**

Economic growth, while necessary but not enough to alleviate poverty of vulnerable groups like young people, is projected to grow in the coming years in Africa. Extrapolations of current economic performance suggest a positive future to 2050.

North Africa (due to energy-based economies) and Southern Africa (due to a more diversified economy) will continue to post higher per capita incomes. Of the other three regions, Eastern Africa is likely to show the strongest growth by 2050 followed by Western Africa.

Africa's growth is however by no means assured because of global developments, particularly the escalating price of commodities like food and oil, which pose serious threats to governance, peace and security, factors that affect economic growth.

Sectors driving the economies in Africa are agriculture, manufacturing, construction and services. Agriculture, though declining as a GDP earner is still a high employer. If nurtured to thrive, it is a sector that would absorb more youth, stimulate economic growth and reduce poverty, two times more effectively than the service industry. The service sector is projected to continue growing as the main GDP earner in Africa but unfortunately, the sector absorbs fewer highly educated people due to the sophistication of the sector and mechanisation of processes. However, as earlier mentioned, 61.4% of youth in SSA are under-educated and this curtails their participation in the sector.

Poverty, inequality and emergence of a middle class

Employed youth were 1.5 times more likely to be found in the extreme poverty class than adults and 1.2 times more likely to be in the moderately poor class. The highest rates of poverty can be observed among young women as well as young people living in rural areas. The number of people living in extreme poverty will be highest in West Africa and it will significantly increase in Central Africa, mainly due to the higher proportions of younger populations hence higher dependency ratios than the other regions.



Sub-Saharan Africa has the highest levels of income and gender inequalities in the world. There is growing evidence that such inequality impedes economic growth, and SSA's progress in reducing poverty will continue to be slow because of high inequalities. It has been estimated that a one percent increase in income levels could result in a 4.3% decline in poverty in countries with very low inequality or as little as a 0.6% decline in poverty in highly unequal countries.

Africa's middle class (defined as those earning between USD 2 to 20 per day, and which constitutes the poor in other countries of the world) is expected to rise to 42% of the population by 2060. This group is associated with more affluent lifestyles of increased consumerism of luxury goods but SSA's so called 'middle class' is vulnerable due to the

precarious nature of their work and their consumer behaviour does not coincide with perceptions of a middle class that will sustain domestic consumption and growth in the future.

#### ICT

Technology penetration in Africa has been growing rapidly and is expected to have massive economic and social impacts. There are wide disparities in mobile penetration in the continent. The disparities range from one percent in Eritrea to 83% in Kenya. While only 10% of global Internet users came from Africa, the phenomenal growth of digital inclusion to the unconnected between 2000 and 2017 as a result of the mobile economy ranges from 755% in Sao Tome & Principe to 1,021,354% in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

On average, the sector has expanded internet access in Africa by 8,503%. This increased inclusion is supported by the YMCA survey where 90% of the respondents said they had access to internet and 84% of them accessed the net through their mobile phones.

The mobile ecosystem supported 3.8 million jobs in 2015. This includes workers directly employed in the ecosystem and jobs indirectly supported by the economic activity generated by the sector. The number of jobs supported will increase to 4.5 million by 2020. The rapid IT growth reflected in the forecasts will have a positive impact in Africa's economy but most importantly in the lives of youth – to innovate and be gainfully employed. Additionally, the internet and mobile phones have become tools for social transformation.



## 3. YOUTH DEFINITIONS AND OUTLOOK


*From the onset of this work, it was important to determine what the term youth means across the continent since societies define and distinguish youth differently*

### 3.1 Youth definitions

While youth connotes a transition phase from childhood into adulthood, it presupposes a change from being dependent on others to being independent when people have to negotiate a complex interplay of both personal and socio-economic changes in order to take effective control of their own lives and assume social commitments.<sup>5</sup> It is usually marked by certain rites of passage or

other defining events such as gaining employment or establishing a family and since these shifts do not occur at the same time, there is no universal consensus on a clear-cut indicator when this transition happens thus making the concept problematic and ambivalent to define.<sup>6</sup> According to the Africa Alliance of YMCAs survey (see figure 10), 85% of the respondents felt that attaining a

certain age best described who a youth is. About 15% of respondents felt that attaining certain status such as economic independence defined youth hood while 11% of the respondents felt that certain transitions such as getting married were symbolic of attaining the status of youth hood. Other descriptions of attaining youth hood included: independent decision-making, taking



**FIGURE 11:** *Definition of youth*

responsibility for oneself, or ones decisions and actions; attaining a societal position; finding / discovering oneself; aspiring to a higher status of leadership or parenting; being self-reliant even when not employed; potential; feeling youthful (it is a state of mind); being energetic or athletic.


The age categorisation is mostly used to provide some degree of objectivity. However, these age categories also differ across space and time. Even within a society, "people within a wide range of ages claim the space of youth, at specific times and in specific places."<sup>7</sup> In some cultures, pre-teenagers may be considered as youth, while people in their 40s may also be included in this category, for

example, if they are not married.<sup>8</sup> In the youth survey conducted by AAYMCA, when asked to specify the age bracket of youth, age categories ranging from 6 to 50 years were given.

Other age descriptions include: the UN General Assembly which defines youth as individuals aged between 15 and 24 without prejudice to other definitions by Member States; World Health Organisation (WHO), UNICEF and UNFPA define adolescent as those aged between 10 and 19, young people as those aged between 10 and 24 and youth as those aged between 15 and 24 respectively; the Commonwealth defines youth as the age bracket between 15 and 29 years, UN Habitat (Youth Fund) defines

youth as those aged between 15 and 32 while the African Union (AU) defines youth as those aged between 15 and 35.

Figure 11 (Also see annex 1.3) shows the definitions of youth in various African countries. The figure shows varying age ranges with the lowest lower limit being 0 and the highest upper limit being 40 to describe youth. Algeria has no lower limit; Egypt, Guinea Bissau and Tunisia have differing upper limits while Mali has two different age ranges to define youth. Central Africa Republic, Chad, Djibouti, Libya, Sao Tome and Principe, Somalia, and South Sudan do not have specified age ranges to define youth.





### 3.2 Youth outlook

#### Identity


is an organised, learned and dynamic subjective evaluation of how an individual see's themselves or who they perceive they are.<sup>9</sup> Young people who cultivate a clear and positive identity after their developmental struggles during adolescence often advance more smoothly into adulthood than those who do not. When asked which was the most important identity as a young person, as shown in figure 12, most

respondents recognised their youth hood (30%), being African (21%), their country of origin (16%), their gender (13%) and being a global citizen (12%). Other important identities included faith and being kind.


When asked how other people view youth, almost half (49%) felt that other people viewed them positively (e.g. youth are an asset), about one third felt that people viewed them negatively (e.g. lost or irresponsible) and about 21% gave neutral

comments that described what youth tend to do rather than who they are, such as being a tech savvy generation.

While many young people (86%) felt optimistic about their value in society mainly because of their potential, a big proportion (68%) also felt disillusioned about life and the future mainly due to few opportunities and an environment that is not conducive for them to explore that potential as shown in figure 13.



**FIGURE 13:** *Most important identity*



**FIGURE 14:** *Perception on value and disillusionment of youth*





**Success** is defined as having a good profession or job (19%), being well educated (18%), helping others (14%), being in good spiritual standing (12%), and having a lot of money / fortune (9%) as shown in figure 14. Interestingly, having family and friends or being in good health, things that are perceived to matter to the older generation, received less prominence in the study.

**The greatest fear** among youth is the fear of failure (36%), poverty (22%), death (17%) and terminal illness (14%). Other fears included unemployment, religious fears (such as dying without knowing God, God's judgement); not fulfilling their purpose, war, and death of loved ones. Young Africans' greatest aspirations: for themselves is successful and better lives, education, happiness and good jobs; for their families is happiness, better lives (wealth and success), long life, love and unity; and for Africa is peace, development and unity. Opportunities that young people see in their countries and appreciate include access to basic education, and opportunities for agriculture and for doing business.

The greatest challenges for young people in Africa are finding work, poverty, illiteracy in their communities and quality of education, drug abuse among their peers, HIV/ AIDs prevalence, corruption in their governments and ineffective citizen engagement. Most young people (63%) do not see their governments, as currently structured, being able to address these and other young people's concerns. In fact 73% say that their government have never adequately addressed youth issues in the past and in order to be more effective, they (government) would need to allocate more resources to youth relevant issues (49%), have more young people in governance (28%), do better legislation and make better youth policies (16%) and eradicate corruption.

Although many young people's



view of corruption is that it is a great challenge in their country and although 96% of the respondents say that they would not receive a bribe to elect a person, a spirited discussion in various countries confirmed that almost all young people would take money and gifts from politicians. They however, do not consider these as bribes but as facilitation resources available during campaign times.

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their opinion, three quarters of them will participate in the country's next elections mostly as voters (70%) and also as civic educators or election observers (7%). Only 3% will offer themselves as candidates. When asked of other ways youth engage in debates and discussions on issues concerning youth, most said through social media (49%), youth councils (14%), religious institutions (10%), Non-Governmental Organisations/ Civil Society Organisations - NGO/ CSO's (8%), and youthful Members of Parliament (7%).

Most youth in SSA subscribe to a religion (91%) and 14% feel that religious extremism is justified.



## 4. DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS

*Population considerations such as growth or decline, structure and distribution across different age groups at any given point in time are important because they have a significant impact on people's quality of life and the socio-economic development of a country.<sup>10</sup>*

### 4.1 Sex ratio of young men and women

Sex ratio is the proportion of men and women and is important because it impacts on issues of gender equality, the future of labour markets, marriage and family formation. The ratio of young men to women in the world was 51:49 in 2015 and is expected to remain the same by 2060. In Africa, the male to female sex ratio was 50.1: 49.9 and it is expected

to slightly change in favour of young men to 50.5: 49.5 by 2060 as shown in table 2. North Africa is projected to be the only region that will have a female ratio that is slightly above that of young men. However, it is important to note that the sex ratios are projected from the current status.

With scientific advancement, it is also expected that future sex ratios will

be altered depending on people's preferences of whether they want to get a boy or a girl.<sup>11</sup> Discussions are also rife on whether the future definition of people should distinctly remain male and female as the only sex identities or include a third category that accommodates intersex and transgender sex identities.

**Source: UN world population prospects, 2017**

	2015		2030		2045		2060	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
World ratio	51.2	48.8	51.6	48.4	51.4	48.6	51.2	48.8
Africa ratio	50.1	49.9	50.5	49.5	50.5	49.5	50.5	49.5
Eastern Africa	50.0	50.0	49.8	50.2	50.2	49.8	50.1	49.9
Central Africa	50.0	50.0	50.0	50.0	50.4	49.6	50.3	49.7
Northern Africa	50.0	50.0	51.1	48.9	51.9	48.1	49.5	50.5
Southern Africa	50.0	50.0	50.0	50.0	50.0	50.0	50.0	50.0
Western Africa	50.9	49.1	50.8	49.2	50.8	49.2	50.6	49.4


**TABLE 2:** *Ratio of young men and women (aged 15 - 34) between 2015 and 2060*

## 4.2 Population structure / distribution

The age structure of a population is the distribution of various age groups in the population. Understanding the age structure of a population is important because people's economic behaviour and needs vary at different stages of life. Changes in the age structure of a country therefore have significant effects on its economic performance<sup>12</sup>.

The youth structure in Africa, which comprises of: 15 – 19; 20-24; 25-29; and 30-34 year olds was 10.3%, 9%, 7.9%, and 6.9% of the total population respectively in 2015 as shown in figure 16. By 2060, the structure is expected to change to 9.1%, 8.5%, 8%, and 7.3% of the total population. Of all the youth segments, 15-19 year olds will still have the highest population by 2060 (of 260 million youth) although

it is the segment that will have the slowest increase (of 2.19 times). The fastest growing segment will be 30 – 34 year olds (2.65 times), followed by 25-29 year olds (2.51 times), then 20 – 24 year olds (2.34 times) As shown in table 3, regionally, the highest rate of growth between 2015 and 2060 will be in Central Africa where the youth population will grow 3 times. This is attributed to the fact that the region



**FIGURE 17:** *Proportion of youth by age cohort btw 2015 & 2060* Source: UN world population prospects, 2017  
**Source: UN world population prospects, 2017**

has the highest number of child population in Africa, which will in the future surge the number of children maturing into youth and also the childbearing population. The lowest level of growth will be experienced in Southern Africa, mainly due to the effects of HIV and Northern Africa

(1.37 times) mainly due to the fact that the region experienced the tip of its youth bulge earlier than the rest of the continent..

	Agespecif- ic pop in 2015	Total pop	% of- total pop	Agespecif- ic pop in 2060	Total pop	% oftotal pop	How manytimes population will increase
<b>World</b>	in millions			in millions			
<b>15-19</b>	593	7383	8.0	692	10,222.6	6.77	1.17
<b>20-24</b>	601	7383	8.1	682	10,222.6	6.67	1.13
<b>25-29</b>	613	7383	8.3	671	10,222.6	6.56	1.09
<b>30-34</b>	553	7383	7.5	662	10,222.6	6.48	1.20
	2,360	7383	32.0	2,707	10,222.6	26.48	1.15
<b>Africa</b>							
<b>15-19</b>	123	1194.4	10.3	269	2,964.4	9.07	2.19
<b>20-24</b>	108	1194.4	9.0	253	2,964.4	8.53	2.34
<b>25-29</b>	94	1194.4	7.9	236	2,964.4	7.96	2.51
<b>30-34</b>	82	1194.4	6.9	217	2,964.4	7.32	2.65
	407	1194.4	34.1	975	2,964.4	32.89	2.40
<b>Eastern Africa</b>							
<b>15-19</b>	44	399.5	11.0	94	1,046.3	8.98	2.14
<b>20-24</b>	38	399.5	9.5	89	1,046.3	8.51	2.34
<b>25-29</b>	32	399.5	8.0	84	1,046.3	8.03	2.63
<b>30-34</b>	26	399.5	6.5	78	1,046.3	7.45	3.00
	140	399.5	35.0	345	1,046.3	32.97	2.46
<b>Central Africa</b>							
<b>15-19</b>	16	153.7	10.4	45	464.7	9.68	2.81
<b>20-24</b>	14	153.7	9.1	42	464.7	9.04	3.00
<b>25-29</b>	12	153.7	7.8	38	464.7	8.18	3.17
<b>30-34</b>	10	153.7	6.5	34	464.7	7.32	3.40
	52	153.7	33.8	159	464.7	34.22	3.06
<b>Northern Africa</b>							
<b>15-19</b>	20	225	8.9	27	391.0	6.91	1.35
<b>20-24</b>	20	225	8.9	28	391.0	7.16	1.40
<b>25-29</b>	20	225	8.9	26	391.0	6.65	1.30
<b>30-34</b>	18	225	8.0	26	391.0	6.65	1.44
	78	225	34.7	107	391.0	27.37	1.37

Southern Africa							
15-19	6	63.4	9.5	6	89.5	6.70	1.00
20-24	6	63.4	9.5	6	89.5	6.70	1.00
25-29	6	63.4	9.5	6	89.5	6.70	1.00
30-34	6	63.4	9.5	6	89.5	6.70	1.00
	24	63.4	37.9	24	89.5	26.82	1.00
Western Africa							
15-19	37	352.6	10.5	94	972.9	9.66	2.54
20-24	31	352.6	8.8	87	972.9	8.94	2.81
25-29	26	352.6	7.4	79	972.9	8.12	3.04
30-34	22	352.6	6.2	72	972.9	7.40	3.27
	116	352.6	32.9	332	972.9	34.12	2.86

Source: UN world population prospects, 2017

Eastern and Western Africa will still have the highest populations and proportions of youth by 2060. Western Africa is the region that will most increase its share of youth in

the continent by six percent while Northern Africa is the region that will most reduce its share of the youth population in the continent by eight percent as shown in figure 17.

Age structures are influenced by parameters such as fertility, mortality and migration<sup>13</sup>. Africa is undergoing a demographic transition, owing to the fact that women are giving birth




FIGURE 18: Regional proportion of youth in the continent

Source: UN world population prospects, 2017



later, to fewer children and spacing them more. As shown in table 4, fertility rates in Africa in 2015 were approximately 1.8 times more than the global rate but by 2060, the rates will be 1.5 times less than the 2015 rates. Central Africa, which had the highest fertility rates in 2015, is projected to half its fertility rate

by 2060. Infant mortality is also projected to decline by 2.5 times in Africa from 50 per 1,000 live births in 2015 to 20 per 1,000 live births in 2060. Western Africa will have the highest decline in infant mortality by 3 times in 2060.

Number of children per woman				
	2015	2030	2045	2060
World	2.47	2.39	2.27	2.17
Africa	4.43	3.9	3.27	2.81
Sub-Sahara Africa	4.75	4.12	3.4	2.88
Eastern Africa	4.48	3.81	3.14	2.71
Central Africa	5.54	4.72	3.69	2.99
Northern Africa	3.09	2.79	2.47	2.27
Southern Africa	2.49	2.26	2.02	1.89
Western Africa	5.2	4.56	3.37	3.1
Infant mortality rate (both sexes per 1000 live births)				
	2015	2030	2045	2060
World	31	25	18	13
Africa	50	39	27	20
Sub-Sahara Africa	53	41	29	21
Eastern Africa	46	35	25	19
Central Africa	64	51	36	27
Northern Africa	24	19	14	11
Southern Africa	32	25	19	15
Western Africa	59	44	29	19

**TABLE 4:** *Number of children per woman, infant mortality rate and average change in urban population*

**Source:** UN world population prospects, 2017



## 4.3 Implication of population trends

These trends have various implications including: decrease in overall annual population growth rate; increase in population; altering of the age composition; and increase in life expectancy. **Decrease in overall annual population growth rate:** A first effect of declining fertility

and mortality rates is the “lowering of Africa’s overall annual population growth rate”<sup>14</sup> (from 2.49% in 2015 to 1.53% by 2060). Southern Africa will triple its decline such that by 2060, it will be the region with the lowest population growth rate of 0.38% as shown in table 5. The rates of decline

can be disrupted by a slowing GDP per capita or by an epidemic like HIV/AIDS as was the case in Southern Africa or by low funding on family planning programmes

**Increase in population:** Sustained population growth results from mortality rates falling by more than

Population growth rate	2015	2030	2045	2060
World	1.09	0.87	0.63	0.42
Africa	2.49	2.25	1.92	1.53
Sub-Sahara Africa	2.65	2.43	2.06	1.65
Eastern Africa	2.71	2.43	1.99	1.57
Central Africa	3.04	2.78	2.32	1.83
Northern Africa	1.78	1.39	1.12	0.77
Southern Africa	1.28	0.93	0.64	0.38
Western Africa	2.65	2.49	2.18	1.77

**TABLE 5:** *Africa population growth rates by sub-regions*

**Source:** UN world population prospects, 2017

fertility rates.<sup>15</sup> Although Africa’s fertility and population growth rates have been declining (as shown in table 4 and 5), Africa’s population has been growing. In 2015, the population was 16%<sup>1</sup> of the global population and it is projected to grow two and half

times more by 2060, thus increasing its share of the global population to 29% or one third of the total global population as shown in table 6.

The African youth population is projected to more than double by 2060 as shown in table 3. Western

Africa will add 216M more people while Eastern Africa will add 205M more people in the continent, making the two regions the highest contributors of population growth in Africa.

<sup>1</sup> According to UN, 2015 World population prospect, 60% i.e. 4.4 billion people in 2015 live in Asia; 10% i.e. 738 million live in Europe; 9% i.e. 634 million lived in Latin America and the Caribbean; 5% i.e. 358 million lived in Northern America; while 39 million people lived in Oceania. China (1.4 billion) and India (1.3 billion) remain the 2 largest countries of the world, both with more than 1 billion people, representing 19 and 18% of the world’s population.

**TABLE 6:** *Overall population in millions between 2015 and 2060*

Overall population in millions	2015	2030	2045	2060
World	7383	8551	9504	10223
Africa	1194	1703	2312	2964
Proportion of Africa's pop in relation to the global pop	16.2	19.9	24.3	29.0
Sub-Sahara Africa	969	1418	1969	2573
Eastern Africa	400	587	888	1046
Central Africa	154	238	345	465
Northern Africa	225	285	342	391
Southern Africa	1.3	1.7	83	90
Western Africa	353	518	731	973

**Source:** UN world population prospects, 2017

#### **Altering of the age composition:**

The third effect on declining mortality and fertility rate is the change on the age composition of the population. The phenomenon leads to a decrease in the share of children (aged 0-14), an increase in the share of the youth population (aged 15 – 35 year olds) which in turn surges the proportion of the working age population i.e. 15 – 64 year olds and slightly increasing the aging population. As evidenced in table 7, the proportion of children in Africa aged 0-14 years old is projected to decline from 41% in 2015 to 29% by 2060. The proportion of the youth will remain at 34% from 2015-2045 before it declines to 33% by 2060. It is important to note that by 2045, youth will form the highest population

cohort in the continent. The share of adult population will consistently increase from 21% in 2015 to 30% by 2060 while the elderly population will consistently increase from 3% of the population to 7% of the population.

Currently, the proportion of children to population is highest in Central Africa (46%) while the proportion of youth to population is highest in Southern Africa (37%). Southern Africa (29%) and Northern Africa (28%) have the highest proportion of adults to population while Northern and Southern Africa have the highest proportion (5% each) of the elderly population.

The increasing and decreasing

trends of the age composition in the different age cohorts will increase the working age population (15 – 64 year olds) by 150% in 2030, 214% in 2045 and by 283% in 2060). In other words, the working age population is projected to increase one and half times in the next 15 years, double by 2045 and almost triple by 2060. The share of the working age population is therefore projected to grow from 55% of the total population to 63% of the total population i.e. from 663 million people in 2015 to about 1.9 billion people as demonstrated in table 7.

Region, sub-region, country or area *	Reference date (as of 1 July)	Total population (in millions) by cohort				Total population (in millions)	Proportion of age cohort to the total pop			
		0-14	15-34	35-64	65+		0-14	15-34	35-64	65+
WORLD	2015	1931	2360	2480	612	7383	26	32	34	8
	2030	2025	2481	3048	997	8551	24	29	36	12
	2045	2064	2652	3374	1414	9504	22	28	36	15
	2060	2090	2707	3608	1817	10222	20	26	35	18
Sub-Saharan Africa	2015	418	330	192	29	969	43	34	20	3
	2030	555	497	318	49	1419	39	35	22	3
	2045	686	684	512	87	1969	35	35	26	4
	2060	786	863	765	159	2573	31	34	30	6
AFRICA	2015	490	407	256	41	1194	41	34	21	3
	2030	636	586	411	70	1703	37	34	24	4
	2045	772	791	625	123	2311	33	34	27	5
	2060	874	974	901	215	2964	29	33	30	7
Eastern Africa	2015	173	139	75	12	399	43	35	19	3
	2030	225	210	132	20	587	38	36	22	3
	2045	271	281	220	38	810	33	35	27	5
	2060	305	345	323	74	1047	29	33	31	7
Central Africa	2015	70	50	29	4.5	153.5	46	33	19	3
	2030	100	82	48	7.5	237.5	42	35	20	3
	2045	128	122	82	13.5	345.5	37	35	24	4
	2060	148	160	131	25	464	32	34	28	5
Northern Africa	2015	73	77	63	12	225	32	34	28	5
	2030	82	90	93	21	286	29	31	33	7
	2045	86	107	113	36	342	25	31	33	11
	2060	89	111	136	55.5	391.5	23	28	35	14
Southern Africa	2015	19	23	18	3	63	30	37	29	5
	2030	20	25	25	5	75	27	33	33	7
	2045	19	26	31	7.5	83.5	23	31	37	9
	2060	18	25	34	12	89	20	28	38	13
Western Africa	2015	155	117	71	10	353	44	33	20	3
	2030	210	180	112	16	518	41	35	22	3
	2045	268	256	180	28	732	37	35	25	4
	2060	314	333	277	49	973	32	34	28	5

**TABLE 7:** *Proportion of children, working age population and the elderly between 2015 and 2030*

**Source: UN world population prospects, 2017**

The median age in Africa in 2015 was 19.4 compared to the global median age, which was 29.6 years old. By 2060 Africa's median age is projected to be 26.8 years. While Central Africa had the youngest population in 2015,

by 2060, Western Africa will have a slightly younger population than Central Africa as shown in table 8. Increase in life expectancy: A forth effect of lowering fertility and mortality rates is improved life expectancy. It is

projected that by 2060, average life expectancy in Africa will reach 72.9 years, compared to 62.4 in 2015 (see table 9). The improvement varies across regions. Northern Africa and Eastern Africa are projected to have

	2015	2030	2045	2060
World	29.6	33	35.3	37.4
Africa	19.4	21.2	23.9	26.8
Sub-Saharan Africa	18.3	20.1	22.8	25.9
Eastern Africa	18	20.5	23.7	27.1
Central Africa	17.1	18.7	21.3	24.6
Northern Africa	25	27.6	30.9	34.2
Southern Africa	25.5	28.9	32.3	36
Western Africa	17.9	19.3	21.7	24.5

**TABLE 8:** *Median age between 2015 and 2030*

**Source: UN world population prospects, 2017**

the highest life expectancies with 78.5 and 74.2 years respectively against 69.2 years in Western Africa. These life expectancy trends are expected due to "projected better incomes,

access to improved water supply and sanitation, and better health facilities".<sup>16</sup> Science innovations will also play a part in lengthening the lifespan of individuals.



World	2015	2030	2045	2060
At birth	72	73.8	76.2	78.3
15	60.7	61.9	63.5	65
20	56.1	57.2	58.7	60.1
25	51.5	52.6	54	55.4
30	46.9	47.9	49.3	50.7
35	42	43	45	46
Africa			-	
At birth	62.4	65.7	69.8	72.9
15	53.8	55.7	58.3	60.4
20	49.4	51.2	53.7	55.7
25	45.2	46.8	49.1	51.1
30	40.99	42.5	44.6	46.4
35	36.8	38.2	40.1	41.9
Sub - Sahara Africa				
At birth	60.4	64	68.4	71.8
15	52.2	54.3	57	59.4
20	47.8	49.8	52.4	54.7
25	43.7	54.5	47.9	50.1
30	39.6	41.2	43.5	45.5
35	35.5	37	39	40.9
Eastern Africa	-	-	-	-
At birth	64	67.2	71.1	74.2
15	54.6	56.5	59.2	61.5
20	50.1	51.9	54.5	56.7
25	45.7	47.4	49.9	52.1
30	41.5	43	45.3	47.2
35	37	38.7	40.8	42.8
Central Africa	-	-	-	-
At birth	60	63.4	67.9	71.3
15	52.6	54.7	57.3	59.5
20	48.9	50.3	52.8	54.8
25	44.2	46	48.3	50.2
30	40.1	41.8	43.9	45.7
35	36.1	37.6	39.5	41.2
Northern Africa	-	-	-	-
At birth	72.5	73.9	76.4	78.5
15	60	61.3	63.1	64.8
20	55.3	56.5	58.3	59.4
25	50.5	51.7	53.5	55.1
30	45.8	47	48.7	50.3
35	41.1	42.3	43.9	45.5
Southern Africa	-	-	-	-



At birth	63.5	66	69.7	73.2
15	51.5	53.3	56.5	59.6
20	46.9	48.6	51.6	54.7
25	42.4	44	46.9	49.9
30	38.2	39.6	42.3	45.2
35	34	35.5	37.9	40.6
Western Africa	-	-	-	-
At birth	56.9	60.9	65.8	69.2
15	49.7	52	54.8	56.9
20	45.6	47.7	50.3	52.3
25	41.7	43.5	45.9	47.7
30	37.8	39.4	41.5	43.1
35	33.9	35.2	37.1	38.6

**TABLE 9:** *Life expectancy at exact age (2015 – 2060)*  
**Source: UN world population prospects, 2017**

### **HOW WILL AFRICA HARNESS ITS YOUTH DEMOGRAPHIC DIVIDENDS?**

*Understanding the demographic characteristics of a population is important for purposes of planning and service delivery. The age composition of a country's population is an important factor for development policy making.<sup>17</sup> If countries in Africa manage the demographic transition wisely, by highly investing in the human development of its children and youth e.g. through good reproductive health care and high quality education that can enable easy access to good job opportunities for the rapidly growing working age population, a window of opportunity can open up (demographic dividend) to foster the improvement of people's general wellbeing and improve economic growth.<sup>18</sup>*

*While fertility declines yield an immediate drop in the growth rate of number of children, there is usually a substantially delayed decline in the rate of growth of the working age population. The stalling of the fertility decline mentioned earlier could threaten to maintain Africa's population in the "arc of instability" demonstrated by a non-ending youth bulge. If the large proportion of young adults in the working-age population does not get adequate, good quality education and become gainfully employed, it implies high levels of political instability and backlash.<sup>19</sup>*



# 5. URBANISATION & MIGRATION TRENDS

## 5.1 Urbanisation

*While Africa is the least urbanised continent in the world, it is experiencing the highest urban growth and the most rapid rate of urbanisation.<sup>20</sup> Africa and especially SSA, has experienced an unprecedented rate of urban growth, outpacing other regions.<sup>21</sup>*

As shown in table 10, only 40% of the population in Africa was urban in 2014. By 2050, 56% of the population will be living in urban areas – an increase of 16 percentage points. Southern Africa was the most urbanised while Eastern Africa was the least urbanised in 2014. By 2050, the proportion of urban growth will be highest in both Eastern and Western Africa (i.e. by

19% each). Western Africa will also experience the highest growth of urban population between 2014 and 2050 (i.e. by 360 million people). Although Eastern Africa is projected to be the least urbanised by 2050, several cities such as Dar es Salaam, Nairobi, and Addis Ababa in Eastern Africa, are now and will continue to be among the fastest-growing

in the world (see table 11) by 2025. This increased urbanisation will be associated mainly with an increase in rural-urban migration, natural population growth of youthful and working age populations as well as the spatial reclassification of urban areas.

	Population (000,000)		Population-change	Proportion urban (%)		% Change
	2014	2050		2014	2050	
World	3,880	6,338	2,458	54	66	12
Africa	455	1,339	884	40	56	16
Sub-Saharan Africa	346	1,137	791	37	55	18
Eastern Africa	97	379	282	25	44	19
Central Africa	61	192	131	44	61	17
Northern Africa	110	202	92	51	63	12
Southern Africa	37	55	18	61	74	13
Western Africa	151	511	360	44	63	19

**TABLE 10:** *Urban population and proportion urban*

**Source:** World urbanisation prospects, 2014


**TABLE 11:** *African Cities that will grow by more than 50% by 2025*

City	Country	Projected % change in growth (2010 – 2025)
Dar es Salaam	Tanzania	85.2
Nairobi	Kenya	77.3
Kinshasa	Congo	71.8
Luanda	Angola	69.3
Addis Ababa	Ethiopia	62.4
Abidjan	Cote d'Ivoire	53.2
Dakar	Senegal	51.5

Source: AfDB, 2014

In the AAYMCA survey, when young people were asked where they would like to live in the future, most (72%) preferred to live in urban areas than in rural areas (25%) as shown in figure 18.

**Where young people would like to live in the future**



**FIGURE 19:** *Where young people would like to live in the future*

## 5.2 ‘Sluminisation’ of Africa

Africa will become far more crowded due to the expected population surge. The population will more than double to 80 persons per square kilometres between 2015 and 2050.<sup>22</sup> African cities are not designed and equipped to accommodate such rapid population increases. As such,

urbanisation in Africa has brought about the proliferation of slums and as shown in table 12, 61.7% of people living in urban areas are slum dwellers. Africa therefore has the highest population of people living in slums in the world.<sup>23</sup> A comparison in SSA between urban growth rate (4.58%) and slum

growth rate (4.53%) showed that both were similar while in Northern Africa, urban growth rate (2.48%) was higher than slum growth rate (-0.15%).<sup>24</sup> By 2030, the slum population is projected to almost double.<sup>25</sup>



**TABLE 12:** *proportion of urban population living in slums (1990 – 2012)*

Major region or area	1990	2014	2050
Proportion of urban population			
Africa	31	40	56
Sub-Saharan Africa	27	37	55
Population density			
Africa (Per sq. km)	16*	39	80
Proportion of slum population			
Northern Africa	34.4	13.3	
Sub-Saharan Africa	70.0	61.7	

Source: State of the World's Cities 2012/2013; UN habitat. (2014). World urbanisation prospects; UNICEF, 201426

### 5.3 Migration in Africa

Migration is a significant contributor to urban growth and urbanisation, as people move in search of social and economic opportunities. Urban migration in Africa in 2014 was double the global average but by

2050, it will be 2.5 times more than the global average (see table 13). The highest rate of migration to urban areas will be experienced in Eastern Africa while the least will be experienced in Southern Africa. Even

though the annual growth rate has been declining, African urban areas grew 1.7 times faster than the urban growth rate of the world in the same years.<sup>27</sup> The bulk of African migration takes

**TABLE 13:** *Average change in urban population in percentage*

	2015	2030	2045	2050
World	1.84	1.44	1.07	1
Africa	3.42	3.12	2.7	2.56
Sub-Sahara Africa	3.83	3.47	2.94	2.78
Eastern Africa	4.35	4	3.37	3.17
Central Africa	3.75	3.38	2.79	2.61
Northern Africa	2.04	1.74	1.49	1.36
Southern Africa	1.43	1.16	0.9	0.82
Western Africa	4.06	3.54	2.94	2.78

Source: UN world population prospects, 2017

place within the continent, as people circulate within Africa, looking for economic opportunities.<sup>28</sup> **Rural – urban migration** is a dominant migration stream as well as **intra –regional migration**, another

form of mobility flow within Africa, which is larger (53%) than migration to other regions. Major destination countries within Africa are South Africa, Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Kenya, and Ethiopia.<sup>29</sup> In West Africa in

particular, intra-regional movements make up 90% of migration movements as shown in table 14 making it the region with the largest intra-regional movement

**TABLE 14: Origin and destination of migrants by region**

	Africa	Asia	Europe	Latin America	Oceania	Other regions
Africa	52.6	12.5	28.9	0.2	0.9	4.9
	East Africa	Central Africa	Northern Africa	Southern Africa	Western Africa	Outside Africa
	47	15	12	27	0	34
	30	50	6	7	7	58
	51	27	20	0	2	91
	35	0.1	0	65	0	63
	3	7	0.7	0	90	35
Total	166.00	99.10	38.70	99.00	99.00	281.00
Average level of migration	33.20	19.82	7.74	19.80	19.80	56.20


Source: AfDB, 2010<sup>30</sup>

Despite the dominance of intra-regional migration within Africa, the Africa Alliance of YMCAs survey indicates an acceleration and diversification of migration destinations from outside the continent. When young people were asked if they would like to migrate to other countries in search of better work opportunities, 67% of


the respondents said yes and only 31% said no. Of those who said yes, a whopping 87% of them said they would move to places outside Africa. Only 13% of those who would like to migrate said they would stay within the continent as shown in figure 19. Despite recent data showing migration is not following colonial and linguistic patterns, the survey

shows that USA, Europe and Canada still dominate as the go to places for young Africans. The highest migrants to other destinations outside Africa are Northern Africans (91%) followed by Southern Africans (63%) and Central Africans (58%) as shown in table 14.

**Would you migrate to another country in search for better work opportunities?**



**Where would you search for better work opportunities**

**FIGURE 20: Migration to other countries**

Migrants from SSA tend to be younger and more educated than the native population, hence the factor of brain drain in the continent.<sup>31</sup> It is projected that by 2050, nearly all major industrialised nations will

experience a substantial deficit in their labour force, particularly of the most productive age bracket, while currently poor regions such as SSA and South Asia are expected to witness a huge surplus of the working

age population as shown in table 15. These factors (of demographic and labour market pressures) are likely to influence the pattern of migration from Africa to OECD countries in the future.<sup>32</sup>

**TABLE 15:** *Change in the size of labour force in selected regions of the world during 2010- 2050 (in millions of people)*

Age group	SSA	North Africa	South Asia	India	China	Europe	North America
15-24	163.4	-10	25	-7.8	-67.6	-18.1	-10.8
25-39	261.6	-4	130	92.3	-85.8	-36.7	-7.4
40-64	274	-4	150	299	77	-33.4	1.2
Total	699	-18	305	383.5	-76.4	-88.2	-17

Source: AfDB, 2010

### THE IMPACT OF INCREASED URBANISATION

Much of the population growth in cities has resulted in rapidly expanding informal settlements, hence unplanned and overcrowded places where people are living in conditions of extreme poverty and deprivation. While these trends generally present daunting challenges for development, they disproportionately affect young people who become vulnerable to taking risky low paying jobs that expose them to sexual and other forms of exploitation, physical and emotional harm. Low access to clean water, sanitation, electricity, education and health care denies them their basic rights to these basic services.<sup>33</sup>

Living in an urban environment is associated with raised blood pressure, blood sugar, and BMI particularly for recent settlers, with increased blood pressure becoming apparent within months of migrating from rural to urban areas. Urban residents have a 1.5 to 4 times higher prevalence of diabetes than their rural counterparts, and have increased cardiovascular risk. Urbanisation, higher incomes, sedentary lifestyles, and alcohol consumption independently contribute to higher BMI due to changes in dietary habits. Pollution (caused by emissions from industry, motor vehicles, and households, and exacerbated by the use of trucks for long-distance transportation),<sup>34</sup> and stress raises cardiovascular risks. Overall the health and well-being of young people is affected by unplanned urbanisation.

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Urban poverty is now a permanent feature of most economies because while it is generally assumed that urban populations are more literate and more prosperous than rural populations, the recent State of the World's Cities Report clearly shows that the urban poor in developing countries are as badly off, if not worse off than their rural relatives<sup>35</sup>. However, despite these challenges, cities have played a pivotal role in sustaining economic growth in recent years, generating about 55% of the continent's total GDP. If managed properly, African towns and cities can contribute as much to boosting economic output as they have elsewhere in the world (about 90% of the GDP in developed countries),<sup>36</sup> which includes raising the quality of life of young people who migrate in search of a more productive life in the cities. However, for this economic growth to be beneficial, equity considerations must be a central part of it.

International migration, which is purely driven by better economic opportunities, has increased global mobility of young people to other countries. This often exposes them to precarious working conditions and in some cases modern day slavery, with little protection from violation due to their migrant status. International migration will also be driven by demand for skilled and unskilled labour from countries whose populations are ageing.





## 6. HEALTH TRENDS

### 6.1 Youth perspective on health


*Results from the Africa Alliance of YMCAs survey show that the biggest health concern among young people is consequences of early and unprotected sex (49%) and includes unwanted pregnancies (10%), HIV/AIDS (15%) and STI's (4%).*

Other concerns are alcohol and drug abuse (26%) and psychological / mental health (7%) as shown in figure 20. Other concerns include malaria, cancer, diabetes.


When asked who influences young

people's decisions on sex and intimate relationships, most (26%) said internet, 19% said peers and friends, 18% said religion and 11% said media, specifically TV and radio as shown in figure 21. Family

members, schools, and health institutions played a small role while governments played a negligible role



**FIGURE 21:** *biggest health concern among young people*



**FIGURE 22:** *Biggest influencer of sex and intimate relationship decisions*

## 6.2 Sexual reproductive health

**Risky sexual behaviour:** As shown in table 16, up to 27% of male and 26% of females aged between 15 and 19 years old reported sex before age 15 in selected countries. Early sexual debut was more common among the least educated and rural females. Reporting of multiple sexual partnerships was more common among males than females while urban males and females as well

as females with higher education, were more likely to report multiple partnerships. Urban youth and those with higher education also reported more condom use. Adult support for condom education for 12 to 14-year-olds has increased over time from 60 to 65%.<sup>37</sup> More specifically, a significantly larger proportion of females compared to males reported having had early sex (before the age

of 15) in countries in West Africa. In Central, Eastern and Southern Africa, the pattern was mixed with a higher proportion of males reporting early sex in many countries. In most countries, 2–6% of 15 to 19 year-old females who had sex in the past year had a partner who was 10 or more years older during that time.

**TABLE 16:** *Sexual behaviour of African adolescents*

Region/country	Legal age of consent for sex years	Proportion of people having sex before the age of 15	
		Male	Female
<b>West Africa</b>			
Benin	18	13	13
Cote d' Ivoire	15	17	20
Ghana	16	4	8
Guinea	15	18	20
Liberia	16	9	19
Mali	16	6	24
Niger	13	5	26
Nigeria	13	6	15
Senegal	16	13	9
Sierra Leone	14	11	22
<b>Central Africa</b>			
Congo	not known	24	23
DRC	18	18	18
<b>Eastern Africa</b>			
Ethiopia	15	2	11
Kenya	18	22	12
Madagascar	14/21	8	17
Mozambique	16	27	23
Rwanda	18	15	5
Tanzania	18	8	11
Uganda	18	14	12
Zambia	16	16	12
Zimbabwe	12/16	5	5
<b>Southern Africa</b>			
Lesotho	14 (M) 16 (F)	26	9
Namibia	16	19	7
Swaziland	18	5	7

**Source:** Doyle, Mavedzenge, Plummer, and Ross (2012)

**Teenage pregnancies:** Although fertility among adolescents has fallen in most countries, data gathered in 54 countries between 1990 and 2011 shows a slight decline in the percentage of women between the ages of 20 and 24 who reported a birth before age 18 (from about 23% to about 20%)<sup>38</sup>. However, high


fertility among under 18s remains a concern in some areas. It is estimated that 20,000 girls aged 15 to 19 give birth every day. This translates to about 14 million adolescent girls becoming mothers every year. Most of the world's births to adolescents (95% or 110 births per 1,000<sup>39</sup>) occur in Africa where about 19% of young

women become pregnant before age 18.<sup>40</sup> One quarter of teenagers aged 15 – 19 have an unmet need for contraceptives (see table 17), yet this is a critical age for young African women to participate in education and build skills needed for adult life.

The greatest increase in pregnancy

among adolescent girls less than 18 years of age over the next 20 years is likely to happen in sub-Saharan Africa. As shown in figure 22, in West and Central Africa, the number of pregnancies among adolescent girls less than 18 years of age could increase by 67%, from 5.4 million

in 2010 to 8.9 million in 2030 (i.e. 1.8 million per year). Over the same period, in Eastern and Southern Africa, the number of pregnant adolescent girls could increase by 57%, from 4.7 million to 7.4 million (i.e. 1.5 million per year)<sup>41</sup>



**FIGURE 23:** *Number of women aged 20-24 (millions) who will give birth before age 18 from 2010 to 2030*  
**Source:** UNFPA, 2013a

#### Teenage maternal mortality:

Research shows that very young adolescents in low-income countries have double the risk for maternal death and obstetric fistula than older women. A study by WHO<sup>42</sup> shows that girls who become pregnant at 14 or younger are more likely to experience premature delivery, low infant birth weight, perinatal mortality and health problems in new borns. According to UNFPA<sup>43</sup> 70,000 adolescent girls die annually from complications brought about by pregnancy and childbirth. Many countries with high levels of early adolescent motherhood are also those with very high maternal mortality ratios.<sup>44</sup>

**Early marriage:** In the developing

world, more than one third of women are married before the age of 18.<sup>45</sup> Even though early marriage is on the decline, the proportion of adolescent girls who are married is nine times that of young men the same age in SSA, 13 times in Western and Central Africa and six times in East and Southern Africa as shown in table 17. Young married girls often lack knowledge about sex and the risks of sexually transmitted infections (STI's) and HIV/AIDS. An estimated 100 million girls will marry before their 18th birthday by 2025.<sup>46</sup>

Child marriage (of 20 to 24 year-old women who are married before 18) is only projected to fall, from 25% in 2015

to around 22% in 2030.<sup>47</sup> However, due to a high population growth rate in sub-Saharan Africa, the number of women who get married before 18 is expected to increase by 50% over the next 15 years. Given that early sexual debut and childbearing were more common among the least educated and/or rural females, educating girls and improving the quality of life will play a big role in reducing teenage pregnancies and marriages. In order to end child marriages by 2030, progress would need to be around eight times faster.<sup>48</sup>



**TABLE 17:** *Distribution of adolescents' marital status, percentage of live births and contraceptives in 2010*

Region	Female	Male	% of women aged 20-24 with a live birth by ages 15 or 18, 1995-2011		Among 15-19 year olds			
	Currently married (%) in 2010		Age at first birth before 15	Age at first birth before 18	Adolescent birth rate (ABR) per 1000	Total demand for family planning (%)	Contraceptive prevalence (%)	Unmet need for contraception (%)
SSA	23.6	2.6			120	37	13	24
East and Southern Africa	19.2	3.1	4	25	112	48	22	26
West and Central Africa	28	2.1	6	28	129	30	7	23


Source: UNFPA, 2013a

#### Maternal Mortality Rates (MMR)

- MMR declined by 47% in Africa between 1990 and 2013. While MMR has been lowest in Northern Africa, the highest decline was in Eastern and Northern Africa (see table 18). The decline is credited to declining fertility

rates of women (see table 4 and 5) and greater access to contraceptives (see table 17).<sup>49</sup> Projections based on current trends show that "maternal mortality is expected to fall by 22% from 195 to 152 deaths per 100,000 live births between 2015 and 2030

globally. MMR in SSA is projected to remain high at 338 deaths per 100,000 live births in 2030, only falling by 28% from 470"<sup>50</sup> in 2015



**TABLE 18:** *Maternal mortality rate (maternal deaths per 100 000 live births) between 1995 and 2013*

Location	1995	2000	2005	2010	2013	% change in MMR between 1990 & 2013	Average annual % change in MMR btw 1990 & 2013
World	360	330	270	230	210	-45	-2.6
Sub-Saharan Africa	930	830	680	560	510	-49	-2.9
Africa	840	750	620	510	460	-47	-2.7
Eastern Africa	920	790	630	500	440	-57	-3.6
Central Africa	1100	1100	880	750	680	-38	-2.1
Northern Africa	130	110	87	74	69	-57	-3.6
Southern Africa	180	200	200	170	160	-22	-1.1
Western Africa	950	850	700	590	540	-47	-2.8

**Source: WHO, 2014**

**Contraceptive use:** In 2015, Sub-Saharan Africa was using less than half of the world's contraceptives. However, between 1995 and 2015, Sub-Saharan Africa doubled its

contraceptive use with the highest improvement being in Western and Eastern Africa where use of modern contraceptives tripled (see table 19).

**TABLE 19:** *Percentage of Married Women 15-49 Using Contraception*

Area	Percent of Married Women 15-49 Using Contraception (1995)		Percent of Married Women 15-49 Using Contraception (2015)		Level of improvement	
	All methods	Modern methods	All methods	Modern methods	All methods	Modern methods
World	58	49	62	56	1.1	1.1
Africa	22	17	35	29	1.6	1.7
Sub Saharan Africa	15	11	30	25	2.0	2.3
Northern Africa	39	35	51	46	1.3	1.3
Western Africa	8	4	16	12	2.0	3.0
Eastern Africa	17	12	41	35	2.4	2.9
Central Africa	-	-	20	10		
Southern Africa	50	48	60	59	1.2	1.2

**Source: Population Reference Bureau, 1995 and 2015**

**Abortion:** In Africa, access to abortion where the life of the woman was in danger,<sup>51</sup> is in specified and varying circumstances in 42 out of 54 African countries, yet legislation has not proven to guarantee implementation of policy and provision of services. At least nine percent of maternal deaths (16,000) annually were due to unsafe abortions.<sup>52</sup> As shown in table 20, 15%

of pregnancies in Africa ended up in abortion with the highest rates being in Southern and Northern Africa. However, the regions with the highest numbers of abortions are Eastern and Western Africa, mainly due to the number of women in the reproductive age (see table 20). It is also important to note that in 20 years (i.e. between 1994 and 2014), the number of

abortions generally doubled in Africa and also more specifically in Central, Western and Eastern Africa regions. The number of abortions per 1,000 women has increased in all regions except Northern Africa between 1999 and 2014. Almost all abortions are unsafe in all the regions.

**TABLE 20:** *Abortions in Africa*

Abortion	No. of abortions in millions			Abortion rate (per 1,000 women aged 15–44)		%	Safety of abortion in 2008 per 1000	
	1990–1994	2003–2008	2010–2014	1990–1994	2010–2014		Safe	Un safe
Africa	4.6	6.4	8.3	33	34	15	1	28
North Africa	1.3	0.9	1.9	40	38	23	0	18
Central Africa	0.5	0.9	1	32	35	13	0	36
Southern Africa	0.3	0.2	0.5	32	35	24	6	9
West Africa	1.1	1.8	2.2	28	31	12	0	28
Eastern Africa	1.4	2.5	2.7	32	34	14	2	36

**Guttmacher Institute. (2015<sup>53</sup>, 2016<sup>54</sup>)**

Women's sexual reproductive and health rights (SRHR) are increasingly recognised in laws and guaranteed in constitutions. However, despite often progressive legislation, there is still failure to make reproductive health care available and accessible, resulting in severe restrictions to women's rights and in some cases serious injury or death (including in the context of unsafe abortion). "When a girl becomes pregnant, her present and future change radically and rarely for the better. Her education may end, her job prospects disappear and her vulnerabilities to poverty, exclusion and dependency multiply".<sup>55</sup>


## 6.3 Non-communicable diseases (NCD's)

The burden of these diseases is rising disproportionately among lower income countries and populations.<sup>56</sup> As shown in figure 23, one quarter of deaths in SSA were caused by NCDs. The four main NCDs are cardiovascular diseases (CVDs),


cancer, respiratory diseases and diabetes. Cardiovascular diseases (CVDs) accounts for the most deaths (about 18 million). Surveys found a hypertension prevalence rate of 25 to 35% in the adult population aged 25–64 years.<sup>57</sup> This is followed by cancer

(8.2 million), chronic lung diseases (4 million) and diabetes (1.5 million).<sup>58</sup>

**FIGURE 24:** *Proportion of deaths caused in SSA in 2010 by NCDs Source: World Bank, 2013*



**FIGURE 25:** *Age-standardised mortality rate (ASMR) i.e. ages 30-70 years, per 100 000 population, in SSA regions by cause (2008) Source: World Bank, 2013*




Southern Africa had the highest death rates caused by cardiovascular diseases and diabetes in SSA while East Africa had the highest number of deaths caused by cancer. West Africa had the highest number of deaths per 100,000 people caused by chronic respiratory conditions (see figure 24). In North Africa, NCDs are responsible for more than three quarters of all deaths.<sup>59</sup>

Other facts about NCDs in Africa<sup>60</sup> As shown in figure 4:

- NCDs occur at younger ages in SSA than elsewhere. For example, the average age of death from CVD is at least 10 years younger than in developed countries;
- Half of the deaths caused by NCDs in Africa occur in people under 70 years of age;
- NCDs are already the leading cause of death in people aged over 45 years;
- The NCD death rate among women in Africa is twice as high as the rate in high-income countries


The prevalence of NCDs is rising



**FIGURE 26:** *Proportion of NCD Deaths by Age in SSA, 2010* Source: World Bank, 2013

rapidly and is projected to cause almost three-quarters as many deaths as communicable, maternal, perinatal, and nutritional diseases by 2020, and to exceed them as the most common causes of death by 2030.<sup>61</sup> While globally, NCD deaths are expected to increase by a further 17% in the next 10 years, the largest increase is expected in Africa at 27%<sup>62</sup>. As shown in figure 26, it is projected that the burden of the

four NCDs (CVDs, cancer, respiratory diseases and diabetes) in SSAs will almost double between 2008 and 2030 and the share of deaths these NCDs will cause is projected to rise by 64% to a total of 46%, thus becoming the leading cause of death.<sup>63</sup>



**FIGURE 27:** *Projected Burden of Disease (percentage of Total DALYs) by Groups of Disorders and Conditions in SSA between 2008 and 2030* Source: World Bank, 2013



## 6.4 NCD's among young people

Given that Africa has the world's youngest population who will have matured to the ages when NCDs are most prevalent; by 2050 NCD prevalence will be three times the size it is today.<sup>64</sup> The World Health Organisation estimates that 70% of premature deaths in adults are the result of social influences<sup>65</sup> that begun in adolescence. Four key risk behaviours among young Africans that will spike NCDs are tobacco and alcohol use, physical inactivity, and unhealthy diet due in part to

globalisation, urbanisation, and socio-economic development.

**Tobacco use:** Scientific evidence overwhelmingly shows that tobacco use is a major cause of poor health and mortality from both communicable diseases, such as tuberculosis and lower respiratory infections, and NCDs, including cardiovascular diseases, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and several types of cancer.<sup>66</sup> While only two percent of cigarettes smoked are

in Africa, six percent of smokers live in Africa. This means that, on average, smokers smoke considerably fewer cigarettes per smoker than they do in other parts of the world, most likely due to lower incomes.<sup>67</sup> However, in 2011, WHO estimated that adult tobacco smoking prevalence (men and women) in sub-Saharan Africa ranged from five percent in Niger to 34% in Sierra Leone.<sup>68</sup>

**TABLE 21:** *Prevalent estimates for tobacco smoking among 15+ males and females in Africa (2011) and current use of tobacco products among 13-15 year olds (2005-2010)*

	Age-standardised prevalence estimates for tobacco smoking among males and females in Africa, (2011)		Current Use of Tobacco Products among African Youth, 13-15 Years, (2005- 2010)	
Countries in SSA	Aged 15 years and over		Aged 13 - 15	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Eastern Africa	25	3	18	13
Central Africa	14	3.8	28.8	24.8
Southern Africa	27.5	6.1	26.3	20.3
Western Africa	20.8	4.4	20.2	12.7
Total	87.3	17.3	93.3	70.8
Average	21.8	4.3	23.3	17.7


**Source:** Network of African Science Academies, 2013 and World Bank, 2013

Table 21 shows that prevalence of tobacco use among males aged 15 years old and above in SSA is five times that of females the same age. However among 13 to 15 year olds, tobacco use among young men is only 1.3 times more than that of young females the same age. Southern Africa has the highest prevalence of tobacco use among both males and females aged 15 year olds and above while Central Africa has the highest tobacco use among young people aged between 13 and 15. With the exception of The Gambia and

Central African Republic where young women (aged between 13 and 15) use tobacco more than their male counterparts, all other countries in the African region have a gap between rates of usage in men and in women.

Forecasts show that smoking prevalence in Africa is expected to see a significant increase. Without comprehensive tobacco prevention and control policies, it is estimated that smoking prevalence in the African region will almost quadruple (to 380 million Africans) by 2060 (see figure 27) mak-

ing it the largest expected regional increase globally. This will make Africa have the second most smoking population (of 14%) after Asia if nothing is done. The morbidity and mortality caused by such an increase in tobacco prevalence and use, combined with sustained economic growth and changing population dynamics, will have devastating effects on health, development efforts, and economic growth in African countries.<sup>69</sup>



**FIGURE 28:** *Forecast number of adult smokers in Africa Source: Blecher, E. and Ross, H., (undated).*

### Seeking to increase young female smokers in Africa

The tobacco industry has increasingly sought to grow their market share by appealing to groups with traditionally low smoking rates. In Africa, they have specifically targeted young women in their bid to recruit new smokers. They have designed their products and advertising to make cigarettes seem trendy and socially acceptable through psychological and social appeal marketing and through the promotion of values such as “private time,” and “female camaraderie”. More recently, in low and middle income countries in particular, the tobacco industry has associated its brands with Western ideals and upward mobility thus appealing to a new generation of women with greater purchasing power and more exposure to globalisation. The messaging is also designed to mainstream smoking behaviour as an element of women’s empowerment and evolving social norms.<sup>70</sup>

Enticing youth to smoke ensures a new generation of consumers who will likely be lifetime buyers because youth who start smoking before age 14 are less likely to quit smoking and thus more likely to continue smoking into adulthood than those who start smoking after age 16. In several countries in Africa, tobacco advertisements specifically target youth by associating cigarettes with trends such as film, sex appeal, well-being, and sports.<sup>71</sup>

**TABLE 22:** *Total alcohol per capita consumption*

Derived from routine statistics	Total alcohol per capita consumption	% of current drinkers	% lifetime abstainers	% former drinkers	HED, heavy episodic drinking in pop	HED, heavy episodic drinking among drinkers
Men	9.3	40.2	45.8	14	9.3	23.1
Women	2.7	19.6	68.9	11.5	2.1	10.7
Total	5.9	29.8	57.5	12.7	5.6	19

Source: Ferreira – Borges et al., (2016).

**Alcohol use:** As shown in table 22, the total alcohol per capita consumption is 5.9% in Africa with the percentage of current drinkers being one third of the population and life time abstainers being 58%. The level of consumption varied widely, ranging from 0.2 adults per capita consumption in Comoros to 11 in South Africa (see annex 1.4). Over-

all, alcohol consumption has a large impact on burden of disease and mortality in African countries. Alcohol was responsible for 6.4% of all deaths and 4.7% of all burden of disease and years lost in 2012 as shown in table 23. Alcohol is also linked to chronic and acute health problems. Although generally men drink more than women, women bear a higher

burden of health problems than their male counterparts with the exception on intentional and unintentional challenges as shown in table 23. Alcohol consumption is expected to increase in the next years.<sup>72</sup>

**TABLE 23:** *percentage of alcohol attributable deaths and burden of disease*

Alcohol consumption	% of alcohol attributable deaths in 2012		% of alcohol attributable burden of disease in 2012	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Region				
Africa	4.6	1.8	3.6	1.1
Central Africa	3.3	1.2	2.7	0.7
Southern Africa	8.9	1.9	8.8	1.6
West Africa	4.7	2	3.4	1.2
Eastern Africa	4.1	1.8	3.2	1
Disease				
Cancer	5%	10%	3%	8%
Cardiovascular disease	8%	20%	4%	14%
Gastrointestinal disease	23%	29%	17%	26%
Neuropsychiatric disorders	4%	4%	19%	15%
Infectious disease	22%	28%	17%	23%
Intentional injury	24%	9%	24%	10%
Unintentional injury	14%	3%	14%	4%

Source: Ferreira – Borges et al., (2016).

**Unhealthy diet:** NCDs are not only a matter of lifestyle, but also strongly related to poverty and deprivation. Poor people often have to consume low-priced, low-nutrition, highly processed foods. So their intake is made up largely of calories without micronutrients.<sup>73</sup> These micronutrient deficiencies are responsible for undernourishment, iron deficiency in women of reproductive age (WRA) commonly known as anaemia, overweight or obesity.

## FACTS ABOUT OBESITY

- *Rates of obesity are growing rapidly in developing nations even in countries where hunger exists*
- *Obesity is most rampant in urban areas but in some places, it is catching up in rural areas*
- *Women are more likely to be obese than men in all WHO regions*

Prior to 1990, and by 2010, SSA experienced different risk factors of the disease burden brought by NCDs. In Central, Eastern and Western SSA, childhood underweight, household air pollution from solid fuels and suboptimal breastfeeding were the leading causes of disease, but their contribution to the disease burden has fallen substantially<sup>74</sup>. Africa is now experiencing a nutrition transition and the consumption of specific foods clearly plays a role in this shift. Eating energy dense, often highly refined foods high in fat and sugar and low in micronutrients as well as a marked increase in animal food products contrasted with a fall in total cereal intake and fibre thereby aggravating the health status of individuals including contributing to a significant rise of heart disease and type 2 diabetes.<sup>75</sup> An oversupply of energy dense foods coupled with decreasing physical activity due to the sedentary nature of work, mod-

ernised modes of transportation and increased urbanisation have resulted in obesity.<sup>76</sup> About 14% of adolescents and one third of SSA's adult population are overweight (38% female and 22% males). In SSA and as shown in table 24, women had triple the obesity prevalence of men while 3% of adolescents were obese. Obesity is not just a phenomenon of urban areas.<sup>77</sup> In Northern African countries such as Egypt and Morocco, rural obesity is catching up. South Africa, Ghana, Gabon, Cape Verde, and Senegal have substantial proportions of the population (30 to 55% amongst adults and higher in women) being obese or being overweight. It is projected that by 2025, there will be an 80% increase in obesity prevalence from 10.4 million (in 2007) to 18.7 million<sup>79</sup> in Africa. "The number of overweight children is projected to double by 2030".<sup>80</sup>

			Overweight			Obesity		
	% of under-nourished people	% Prevalence of anaemia	% Adolescents	% Male	% Female	% Adolescents	% Male	% Female
SSA	36		14	22	38	3	5	15
Central Africa	57	18		25	39		6	15
Southern Africa	37	6	12	31	57	3	10	30
West Africa	14	47	13	21	36	1	4	13
Eastern Africa	35	29	15	18	34	4	4	12

Table 24: Prevalence of overweight (OW) and obesity (OB) among adolescents and adults by sub-region  
Source: FAO, 2017

## How to avoid intergenerational malnutrition

With unequally distributed incomes in most developing countries, hunger and obesity now often co-exist in the same country or region, creating a growing "double burden of malnutrition". Improvements in the nutritional status of women and girls will contribute to reducing gender inequality while at the same time, breaking the cycle of impact on intergenerational malnutrition. Gender empowerment is an essential part of nutrition improvement across the entire life cycle.

Physical inactivity: Overall, physical activity levels are relatively high in Africa, with most activities being either work-related or transport-related. In most African cities, most residents walk or use public transportation for daily routine activities. This is especially so in rural areas. Levels of physical inactivity have been shown to rise with rising urbanisation in Africa. The prevalence of insufficient

physical activity rose according to the level of country income. High-income countries had more than double the prevalence of physically inactive people compared to low-income countries. It is estimated that 41% of men and 48% of women were insufficiently physically active in high-income countries compared to 18% of men and 21% of women in low-income countries. Africa has 25%

of men and 33% of women being insufficiently physically active.<sup>81</sup> In all WHO regions, men were more active than women.

The faster economies grow, the faster the population becomes inactive. In some cases, physical inactivity is projected to increase direct costs of emerging economies by 450% by 2030.<sup>82</sup>

*Physically inactive people have a 20 to 30% increased risk of all-cause mortality compared to those who engage in at least 30 minutes of moderate intensity physical activity on most days of the week. Women are at the heart of that risk given that they tend to be more inactive than men. The increased urbanisation, automation of work and other aspects of life due to higher-incomes is a likely determinant of insufficient physical activity among women, even though it will help reduce the 'double shift' women have to do.*

**Mental and behavioural mood disorders** including major depression and bipolar disorder, anxiety, alcohol and drug abuse, and schizophrenia are among the top 20 conditions that result in the greatest burden of disability worldwide.<sup>83</sup> Significant population growth and aging will result in an estimated 130% increase in the burden of mental and substance use disorders in Sub-Saharan Africa by 2050, a phenomenon that is likely to significantly affect health and productivity in Sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>84</sup> Mental and substance use disorders are the leading cause of disability, accounting for 23% of all disability-

associated burden (years lived with a disability, YLD) globally and 19% in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2010. Major depressive disorder (MDD) makes the largest contribution to YLD, as it accounts for about 40% of YLDs.<sup>85</sup> In fact, disability associated with mental and behavioural disorders exceeds the burden associated with NCDs as well as neurological diseases, war and injuries.<sup>86</sup>

As shown in table 25, the burden of mental and behavioural mood disorders is likely to triple in 40 years (depending on the condition). The burden of mental and substance use

disorders will continue to be highest in Eastern and Western Africa but the highest increase in prevalence of burden will be experienced in Central Africa. Although the burden of mental and behavioural mood disorders was highest among 20-24 year olds in 2010, it will be highest among 25-29 year olds while the highest increase in prevalence will be among 30-34 year olds. Left unabated, the disability burden of individual mental and substance use disorders will continue to be a leading cause of total disease burden in the future regardless of income-levels.



	Years lived with disability (YLD), 2010 in millions	Years lived with disability (YLD) 2050 in millions	Number of times growth/increase will occur
<b>Disease</b>			
Schizophrenia	1	3	3.0
Alcohol dependence	0.5	1.5	3.0
Major depressive disorder (MDD)	7	17	2.4
Bipolar	1	3	3.0
<b>Region</b>			
Central Africa	2	7	3.5
Southern Africa	1.5	2	1.3
West Africa	6	15	2.5
Eastern Africa	9	20	2.2
<b>Age</b>			
20-24	2.7	5.2	1.9
25-29	2.5	5.3	2.1
30-34	2	5	2.5
Table 25: Disability burden for individual mental and substance use disorders, 2010 to 2050 Source: Charlson, et al., 2014			

*This trend is of particular concern to youth in Africa because with modernisation, they are in contexts of high mental and emotional stressors including social isolation from peers and friends, in extreme economic, political marginalisation and in contexts of conflict and armed insecurity.*

## 6.5 Communicable diseases

Communicable diseases such as HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, respiratory diseases, other infections and parasitic diseases have continued to predominate in the morbidity and mortality statistics. However, as shown in figure 26, by 2030, these will decrease significantly (by almost half) as causes of death. However, treatments for the major communicable diseases will continue to occupy a significant portion of national health budgets for the foreseeable future.<sup>87</sup> The likelihood of a HIV vaccine coming onto the market in the

coming decade is slim, but perhaps one will emerge over the next 50 years. "HIV will continue to cause premature deaths in the working-age population, and will erode the social fabric of countries and the integrity of communities."<sup>88</sup>

HIV/AIDS has a disproportionate impact on youth and particularly young women in Africa. As shown in table 26 adolescent girls and young women aged 15-24 accounted for 25% of new HIV infections, and women in SSA accounted for 56% of

new HIV infections. Harmful gender norms and inequalities, multiple partnerships, insufficient protection during intercourse, insufficient access to education and sexual and reproductive health services, poverty, food insecurity and violence, are at the root of the increased HIV risk of young women and adolescent girls.<sup>89</sup>


New HIV infections	% Prevalence
<b>Male in SSA</b>	
15-24	12
25+	31
<b>Female in SSA</b>	
15-24	25
25+	31
<b>New infections among key populations in Eastern &amp; southern Africa</b>	
Sex workers	4
People who inject drugs	2
Gay men and men having sex with men	6
Transgender people	
Clients of sexual workers & partners of key populations	9
Rest of the population	79
<b>New infections among key populations in Western and Central Africa</b>	
Sex workers	15
People who inject drugs	0.4
Gay men and men having sex with men	2
Transgender people	
Clients of sexual workers & partners of key populations	10
Rest of the population	73
Table 26: New HIV infections Source: UNAIDS, 2016	

Some projections indicate that the number of people living with HIV/AIDS will be around 70 million by 2050 (see figure 28), an increase of 2.7 times from the 2010 infection rate. New infections will

increase 2.8 times from the 2010 rates while the number of deaths between 2010 and 2050 will triple. Other projections, which assume increased prevention and treatment activities, show that HIV/AIDS

deaths will drop to about 1.5% by 2060 in the low case scenarios and to 1.4% in the high case scenario as shown in table 27.<sup>90</sup>

**FIGURE 29: HIV deaths, infections and living with virus (2010 - 2050)** Source: UNAIDS, 2016



	15-24 in 2013 Male	15-24 in 2013 Female	2020	2030	2060
<i>High-case scenario</i>	1.2	2.1	1.97	1.77	1.4
<i>Low-case scenario</i>	0.8	1.7	1.89	1.71	1.5

**Table 27: Optimistic HIV projections in Africa in total population (%)**  
**Source: AfDB, 2011**

In sub-Saharan Africa, key populations accounted for more than 20% of new infections, and HIV prevalence among these populations is often extremely high.<sup>91</sup> In other regions of the world such as Central Asia, Europe, North America, the Middle East and North Africa, analysis of available data suggests that more than 90% of new HIV infections were among people from key populations and their sexual partners. As the continent on one hand becomes increasingly more liberal in its values hence the increase in these key populations in society, and on the other hand, is reluctant to reach out to these key populations due to conservative values, new HIV/AIDS infections could surge.

Education as a key determinant of health and the positive effect of education on health is well documented.<sup>92</sup> For example, the interrelationships between girls' education and their health status have been shown in several studies on HIV/AIDS, which reveal that HIV/AIDS in Zambia spread faster among uneducated girls compared with educated ones. In Zimbabwe, studies demonstrate that girls dropping out of school are more likely to be infected by HIV than those who continue. In Kenya, girls who stay in school have been shown to delay their sexual debut more often than those who drop out.

## 6.7 Sexual violence

Gender violence, including domestic violence, is evident in all societies, among all socioeconomic groups and at all levels of education. According to a 2013 global review, one in three women (35%) has experienced physical or sexual intimate partner violence or non-intimate partner sexual violence.<sup>93</sup> In some countries that share rises to 70% and more often than not, the violence goes unreported to the police.


As shown in table 28, more than one third of women in Africa experience physical and/or sexual intimate partner violence in their lifetime and about 12% experience sexual violence from people who are not their partners. Intimate partner violence is quite high among youth (average of 43.5%) and in Central Africa (at an average of 66%). Non-partner sexual violence is highest in Southern Africa (17%). In the Africa Alliance of YMCAs survey,

when young people were asked whether they had experienced any form of gender violence, about 13% said yes and 84% of the respondents had not. Rape was the most frequent form of violence (38%) followed by battering (27%) and incest (11%) as shown in figure 29. Other forms of violence included verbal and physical abuse as well as racism

Violence against women	% Prevalence in Africa
Lifetime prevalence of physical and/or sexual intimate partner violence among ever-partnered women	36.6
Lifetime prevalence of non-partner sexual violence	11.9
Lifetime prevalence of intimate partner violence (physical and/or sexual) or non-partner sexual violence or both among all women (15 years and older)	45.6
Intimate partner violence by age	% Prevalence in Africa
15-19	44
20-24	44
25-29	42
30-34	44
Intimate partner violence by region	% Prevalence in SSA
Central Africa	65.6
Southern Africa	29.7
West Africa	41.8
Eastern Africa	38.8
Non-partner sexual violence by region	% Prevalence in SSA
Central Africa	21
Southern Africa	17.4
West Africa	9.15
Eastern Africa	11.5

Table 28: Sexual violence  
Source: WHO, 2013<sup>94</sup>

**FIGURE 30:** *Type of violence experience*







## 7. EDUCATION TRENDS

*Lack of Early Childhood Education programmes (ECD) prevents children under the age of five from reaching their developmental potential and having good education outcomes in their primary school.<sup>96</sup>*

As shown in table 29 in SSA, only 18% of young children in Africa were enrolled in preprimary programs in 2012, yet enrolment in these programs rose by two times between 1990 and 2011.<sup>95</sup> Lack of Early Childhood Education programmes (ECD) prevents children under the age of five from reaching their developmental potential and having good education outcomes in their primary school.<sup>96</sup>

There has been an increase in the number of students enrolled in primary school (by more than 25% between 1990 and 2011)<sup>97</sup> due to among other things, Free Primary Education (FPE) policies in many countries. However, more boys than girls, on average, in SSA, have access to primary education (see table 29). However, in Eastern and Southern Africa, slightly more girls than boys attend school with slightly more boys dropping out of school in the region. In West and Central Africa,

the survival rate in 2012 was the same for both boys and girls.

Maintaining a high quality primary education however continues to remain a challenge for most countries. After graduating from primary school, many students find it difficult to attend secondary schools as these schools can only accommodate an average of 36% of qualifying secondary students across Africa (see table 29). A secondary education is essential in preparing students for higher education and important life skills. Additionally, a secondary education provides the skills and tools to help meet a country's growing demands for highly skilled and educated workers in a globalised world.<sup>98</sup> On average, more boys than girls attend secondary school in SSA but in Eastern and Southern Africa, slightly more girls than boys attend secondary school.

Technical and vocational education and training has not been a top priority for many African countries. In 2012, these programs accounted for only eight percent of total enrolment in SSA (see table 29). As a result, only 10% of young men and six percent of young women in sub-Saharan Africa are enrolled in higher education institutions "yet a one-year increase in average tertiary education levels would raise annual GDP growth in Africa by 0.39 percentage points. Higher education pays off as returns on investments are 21% in Africa, the highest in the world".<sup>99</sup>

With about one third of young people in SSA being illiterate, barriers that prevent young people from accessing universal education throughout their schooling years and especially young women, limit their ability to fully realise their potential as transformative leaders.<sup>100</sup>

Youth literacy rates	Male	Female
Sub-Saharan Africa	76	66
Eastern and Southern Africa	79	72
West and Central Africa	73	57
Gross enrolment rate in pre-primary		
Gross enrolment rate in pre-primary	18	18
Primary net attendance		
Sub-Saharan Africa	74	73
Eastern and Southern Africa	77	79
West and Central Africa	72	69
Survival rate to last primary grade - Percentage		
Sub-Saharan Africa	56	57
Eastern and Southern Africa	46	48
West and Central Africa	67	67
Out of school rate for children of primary school going age		
Sub-Saharan Africa	19	24
Eastern and Southern Africa	15	16
West and Central Africa	22	30
Secondary net attendance		
Sub-Saharan Africa	38	34
Eastern and Southern Africa	26	27
West and Central Africa	46	39
Gross enrolment rate in tertiary education		
Gross enrolment rate in tertiary education	10	6

Table 29: Education trends  
Source: UNICEF Global dataset<sup>101</sup>

Education is an important driver of countries' economic performance and potential. Basic literacy is essential, but it is increasingly the quality and accessibility of primary, secondary and higher education that will determine whether African

economies can successfully move up the value-added production chain.<sup>102</sup> As shown in table 30, literacy levels are projected to improve by 25 percentage points between 2012 and 2050 in Africa with West Africa experiencing the highest im-

provement (29 percentage points) followed by Eastern Africa (28 percentage points). The least improved region will be Southern Africa due to its already high literacy levels in the region.

Literacy	2012	2020	2030	2050	Improvement between 2012 & 2050
Africa	68	75	82.5	92.5	24.5
North Africa	73	80	89	97	24
Central Africa	66	71	78	90	24
Southern Africa	81	87	93	97	16
West Africa	60	67	76	89	29
Eastern Africa	67.5	76	84	95	27.5

Table 30: Literacy levels  
Source: AfDB, 2011

SSA is set to have a secondary school completion rate of 64% by 2030, with the proportion of children who complete secondary school expected to increase by almost 50% by then. Though it will be the region with the lowest Secondary School Completion Rate (SSCR), it will be the region with the most rapid progress. There is a trend in all the regions in Africa towards the equalisation of female and male access to secondary education and this is expected to continue in the future. More attention needs to be devoted to not just increasing primary schools enrolment, but ensuring that students stay in school and receive a quality education.<sup>103</sup> In the AAYMCA survey, although 77% of the respondents said the education they received was relevant and valuable to them in the future, 22% felt that was not the case.

Several studies found that “each year of additional schooling for girls reduces infant mortality by 5-10%. The children of mothers with five years of primary education are 40% more likely to live beyond the age of five and 43% less likely to be malnourished. Women with primary education have on average fewer children, use more productive farming methods and, as non-agricultural workers, receive higher wages”.<sup>104</sup>

Companies operating in Africa repeatedly cite insufficient skilled labour as a bottleneck to growth. By improving the knowledge and skills of workers, especially of youth, through increased access to secondary, technical and vocational education and training, local economies can build a skilled workforce to increase the production of goods and services and contribute to economic growth.



## 8. EMPLOYMENT TRENDS

### 8.1 Availability of labour and work

*This surge in the productive capacity of the working-age population provides a demographic dividend in Africa due to the additional labour supply*

As indicated in section 3.2.1, the working age population (15 – 64 year olds) will increase by 150% in 2030, 214% in 2045 and by 283% in 2060. This means that the working age population is projected to increase one and half times in the next 15 years, double by 2045 and almost triple by 2060. It also means that the working age population will increase from 663 million people in 2015 to about 1.9 billion people in 2060 or 63% of the total population. This surge in the productive capacity of the working-age population provides a demographic dividend

in Africa due to the additional labour supply. To reach this dividend, however, there is need to ensure that sufficient productive opportunities are available for those entering the labour market.<sup>105</sup> Table 31 shows that high-income regions of the world will have a labour deficit by 2050 while generally low income regions will have migrant labour to offer. Because of the nature of migration and the costs of uprooting individuals and workers, migrants are most likely to come from the pool of young workers, that is, those between the ages of 15 and

39.<sup>106</sup> This group will be the largest in the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa (328), followed by South Asia (158) and MENA (44) regions (see table 31). As shown in figure 19, 67% of respondents in the Africa Alliance of YMCAs survey said they would migrate to other countries outside Africa, in search for better work opportunities. While only 13% of them would like to remain in Africa, a whopping 87% would move to places outside Africa mostly to USA, Europe and Canada.

Change among 15-39 yr. olds	2005-2010 (Millions)	2010-2020 (Millions)	2020-2030 (Millions)	2030-2040 (Millions)	2040-2050 (Millions)	Total population between 2005 - 2050
SSA	31	72	78	79	69	328
South Asia including India	43	72	37	13	-7	158
Middle East and North Africa (MENA)	14	13	6	9	3	44
China	27	13	-37	-37	-51	-85
Europe	-3	-14	-19	-17	-14	-67
North America	4	-1	-4	-3	-5	-9

Table 31: Change in total labor force between 2005 - 2050  
Source: World Bank, undated



	North Africa	SSA
Youth labor force participation rates (2014)		
Male	47.2	56.6
Female	19.7	52.1
Youth employment to population ratio (2000 - 2014)	23.4	48
Youth unemployment rates (2005 - 2014)	30.5	11.6
Youth incidence of long-term unemployment (2012/2013)	60.6	48.1
Qualifications mismatch of youth (2012/2013)		
Well matched	46.5	30.4
Over-educated	11.7	7.4
Under-educated	41.8	61.4
Youth unemployment rate by gender (2014)		
Male	25	10.8
Female	44	12.6
Youth unemployment rate by level of education (2012/2013)		
Primary or less	21.9	7.3
Secondary	25.1	16.1
Tertiary	39.5	21.2
Youth status of employment (2012/2013)		
Wage/salaried workers	8.8	16.8
Own-account workers	39.5	37.8
Contributing family workers	53.9	49.5
Distribution of poor working youth (2013)	59.2	92.2
<i>Table 32: Status of youth un/employment</i> <i>Source: International Labor Organization 2015</i>		

**The labour force participation rate (LFPR)** of youth in SSA remained the same between 1991 and 2014. While the male rate slightly decreased by two percentage points, the female LFPR increased by two percentage points.<sup>107</sup> In both North Africa and SSA, there is more male than female LFPR. However, the gap in North Africa is

much higher (28% points) than in SSA (five percent).

**Employment-to-population ratio (EPR)** of youth is quite high in SSA as shown in table 32 and this is attributed to low household incomes and limited access to education which drive the majority of youth to work too early in their

lives.<sup>108</sup> The North African region is characterised by low EPR mainly due to socio-cultural factors that keep most young women from employment.<sup>109</sup>

**Youth unemployment rates** disproportionately affect young people and especially young women. The youth unemployment rate is


practically three times higher than is the case for their adult counterparts.<sup>110</sup> Generally, youth unemployment in North Africa is almost 3 times the rate in SSA (see table 32). Female youth unemployment in North Africa is also 3.5 times the rate in SSA and almost doubles that of their male counterparts. In both regions, unemployment tends to be for long periods of time compared to other regions of the world (of 12

months or longer). The incidence of long-term unemployment among youth in subSaharan Africa was 48.1%, behind only the share in the Middle East and North Africa, which is 60.6%.

In the Africa Alliance of YMCAs survey, only 30% of youth in Africa were gainfully engaged in productive work while the rest were not. When asked the main challenge young people experience in their

countries, 60% listed employment related issues. The biggest challenge of finding work is lack of it (28%), inexperience (18%), incompatibility of work with education received (14%), discrimination (11%) and lack of adequate skills (11%) as shown in figure 30.

### What is the biggest challenge in finding work?



**FIGURE 31:** *Biggest challenge in finding work in SSA*

**Match of education qualifications:**

In North Africa, almost half of young people (47%) have well matched education qualifications to the job market while almost 12% are overeducated (see table 32). The share of under-educated young workers in low-income countries is triple that of upper middle-income countries (i.e. 63.9 and 22.5%, respectively)<sup>111</sup>. In SSA, three in five young workers (61.4%) do not have the level of education expected to make them productive on the job. Under-education can have a severe impact not only on labour productivity but also on the wages of the young workers. Only one third of young people in SSA have well matched education qualifications to the job market and seven percent are over-educated. Interestingly, YMCA survey, only 14% of the youth interviewed felt that their difficulty in finding work was due to the incompatibility of the job with the education they received an additional 11% felt that finding work was challenging because of lack of adequate skills.

**Level of education and youth employment:**

Youth unemployment rates increased consistently with the level of education attained in SSA (see table 32). In fact, the youth who completed their tertiary education are between two and three times more likely to be unemployed than the youth with primary education or less. This is attributed to two things: an income bias of the tertiary educated whose households can

most likely support them through a lengthy job search - part of the unemployment of the educated is therefore “voluntary” (since the job seekers wait for jobs they would like to have); and the economies are also at a stage of development where demand for high-skilled workers remains limited.<sup>112</sup> In North Africa the socio-cultural barriers faced by young female seeking for work is a contributing factor.

**Vulnerability of work:** Very few young people in Africa are wage earners (9% in North Africa and 17% in SSA) as shown in table 32, yet even among these, a significant proportion (35.9%) was in temporary jobs, and in some cases as many as nine in ten young workers were informally employed.<sup>113</sup> It is important to note that the informal sector contributes about 55% of SSA's GDP and employs 80% of the labour force. Nine out of 10 rural and urban workers have informal jobs in Africa and most of these people are women and youth.<sup>114</sup>

The ILO categorises own-account workers and contributing family workers - characterised by inadequate pay (71% of people in Africa work for USD 2 or less per day<sup>115</sup>) or no earnings (Non-wage employment represents more than 80% of total employment for women and more than 60% for men in Africa<sup>116</sup>), difficult conditions of work that undermine their fundamental rights (such as child labour which accounts for 25% of labour in Africa<sup>117</sup>), or

other characteristics of decent work deficit - as being vulnerable employment. As shown in table 32, 87% of the young people in the labour force in SSA and 93% of young people in North Africa are own-account workers or contributing family workers.<sup>118</sup> Working poor youth were most in SSA (92%) than in North Africa (59%) as shown in table 32.

As shown in table 33, vulnerable employment is projected to slightly decline, perhaps due to heightened awareness of rights and implementation of relevant legislation. There will also be an increase in the real wage growth. Unemployment levels are expected to remain stable through to 2019 although the absolute numbers will be much more in this period given the projected population growth. LFPR is projected to slightly increase from 70.8 in 2014 to 71.3 in 2019. Youth unemployment rate is projected to remain steady. This trend is worrying particularly because the absolute numbers of unemployed youth will be much more given the youth bulge but also employment growth including that of youth is projected to decline.

	2007		2014		2019	
	North Africa	SSA	North Africa	SSA	North Africa	SSA
Vulnerable employment	45	75	40	75	39	70
Unemployment	11.4	7.8	12.4	7.7	12.5	7.6
	2009		2013		2019	
Labor force participation rate		70.4		70.8		71.3
Youth unemployment rate		12.5		11.8		11.8
Employment growth		2.8		3.3		3
Youth employment growth		2.2		3.3		2.6
Real wage growth		3.2		0.4		1.4

### 8.3 Availability and structure of work

The pace of labour force growth (i.e. those in search of employment) outstrips the pace of job creation. Only three million formal jobs are created annually despite the 10 to 12 million youth that enter the workforce each year meaning that the continent will have to create highproductivity jobs at an average of about 12 million jobs per year - an extremely rapid and possibly unprecedented rate - to absorb the

new entrants in the labour force.

The Africa Alliance of YMCAs had very interesting revelations regarding the current job occupations and the desired work aspirations, which turned out to be quite different. Interestingly as shown in table 34, youth are engaged in occupations they would not really like to continue with in future such as business (specifically small informal ones),

volunteering or interning, which can be categorised as vulnerable work. Many youth employment policies target training youth and loaning them to start their own small businesses. Unfortunately, the data indicates that not many are interested in running small informal businesses.

Current work occupation			Future work aspirations	
Business	24		Technology	20.04
Education	15.6		NGO	18.65
Intern/volunteer	6.5		Education	16.34
Social development work	6.5		Agricultural	14.04
Admin	5.5		Health	13.48
NGO	5.5		Politics	4.89
Research	4.5		Religion	3.14
Arts	4.2		Business	2.77
Journalism / communications	4.2		Art	1.94
Technology	3.9		Accounts	1.11
Government	3.6		Legal	0.83
Government / policy	3.6		Architecture/construction	0.46
Health	2.6		Tourism	0.37
Arch / construction	2.3		Admin	0.28
Banking	2.3		Engineer	0.28
Engineer	2.3		Environmental management	0.28
Accounts	1.6		Government / policy	0.18
Security	1		Hotel / food	0.18
Transport	1		Security	0.18
Agriculture	0.6		Social/dev.	0.18
Hotel/food industry	0.6		Aviation	0.09
Religious	0.6		Journalism / communication	0.09
YMCA	0.6		Linguistics	0.09
Legal	0.3		Media	0.09

Table 34: Current and future desired work occupation.



The data in table 34 suggests that high investments should be made in training youth for technology, NGO work, education, agriculture and health related jobs (and from the discussion in prior sections, this is where there is the greatest need for workers in Africa). However, as shown in figure 31 we are training youth for what they really do not want to do in the

future (social science, business and law) and undertraining for what youth would like to do in the future (science, health, agriculture). The effects of global warming and the increased pressure on land due to increased population is likely to significantly affect rain fed agricultural production yet it is among the largest employer in Africa (70%) but also the most vulnerable.

There is a great opportunity to improve this sector because young people are interested in pursuing it and besides, the increasing population will need to be fed. Evidently, technical and vocational skills development through institutional or on the job training could help to fill the gap between education and employment.



University graduation rates (%) 2008-2010 by subject



When asked how the ideal future job should be structured, majority of SSA youth desire to be in formal employment (43%) that is flexible in terms of time and place (42%) as shown in figure 32.

Implications of un/employment to youth A positive outcome of changing demographics is the fact that it increases the number of the working age population compared to the non-wage population (i.e. the aged and the children). If the working age population is gainfully employed, it usually decreases dependency and increases savings, which leads to more development – potentially from low income to middle income. Unfortunately if the majority of the working age population is not meaningfully employed, it leads to many idle people, which could be very destructive. Currently, high levels of youth unemployment and/or underemployment coupled with low wage income will significantly constrain the continent's ability to reap the benefits of the demographic dividend. Unfortunately, part-time employment, temporary employment, informal work and non-wage employment do not fully indicate the vulnerabilities among young workers in developing economies like Africa. While governments have taken steps to regulate formal employment, these regulations do not apply to the informal sector where majority of youth and women work.

"In all countries youth aspire to productive, formal employment opportunities that provide them with a decent wage, relative security and good conditions of work. Unfortunately far too few youth are able to match their aspirations to reality, which means that opportunities to benefit from the demographic dividend in the countries with the greatest potential – principally in Africa – are quickly slipping away".<sup>119</sup>





# 9. ECONOMIC TRENDS

## 9.1 Economic growth

According to UNECA, SSA recovered from the global crisis faster than expected and as shown in table 35 African economies on average registered a five percent economic growth between 2010 and 2016. The growth, especially in 2014 onwards, was driven by strong investment in mining and infrastructure and by strong private consumption, especially in lowincome countries.<sup>120</sup> The growth however slowed down a bit as oil exporters started to adjust to lower global oil prices. West African countries affected by the Ebola cri-


ses were severely impacted by the epidemic. Although activity was to decelerate further in 2015, growth was expected to remain at an average of 4.5% (see table 35) in 2015. This would still make SSA among the fastest-growing region of the world.<sup>121</sup> However, the economic growth rates still fall short of the seven percent pace required for achieving the MDGs.<sup>122</sup> Sectors driving the economies in Africa are agriculture, manufacturing, construction and services. As shown in figure 33, agriculture though declining as a GDP

earner is still a high employer. The sector "supports the livelihoods of 80% of the African population, provides employment for about 60% of the economically active population, and for about 70% of the poorest people on the continent".<sup>123</sup>

Economic growth	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
World economic growth	5.4	4.1	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.5	3.7
SSA GDP growth	6.7	5	4.2	5.2	5	4.5	5.1
SSA inflation rate	7.7	10.2	8.2	6.1	6.1	7.4	6.6
Oil exporting SSA countries	8.5	4.7	3.7	5.7	5.8	4.5	5.2
Resource intensive countries	6.7	4.8	4.2	4.7	4.5	3.9	4.4
SSA frontier and emerging market economies	7.1	5.1	4.3	4.9	5	4.6	4.9
Low income countries	7.6	7.6	6.1	7.1	7.4	6.5	7.1
Fragile states	4.1	3.1	7.4	5.6	5.6	6.1	6.5

Table 35: SSA GDP growth (2010 – 2016)  
Source: IMF, 2015

<sup>3</sup> Resource intensive countries include Angola, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe; Emerging market economies include Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia




**FIGURE 34:** *GDP earners in Africa by sector* Source: UNDP, 2015

Extrapolations of current economic performance suggest a positive future to 2050 as shown in figure 34. North Africa (due to energy-based economies) and Southern Africa (due to a more diversified economy) will continue to post higher per capita incomes. Of the other three regions, Eastern Africa is likely to show the strongest growth by 2050 followed by Western Africa.<sup>124</sup>

Africa's growth is however by no means assured. There are serious risks ahead to Africa's growth

path, which include: global developments, particularly the escalating price of commodities like food and oil pose serious threats to governance, peace and security, factors that affect economic growth. Africa's growth prospects will be heavily influenced by trends in labour availability. Economic performance relies primarily on human resources, which strongly impact on overall productivity. Continued rapid growth in the size of the economically active population (men and women 15 - 64 years of age)

without meaningful employment will pose great challenges; and the movement of working age people from rural areas to urban centres can be instrumental in accelerating economic growth (see section 4). While this population migration leads to more diversified economies, away from a reliance on subsistence agriculture toward sectors such as manufacturing and service activities, it can create high urban unemployment, increase crime and thus lower economic growth.



### What does high GDP mean for youth?

Young people are among the poor segments of society in Africa. While Africa's economy is projected to grow in the coming years, economic growth, while necessary in poverty alleviation, building livelihoods, and improving quality of life, does not by itself reduce poverty since the gain from increased national productivity does not automatically trickle down to the poorest people.<sup>125</sup>


The service sector is projected to continue growing as the main GDP earner in Africa.<sup>126</sup> Unfortunately, the sector absorbs fewer highly educated people due to the sophistication of the sector and mechanisation of processes. However as shown in table 32, 61.4% of youth in SSA are under-educated and this curtails young people's participation in the growing service sector compared to their participation in a sector like agriculture which if thriving would absorb more youth and which, when it stimulates growth, would reduce poverty two times more effectively than the service industry.<sup>127</sup>

## 9.2 Financial inclusion <sup>4</sup>

Economic growth has to be inclusive to be socially and politically sustainable. One key component of inclusive development is financial inclusion. Africa's financial system is underdeveloped. Low and volatile income levels hence lack of enough resources to use a bank account, inflationary environments, high illiteracy rates, inadequate infrastructure, governance challenges, the high cost of banking<sup>5</sup>, lack of the required documentation and distance to the bank

are some of the factors that have limited the financial outreach.<sup>128</sup> As shown in figure 35, overall, 23% of adults in Africa have an account at a formal financial institution although across regions, there is a large variation in account ownership ranging from 42% in Southern Africa to seven percent in Central Africa. Throughout Africa, there is a seven percent gender gap with more men than women owning a bank account at a financial institution.<sup>129</sup> Urban dwell-

ers, middle aged, those with tertiary education and above as well as the wealthy have more bank accounts than their rural, middle aged, lowly educated counterparts. Only about 18% of youth aged between 15 and 24 years old had access to financial institutions. Technological advances such as mobile money achieved the broadest success in financial access in Africa.



**FIGURE 36:** *Financial Access in Africa* Source: AfDB, 2013

<sup>4</sup> Financial inclusion refers to all initiatives that make formal financial services available, accessible and affordable to all segments of the population.

<sup>5</sup> According to AfDB, 2013, in Uganda maintaining a checking account costs the equivalent of 25% of GDP per capita annually



### Financial inclusion of youth

Removing physical, bureaucratic, and financial barriers to expand financial inclusion requires addressing the underlying structural causes such as low-income levels and governance challenges. Successful use of mobile money proves that innovations can bring about dramatic changes in how people engage in financial transactions by lowering entry barriers, reducing costs, and expanding access.


### Case study of Kenya<sup>130</sup>

In 2013, one third of youth aged between 18 and 25 and 20% of youth aged between 26 and 35 were excluded from access to financial services. Some of these young people experienced multiple exclusion especially if they had less education and if they dwelled in rural areas. Technology significantly improved access to the financial services from no one using Mobile phone Financial Services (MFS) to access financial services in 2006 to 62% access in 2013 (making it the highest means of financial access in Kenya). MFS has been of particular advantage to youth because in 2013, 63% of them accessed financial services through phones compared to only 29% who accessed their services through banks. While in 2006 the highest money transfers method was through family/friends (57%), by 2013, 92% of money transfers in the country were done through mobile phones. M-Shwari (a mobile money facility built to extend financial inclusion by integrating savings and borrowing), hit 1 million customers faster than Facebook did. It is estimated that 25 to 43% of Kenya's Gross National Product (GNP) flows through mobile technology. Kenyans sent an average of KShs.118 billion (\$1.4 billion) per month through M-pesa.

Given that the bulk of financial services accessed by youth are transaction related (66%) or savings (59%) related, broadening access to financial services will mobilise greater household savings for youth which enables them to invest in themselves and their families

## 9.3 Poverty, inequality and emergence of middle class

### Proportion of people in SSA living in extreme poverty



**Poverty:** Over the past 20 years, despite the successive global food and financial crises, Africa has maintained a high growth rate. Economic growth (although not the only ingredient) is essential to alleviate poverty, build livelihoods, and improve quality of life. As a result of economic growth, the proportion

of people living in extreme poverty (below the threshold of USD 1.24 per day) has fallen from over 50% in 1981 to less than 45% in 2012 (also see figure 36).<sup>131</sup> While data from household surveys show some improvements in living standards, young people are among the poor cohorts of society for various rea-


sons such as working poverty stemming from the irregularity of work and lack of formal employment and social protection.<sup>132</sup>

Employed youth were 1.5 times more likely to be found in the extreme poverty class than adults and 1.2 times more likely to be in

the moderately poor class.<sup>133</sup> The highest rates of poverty can be observed among young women as well as young people living in rural areas.<sup>134</sup> Although the economic forecasts for Africa are fairly strong, extreme poverty will still remain a challenge in Africa. Given that average GDP performance for Central, East and West Africa will remain between 4% and 7.5%, extreme poverty levels will remain high. Most concerning is the fact that more than 300 million people will still be living on less than USD1.25 a day by

2050 due to population growth.<sup>135</sup> As shown in figure 37, the number of people living in extreme poverty will be highest in West Africa and it will significantly increase in Central Africa, mainly due to the higher proportions of younger populations hence higher dependency ratios than the other regions. Inequality: Sub-Saharan Africa has among the highest levels of inequality, both income and gender, in the world.<sup>136</sup> There is growing evidence that such inequality can impede economic growth, and this is evi-

denced by the fact that in the last 15 years of high growth in sub-Saharan Africa, income inequality has remained broadly unchanged.<sup>137</sup> SSA's progress in reducing poverty will continue to be slow because of high inequalities. Faster reduction in poverty will require growth with equity.<sup>138</sup> It has been estimated that a one percent increase in income levels could result in a 4.3% decline in poverty in countries with very low inequality or as little as a 0.6% decline in poverty in highly unequal countries.<sup>139</sup>



**FIGURE 38:** *Extreme poverty by region between 2010 and 2050*

### Emergence of a middle class

Unfortunately, Africa's middle class is defined as those earning between USD 2 to USD 20 per day, which translates in USD 730 to USD 7300 annually. These figures constitute the working class in countries like USA where their middle class constituted those earning between USD 25,000 and USD 75,000 in 2006. The reference to Africa's middle class is not reflective of the global standards and therefore the narrative that Africa's middle class is rising, paints a false

Most African countries are projected to attain upper middle-income status, thus eliminating extreme forms of poverty.<sup>140</sup> Africa's 'middle class' has grown to some 350 million people (34% of Africa's population), up from 126 million in 1980 (27% of the population). This represents a growth rate of 3.1% in the 'middle class' population from 1980 to 2010 compared with a growth rate of 2.6% in the continent's overall population over the same period. Africa's 'middle class' is projected to continue to grow and reach 1.1 billion (42% of the population) by 2060.<sup>141</sup>

The more affluent lifestyle associated with the middle class has contributed to increased domestic consumption in many African countries. Sales of refrigerators,

television sets, mobile phones, motors, and automobiles have surged in virtually every country in recent years. Consumer spending in Africa, primarily by the 'middle class', has reached an estimated USD 1.3 trillion in 2010 (60% of Africa's GDP) and is projected to double by 2030. As such, the middle class is helping to foster private sector growth in Africa as they offer a key source of effective demand for goods and services supplied by private sector entities.<sup>142</sup>

However, despite having incomes above national poverty lines, the 'middle class' in Africa remains vulnerable. The nature of employment (many work in the informal sector), education (few have university degrees) and consumer behaviour does not coincide with perceptions

of a middle class that will sustain domestic consumption and growth in the future. The social protection systems (which should provide a safety net for this group) fails to reach even half of this population, as coverage rates of informal workers are extremely limited.<sup>143</sup> The vulnerability of Africa's middle class is especially worrying, if those in the middle have precarious incomes and unstable employment, their consumption cannot be counted upon to drive national development, nor can their growth be taken as a sign of social progress. What is more, their political preferences may veer towards populist platforms not necessarily conducive to good economic management.

### **Implications of increased poverty, inequalities and 'middle class'**

The emerging 'middle class' is a critical economic and social actor because of its potential as an engine of growth in sub-Saharan Africa. History tells us that those in the middle vigorously accumulate capital, be it physical (plant, equipment or housing) or human capital (education or health) but are also high consumers. Besides consuming, the social role of a middle class remains equally important. Strong middle classes can effectively influence economic development through more active participation in the political process, expressing support for political programs and electoral platforms, in particular those that promote inclusive growth. The inevitable increase of youth in the labour market needs to be consolidated as an incipient income group that could provide a solid foundation for economic progress and can also contribute to lifting the poor in a society. Reducing income and gender inequalities is also paramount in delivering higher economic growth dividends for the region, which in turn would help alleviate poverty.





# 10. ICT TREND

*Technology penetration in Africa has been growing rapidly and is expected to have massive economic and social impacts, especially on how people live and work. They will create new opportunities as well as disrupt the norm or have negative consequences.*

*In 2017, 10% of global internet users came from Africa compared to 50% in Asia and Pacific, 8.2% in North America, 17% in Europe, 10% in Latin America and the Caribbean's, four percent in middle East and one percent in Oceania / Australia.<sup>144</sup> Mobile phones now facilitate many aspects of development through a combination of voice calls, SMS and mobile applications.*

## 10.1 Mobile ownership

Mobile phone penetration rates are accelerating rapidly in the developing world. Between 2010 and 2015, the growth was 193% making it an 80% penetration rate in 2015 (see table 36). It is projected that by 2020, penetration rates will be at an average of 93%. This is attributed to among other things, new, more

affordable handsets, which are becoming increasingly available. Despite the substantial increase in mobile phone access, the disparity in mobile phone ownership is still there. By the end of 2014, ownership of mobile telephones in SSA was highest in West Africa (47%), followed by East Africa (46%), then

Southern Africa (42%), and lastly, Central Africa and Northern Africa where only one third of its populations own mobile phones. Smart phone penetration is highest in Southern and Western Africa (see table 36)

**TABLE 36:** *Mobile subscription<sup>6</sup> in 2015 and projections to 2020*

Internet Mobile Subscribers	2015	2020
Subscribers (In Millions)	557	725
Penetration Rate		
Africa	46%	54%
North Africa	33%	51%
Central Africa	33%	42%
Southern Africa	42%	50%
West Africa	47%	55%
East Africa	46%	58%
Mobile Phones		
Connections (Millions)	965	1,300
Penetration Rate	80	93
Mobile Broadband Connections	28%	60%
Smartphone Adoption (Millions)	226	720
Smartphone Adoption (%)		

6 EAC has five member states, with a population of 153 million; ECCAS has 10 member states, with a population of 146 million; ECOWAS has 15 member states, with a population of 328 million; SADC has 15 member states, with a population of 295 million



Africa	23%	57%
North Africa		
Central Africa	19%	51%
Southern Africa	24%	57%
West Africa	23%	55%
East Africa	17%	54%

Source: GSMA, 2016<sup>145</sup>

There are wide disparities in mobile penetration in the continent. As shown in table 37, the disparities range from one percent in Eritrea to 83% of the population in Kenya. However, in terms of absolute numbers, Western Sahara has the least mobile penetration of 27,000 people and Nigeria has the highest mobile penetration of 91 million users (which is 48% of the vast population in the country). Table 37 also

shows the phenomenal growth of digital inclusion to the unconnected through internet access between 2000 and 2017 as a result of the mobile economy. It ranges from 755% in Sao Tome & Principe to 1,021,354% in the Democratic Republic of Congo. On average, the sector has expanded internet access in Africa by 8,503%. This fact about increased inclusion is proved by the YMCA survey where 90% of


the respondents said they had access to internet and 84% of them accessed the net through their mobile phones. Other forms/place of accessing the internet included: the cyber (10%), through friends or at home (nine percent), desktop/laptop (14%) and office (nine percent).

Table 37: Mobile and internet user statistics in Africa

AFRICA	Population	Internet Users	Internet Users	Penetration	Internet	Facebook
	(2017 Est.)	31-Dec-00	30-Jun-17	(% Population)	Growth % (2000-2017)	Subscribers (30th June 2017)
Algeria	41,063,753	50,000	18,580,000	45%	37060%	18,000,000
Angola	26,655,513	30,000	5,951,453	22%	19738%	3,800,000
Benin	11,458,611	15,000	1,375,033	12%	9067%	800,000
Botswana	2,343,981	15,000	923,528	39%	6057%	690,000
Burkina Faso	19,173,322	10,000	2,684,265	14%	26743%	600,000
Burundi	11,936,481	3,000	617,116	5%	20471%	450,000
Cabo Verde	533,468	8,000	256,972	48%	3112%	210,000
Cameroon	24,513,689	20,000	6,128,422	25%	24446%	2,100,000
Central African Rep.	5,098,826	1,500	246,432	5%	16329%	66,000
Chad	14,965,482	1,000	748,274	5%	74727%	170,000
Comoros	825,920	1,500	65,578	8%	4272%	60,000
Congo	4,866,243	500	400,000	8%	79900%	400,000
Congo, Dem. Rep.	82,242,685	500	5,107,271	6%	1021354%	2,100,000
Cote d'Ivoire	23,815,886	40,000	6,318,355	27%	15696%	2,400,000
Djibouti	911,382	1,400	180,000	20%	12757%	180,000
Egypt	95,215,102	450,000	37,333,841	39%	8196%	33,000,000
Equatorial Guinea	894,464	500	212,704	24%	42441%	67,000
Eritrea	5,481,906	5,000	71,000	1%	1320%	63,000
Ethiopia	104,344,901	10,000	16,037,811	15%	160278%	4,500,000
Gabon	1,801,232	15,000	865,492	48%	5670%	470,000

Gambia	2,120,418	4,000	392,277	19%	9707%	220,000
Ghana	28,656,723	30,000	9,935,286	35%	33018%	4,000,000
Guinea	13,290,659	8,000	1,302,485	10%	16181%	950,000
Guinea-Bissau	1,932,871	1,500	84,000	4%	5500%	84,000
Kenya	48,466,928	200,000	43,329,434	89%	21565%	6,200,000
Lesotho	2,185,159	4,000	597,860	27%	14847%	290,000
Liberia	4,730,437	500	395,063	8%	78913%	330,000
Libya	6,408,742	10,000	2,800,000	44%	27900%	2,800,000
Madagascar	25,612,972	30,000	1,300,000	5%	4233%	1,300,000
Malawi	18,298,679	15,000	1,758,503	10%	11623%	720,000
Mali	18,689,966	18,800	2,212,450	12%	11668%	1,000,000
Mauritania	4,266,448	5,000	770,000	18%	15300%	770,000
Mauritius	1,281,353	87,000	803,896	63%	824%	630,000
Mayotte (FR)	253,068	n/a	107,940	43%	n/a	56,000
Morocco	35,241,418	100,000	20,535,174	58%	20435%	12,000,000
Mozambique	29,537,914	30,000	5,169,135	18%	17131%	1,400,000
Namibia	2,568,569	30,000	797,027	31%	2557%	520,000
Niger	21,563,607	5,000	931,548	4%	18531%	280,000
Nigeria	191,835,936	200,000	91,598,757	48%	45699%	16,000,000
Reunion (FR)	873,356	130,000	390,000	45%	200%	390,000
Rwanda	12,159,586	5,000	3,724,678	31%	74394%	490,000
Saint Helena (UK)	3,970	n/a	2,000	50%	n/a	2,000
Sao Tome & Principe	198,481	6,500	55,575	28%	755%	38,000
Senegal	16,054,275	40,000	4,119,527	26%	10199%	2,300,000
Seychelles	97,539	6,000	55,119	57%	819%	48,000
Sierra Leone	6,732,899	5,000	792,462	12%	15749%	310,000
Somalia	11,391,962	200	900,000	8%	449900%	900,000
South Africa	55,436,360	2,400,000	29,935,634	54%	1147%	16,000,000
South Sudan	13,096,190	n/a	2,179,963	17%	n/a	180,000
Sudan	42,166,323	30,000	11,806,570	28%	39255%	3,000,000
Swaziland	1,320,356	10,000	436,051	33%	4261%	160,000
Tanzania	56,877,529	115,000	7,394,079	13%	6330%	6,100,000
Togo	7,691,915	100,000	869,956	13%	770%	340,000
Tunisia	11,494,760	100,000	5,848,534	51%	5749%	5,800,000
Uganda	41,652,938	40,000	19,000,000	46%	32458%	2,200,000
Western Sahara	596,021	n/a	27,000	5%	n/a	23,000
Zambia	17,237,931	20,000	5,192,284	30%	25861%	1,400,000
Zimbabwe	16,337,760	50,000	6,722,677	41%	13345%	850,000
TOTAL AFRICA	1,246,504,865	4,514,400	388,376,491	31%	8503%	160,207,000
Rest of World	6,272,524,105	83.40%	3,497,191,128	56%	90%	1,819,496,530
WORLD TOTAL	7,519,028,970	100.00%	3,885,567,619	52%	100%	1,979,703,530

Source: Internet World Stats, 2017



**FIGURE 39:** *Average amount of time youth spent online & favourite social networking sites*

As shown in figure 38, the YMCA survey shows that most youth (83%) in SSA spent 1-5 hours online, while the favourite social networking sites for SSA youth were Facebook and WhatsApp. The most frequent

activities online were chatting with friends (24%), research (22%) and sending/receiving mail (20%). Young people in SSA as shown in figure 39 did more social related activities than economic related

ones such as search for jobs (nine percent), transact (buy or selling something – two percent) or online banking (one percent).

## 10.3 The benefits of the mobile sector

The benefits of the mobile sector are tremendous. In 2015, mobile technologies and services generated 6.7% of Africa's GDP, which amounts to USD150 billion of economic value. By 2020, it is expected to increase to more than USD 210 billion (i.e. 7.6% of GDP). "The mobile ecosystem supported 3.8 million jobs in 2015. This includes workers directly employed in the

ecosystem and jobs indirectly supported by the economic activity generated by the sector. The mobile sector also makes a substantial contribution to the funding of the public sector, with USD17 billion raised in 2015 in the form of general taxation. The number of jobs supported will increase to 4.5 million by 2020, while the tax contribution to public funding will rise

to USD20.5 billion."<sup>146</sup> In 2015, 125 African tech start-ups raised approximately USD 185 million with Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa receiving the bulk of the funding as shown on table 38. More needs to be done to attract investment in the region and enable broader development of the start-up ecosystem because of its tremendous benefits to youth in Africa.

	No. of start ups funded	Total in Million USD
South Africa	45	\$55
Nigeria	30	\$49
Kenya	10	\$47
Tanzania	5	\$25
Egypt	5	\$5
Ghana	8	\$2
Rest of Africa	32	\$2

**Table 38:** Start ups in Africa and corresponding funding

**Source:** GSMA, 2016

### **Influence of ICT on Africa's youth**

Mobile technology is an example of how technology enables communities and even countries to leapfrog in development, shown by the phenomenal increase in mobile penetration in the region and access to internet and broadband.<sup>147</sup> Beyond the potential impact of information technology (IT), there are well-documented economic advantages. According to the Economist in 2009, adding an extra ten mobile phones per 100 people in a developing country boosts growth in GDP per person by 0.8 percentage points. As reiterated earlier, GDP growth, although it does not always result in poverty reduction is necessary for poverty alleviation. Thus, the rapid IT growth reflected in the forecasts will have a positive impact in Africa's economy but most importantly in the lives of youth – to innovate and be gainfully employed. Additionally, the internet and mobile phones have become tools for social transformation – to enhance democracy and improved governance. Amidst various challenges, these have been profoundly instrumental to aid youth activism and participation in elections, government accountability and potentially on the spread of democracy in the continent. Africa has also pioneered many developments in the sector that are benefiting the world such as mobile money. Besides, it is connecting young Africans to the rest of the world through Facebook (see numbers on table 37) and other social media tools.

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# 11. CONCLUSION

An appreciation of the complexity of youth issues and the inherent uncertainty of Africa's future makes it urgent and critical to deduce the implications of future trends in order to comprehensively and strategically anchor policy discussions. By undertaking this project, it is envisaged that Africa Alliance of YMCA's will engage actors in meaningfully deliberating on one of the most confounding issues of our time – a bulging youth population and the resultant effects on Africa's welfare. We also hope that the project will catalyse effective policy conversations and the making of effective real-world decisions that will help us confront the complex realities presented by youth bulges world over





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